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What a difference a few months can bring—and how much stays the same. 
When I sat down in July to write the letter for the August issue (vol. 4, no. 3), 
Syria was still in crisis, Iraq was quickly sliding deeper into crisis, a radical Sunni 
militia calling itself ISIL/ISIS was starting to monopolize the terror headlines, and 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was boiling over into tragedy again. Since then, 
Al Shabaab lost its head, northern Iraq and southeastern Syria were carved into 
what its occupiers are now calling the Islamic State, and the United States and its 
allies have flown their advisors and bombers back into a wicked problem that will 
have global consequences for generations to come. No one seems able to agree 
on whether these changes are actually something new or just a rebranding of the 
same old jihad. Paradoxically, events may promise those tasked with combating 
terrorism far more job security than any of us really wishes for.
It’s easy for the Western allies to obsess over terrorism in the Middle East, but 
other countries are dealing with internal and external terrorism in their own 
ways. I spent a few weeks in India over the summer, meeting with journalists, 
scholars, and military analysts to talk about their research and the subcontinent’s 
terrorist movements. My goal was to invite contributions to CTX, and this issue 
brings you the first fruit of that mission. Dr. Sanchita Bhattacharya leads the 
issue off with an analysis of the political and legal climate in Pakistan that 
allows seemingly unlimited funding to flow to indigenous terrorist groups 
like Lashkar-e-Taiba. Not only do tough-sounding laws go unenforced, she 
observes, but the Pakistani regime itself appears complicit in enabling terrorism 
to flourish.
The next article, by Dr. Chris Harmon and Dr. Paula Holmes-Eber, focuses on 
women who have taken an active role in terrorism. We often forget that, from 
the radical leftist groups of the mid-twentieth century to anti-colonial insurgen-
cies to present-day suicide bombers, some women have proven just as fervent 
as some men when it comes to their embrace of terrorism. We then turn from 
a topic that typically receives too little attention to one that might be receiving 
too much. Dr. Siamak Naficy describes the ways in which a current fascination 
with cultural sensitivity training in military and policy circles can actually 
obscure more than it illuminates. From his perspective as an anthropologist, he 
urges us to reexamine our own cherished assumptions if we hope to understand 
our opponents.
What does it say about a culture that creates annual holidays to honor its war 
dead and its military veterans, but then turns those holidays into just another 
excuse for brass band concerts and outdoor grilling? MAJ Anthony Heisler 
found himself asking this question when a well-meaning civilian wished him a 
“Happy Memorial Day!” His essay is his attempt to find an answer, and perhaps, 
bring change.
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Last June, a group of 40 marksmen from seven countries gathered in Kazakhstan for the fifth annual “Golden Owl” 
international competition for sniper teams. MAJ Tlek Mirza and LT Ruslan Bek describe the competition, which took 
place over the course of several days in daunting weather conditions. The article is illustrated with a number of nice images 
of the event taken by photojournalist Samat Kazhymov. 
For the CTAP interview,  Amina Kator-Mubarez and I spoke with LTC Chok Dhakal of the Nepalese Army. LTC Dhakal 
spoke frankly about the difficulties the Royal Nepal Army (as it was then known) faced in confronting Maoist insurgents 
over the course of a bloody 12-year civil war. Although the years of fighting severely strained the country’s military, LTC 
Dhakal remains optimistic about the future of civil-military relations in republican Nepal. 
Ethicist George Lober offers an unsettling rumination on the moral dilemmas military personnel in particular must 
confront “when dealing with the truly diabolical.” Where, he asks, would you draw the line between honoring the rule of 
law and engaging in extrajudicial killing when innocent lives are clearly at stake?
Next, Indian journalist Malladi Rama Rao reviews a book by terrorism experts Surinder Kumar Sharma and Anshuman 
Behera, Militant Groups in South Asia (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2014). And last, but not least, in a think piece about 
the purposes of movies, LTC Samuel Bettwy wonders whether American filmmakers are wasting an opportunity to 
positively influence Muslim audiences by collaborating with their Middle Eastern counterparts—something European 
filmmakers have already begun to do.
Don’t forget to check out the latest monographs from the Joint Special Operations University in our Publications An-
nouncements, and as always, I hope you will drop me a line and let me know what you think about CTX: CTXeditor@
GlobalECCO.org. You can also like Global ECCO on Facebook to receive news updates on topics of interest to the CT 
community. 
Finally, please take a moment to fill out the four brief questions in our customer survey, so we can get a sense of how to 
better serve our community—that’s you: https://survey.nps.edu/576694/lang-en
ELIZABETH SKINNER
Managing Editor, CTX 
CTXEditor@globalecco.org
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First Lieutenant Ruslan Bek works as a reporter in the Mass Media 
department of the Ministry of Defense (MoD), Republic of Kazakh-
stan. After finishing his university degree, he became a sergeant in the 
Army Airborne Forces before turning to journalism. LT Bek’s goals are 
to tell the world about the work being done by the Army of Kazakhstan 
and to promote peaceful international relations.
Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Samuel W. Bettwy recently retired from 
the Judge Advocate General’s Corps of the US Army Reserve after 
serving for 28 years, most recently as the deputy judge advocate for the 
79th Sustainment Support Command in Los Alamitos, California. He 
has also served as an attorney for the US Department of Justice since 
1986. LTC Bettwy currently teaches Comparative Criminal Procedure 
through Film at Thomas Jefferson School of Law in San Diego, Cali-
fornia. His course textbook will be published in the next issue of Opinio 
Juris in Comparatione. 
Dr. Sanchita Bhattacharya is presently a research associate with 
the Institute for Conflict Management in New Delhi, India. She 
successfully defended her PhD dissertation, Madrasa Education in 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh: A Comparative Study, at the School 
of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. She 
writes frequently on the subject of political Islam, and her articles have 
been published by journals including the East Asia Forum, Outlook 
India, and New Age Islam.
Lieutenant Colonel Chok Bahadur Dhakal has served in the Nepalese 
Army since 1990. He was an independent company commander and 
battalion commander in insurgent-affected areas during the Maoist in-
surgency in Nepal (1996–2008). He has served on the Chief of the Army 
staff and as an instructor in the Army Academy and the Army Command 
and Staff College, among other posts, and on UN peacekeeping missions 
in Croatia, Lebanon, and the Ivory Coast. LTC Dhakal holds three 
MA degrees: in Strategic Studies (Nepal), Defense Studies (UK), and 
National Security Affairs (US). 
Dr. Christopher C. Harmon currently serves on the faculty of the 
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii. He first 
published on terrorism in 1982 and has taught in related programs in a 
half-dozen civilian and military graduate schools. From 2010 to 2014, 
Dr. Harmon served as the Horner Chair of Military Theory at the US 
Marine Corps University. Dr. Harmon is the author or editor of five 
books, including two editions of Terrorism Today (Routledge, 2000, 
2007) and Toward a Grand Strategy against Terrorism (McGraw-Hill, 
2010). He serves on the editorial board of Terrorism & Political Violence.
Major Anthony F. Heisler is a US Army Special Forces officer who has 
served as a fire support officer and platoon leader with the 4th Infantry 
Division in Iraq, and as the detachment commander of a Special Forces 
Operational Detachment-Alpha during two deployments to Afghani-
stan. He also has extensive operational experience working with NATO 
partners in Europe and in Afghanistan. MAJ Heisler holds degrees in 
history and in German language and literature from George Wash-
ington University and is currently pursuing an MS in Defense Analysis 
at the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, California.  
Dr. Paula Holmes-Eber, an anthropologist and specialist on Middle 
Eastern and North African cultures, has published extensively on 
the cultural aspects of war and conflict. Her books include Culture 
in Conflict: Irregular Wars, Culture Policy, and the Marine Corps 
(Stanford Security Studies, 2014), Operational Culture for the War-
fighter: Principles and Applications, 2nd ed. (Marine Corps University 
Press, 2011), and Daughters of Tunis: Women, Family, and Networks in a 
Muslim City (Westview Press, 2002). Dr. Holmes-Eber earned her PhD 
in cultural anthropology from Northwestern University.
George Lober guides US and international military students through 
the tricky terrain of ethics and critical thinking at NPS. He earned his 
BA and MA in English from the California State University system, and 
has published in the journals Eclectic Literary Forum and Red Wheel-
barrow. Mr. Lober became interested in the study of ethics in 1998 
through a reacquaintance with both philosophy and critical thinking, 
and joined the faculty of NPS in 1999.
Major Tlek Mirza is the chief of staff in the Mass Media department 
of the MoD, Republic of Kazakhstan. Previously, he served as an officer 
in the Army Airborne Forces and took part in a 2006 peacekeeping 
mission in Iraq.
Dr. Siamak Naficy is a senior lecturer in Defense Analysis at NPS. He 
earned his PhD in anthropology from the University of California, Los 
Angeles. As an evolutionary scientist, his interests include cultural an-
thropology, evolutionary biology, and cognitive and social psychology. 
His research focuses on social intelligence and social preferences, 
including the ways in which socio-cultural and evolutionary processes 
shape human adaptive features, especially those that produce identity, 
within-group favoritism, and between-group conflict.
Malladi Rama Rao is a New Delhi–based analyst and writer on Indian 
politics and South Asian geopolitical and security issues. He edits 
the South Asian Tribune, is managing editor of the Policy Research 
Group (POREG), and co-directs Syndicate Features Service with his 
wife, Vaniram Rao. Mr. Rao began his journalism career reporting and 
editing for All India Radio (AIR), and won the Best Radio Correspon-
dent of the Year award in 1994. He is presently translating Lord Meher, a 
20-volume life story of Meher Baba, into Telugu, an Indian language.
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Pakistan: Money for Terror
Dr. Sanchita Bhattacharya,  
Institute for Conflict Management
The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
broadly defined the term financing of terrorism as “the financial support, in any 
form, of terrorism or of those who encourage, plan or engage in it.”1 The need 
to track the sources of funding for terrorism was realized as far back as 1986, 
when the United Nations’ General Assembly drafted the first UN Convention 
against Recruitment, Use, Finance, and Training of Mercenaries. This conven-
tion was adopted on 4 December 1989. Furthermore, in 1994 the UN General 
Assembly called attention to the growing connection between drug traffickers 
and mercenaries. In light of these resolutions, the International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly on 9 December 1999.2
The state of Pakistan has, unfortunately, been at the vortex of various forms of 
terrorism and insurgent activities for several decades. The country is internally 
crippled by terrorism and the vast flows of funds to violent extremist groups that 
operate within its borders, even as the danger from this domestic infrastructure 
of terrorism percolates to other parts of the region and the world. Pakistan-
based terrorist groups use a range of instrumentalities to raise finances, which 
include, among other things the manipulation of hawala (an informal system of 
money transfer), abuse of the charitable sector, narco-finance, and abduction for 
ransom. Raising money from criminal activities has long been a forte of militant 
organizations in Pakistan, and the Taliban are not loath to utilize these same 
methods. Ostensibly, such activities in a dar-ul-harb 3 (a war zone) are perceived 
to be legal under Qur’anic law.4 Worse, Pakistan’s state institutions are deeply 
complicit in a wide range of terror finance operations, prominently including 
the printing and distribution of counterfeit Indian rupees, as well as long-term 
involvement in drug running to facilitate the operations of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan.5 The attitude of Pakistan’s government toward terror groups could 
be described as dualistic. On the one hand, terrorists are criminalized by law; on 
the other hand, the Pakistani government provides them with both logistical and 
financial support.6
A River Is Made of Many Small Streams
Terrorism is a syndicate-based activity, requiring huge amounts of financial 
support. The sustenance and training of cadres in various militant outfits and 
insurgent groups depend on a steady flow of funding. Moreover, in Pakistan, 
like in other developing countries, people often take up militant activities as a 
full-time profession, one that includes a salary structure. 
The following section describes in more detail five of the primary means that 
terrorist groups have of generating funding: hawala, narcotics trafficking, 
abduction for ransom, charity, and resource exploitation. 
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Alongside its perfectly legitimate 
function as an efficient 
means of remittance, hawala 
facilitates money laundering.
Hawala
The word hawala comes from the Arabic root h-w-l, which has the basic meanings 
“to change” or “to transform,” and is defined as a bill of exchange or a promissory 
note.7 Hawala is an efficient value transfer system that has endured across un-
stable regions and throughout many civilizations.8 It is widely believed that the 
hawala system emerged during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries to facilitate 
trade along the famous Silk Road.9 Alongside its perfectly legitimate function 
as an efficient means of remittance, hawala facilitates money laundering in three 
stages: (1) discreetly introducing criminals’ funds into the financial system, 
(2) manipulating those funds so that they cannot easily be traced and thus ap-
pear legitimate, and (3) making the “clean” funds available for further use.10
People have used this traditional informal and often unregulated money transfer 
system not only in Pakistan, but throughout South Asia. A similar form of 
money transfer is also associated with ethnic groups from Africa and the rest of 
Asia.11 According to the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan’s web-
site, hawala is an alternative system that operates parallel to traditional banking 
channels.12 It is distinguished from other remittance systems by the level of trust 
it entails, and its extensive use of connections such as family relationships or 
regional affiliations. Transfers of money take place based on communications 
between members of a network of hawaladars, who function as intermediaries.13 
Hawala works by transferring money without actually moving it, requires no 
bank accounts, and is consummated without leaving a paper trail. 
Terrorist groups and criminal gangs have thoroughly infiltrated the hawala 
system in order to transfer funds for their activities, especially from the Middle 
East to Pakistan, and to other parts of the Indian subcontinent. Militant 
organizations in Pakistan have tended to depend heavily on the informal hawala 
system, thus bypassing governmental scrutiny or accountability.14 One of the 
most well-established terror cohorts, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and its front group 
Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), are infamous for siphoning terror money. The group col-
lects “donations” from overseas Pakistani communities in the Persian Gulf and 
in countries such as the United Kingdom. Following a post-9/11 crackdown by 
President Pervez Musharraf to eliminate terror groups, a move the Indian press 
dismissed as mere “eyewash,” the LeT-JuD black money continued to move via 
the hawala network of Pakistan. Unfortunately, the state’s actions in dealing with 
terror funding remained inadequate.15
Because the banking system is not widespread in Pakistan, hawala fills the gap for 
both licit and illicit transactions. There are only 26 million bank account holders 
in Pakistan out of a population of 170 million. Banks are not readily available, 
particularly in rural areas where most of the population resides, so this popula-
tion uses hawala for its ease and ubiquity. Hawala is also used for the payment 
of smuggled goods and for merchants to pay below invoice for imported goods. 
These transactions evade custom duty, thus depriving the government of revenue 
from duties and taxes.16
Hawala networks typically do not maintain a large central business office for 
settling transactions. Instead, a loose association of hawaladars conducts business 
with each other, typically without any formal or legally binding agreements. 
Hawaladars often keep few formal records; those that do exist are usually 
handwritten in idiosyncratic shorthand and are typically destroyed once the 
Banks are not readily available, 
particularly in rural areas where 
most of the population resides, 
so this population uses hawala 
for its ease and ubiquity.
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transaction is completed. Hawala became particularly important for al Qaeda 
after the August 1998 East Africa bombings increased worldwide scrutiny of the 
formal financial system.17 Reportedly, Osama bin Laden turned to an established 
hawala network operating in Pakistan and Dubai and throughout the Middle 
East to transfer funds efficiently.18
The Pakistan-Afghanistan border area, especially Pakistan’s border provinces of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 
is ethnically contiguous and highly porous, which is to the advantage of the 
various militant groups that channel funds using hawala networks. The money 
market at Chowk Yadgar in Peshawar, the capital city of KP, is heavily populated 
by Afghan hawaladars. Furthermore, the autonomous nature of the region makes 
it even easier to transfer goods and money with impunity.19
In a March 2012 report citing Executive Order 13,224, the US Department of 
the Treasury designated two hawala companies working in the border region 
as Specially Designated Global Terrorists: Haji Khairullah Haji Satar Money 
Exchange (HKHS) and the Roshan Money Exchange (RMX).20 Both HKHS and 
RMX have been used by the Taliban to facilitate money transfers. Abdul Satar 
Abdul Manan and Khairullah Barakzai Khudai Nazar co-own and jointly 
operate the HKHS throughout Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Dubai, and manage 
an HKHS branch in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. In 2011, a senior 
Taliban member withdrew hundreds of thousands of dollars from an RMX 
branch in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region to distribute to Taliban 
shadow provincial governors.21
More recently, on 21 August 2014, the United States targeted the financial and 
leadership networks of the Taliban by officially designating one entity and two 
individuals as terrorists. The Pakistan-based hawala group Haji Basir and Zarjmil 
Company (aka Basir Zarjmil Hawala) and its owner Haji Abdul Basir were given 
this designation for providing financial services or other support to the Taliban 
in Afghanistan, according to the US Department of the Treasury. The Treasury 
Department also designated Taliban commander Qari Rahmat for acting for 
or on behalf of the Taliban, and claimed that the Quetta-based branch of Basir 
Zarjmil Hawala distributes money to Taliban members in Afghanistan as well.22
Following 9/11, then-Finance Minister of Pakistan Shaukut Aziz, a former execu-
tive vice president of Citibank in New York, said that $2 billion to $5 billion 
moved through the hawala system annually in Pakistan, more than the amount 
of foreign transfers through the country’s banking system.23 Moreover, a 2002 
report on financial terrorism noted that government officials in Pakistan also es-
timated that $7 billion entered the country each year through hawala; the actual 
volume is likely to be significantly higher.24 In June 2004, the State Bank of Paki-
stan required all hawaladars to register as authorized foreign exchange dealers 
and to meet minimum capital requirements.25 Despite the initiative, unlicensed 
hawaladars still operate illegally in parts of the country (particularly in Peshawar 
and Karachi), and authorities have taken little action to identify non-registered 
hawaladars or enforce the regulations prohibiting them. On 22 November 2012, 
the US Department of the Treasury designated a hawala firm, Rahat Ltd., along 
with its owner Mohammed Qasim and the manager of its branch in Quetta (the 
provincial capital of Balochistan), Musa Kalim, as financers and money laun-
derers for the Taliban. The firm has branches in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, 
which “have been used by the Taliban to facilitate their illicit financial activities,” 
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the Treasury Department disclosed.26 The press release also mentioned, “This 
includes facilitating millions of dollars of transactions to support the Taliban 
shadow governor for Helmand Province, UN Security Council 1988-Listed Naim 
Barich, who was also designated November 15, 2012, pursuant to the Foreign 
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act for his extensive narcotics production and 
distribution activities.” 27
The “trust factor” that is such a vital aspect of the hawala system is well exploited 
by those hawala agents who deal in illicit money transfers. The easy availability 
and accessibility of these dealers have made Pakistan’s hawala network stable and 
resilient. The situation is further complicated because common people without 
any links to terrorists also prefer hawala to banks; hawala is quick and avoids the 
difficult, tedious, and more expensive process of legal remittance.
Narco-finance
Narco-finance has been another vital element of terrorist funding. Pakistan, 
along with Iran and Afghanistan, constitute the Golden Crescent, one of the 
world’s biggest drug-producing regions. Afghanistan produces 90 percent of the 
global supply of opium, from which heroin is processed, and roughly 40 percent 
of Afghan opium is smuggled through Pakistan.28 Because the opium trade 
remains a major source of financing for the jihad led by the Taliban and al Qaeda 
in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, and also for the “holy” cause of defeating the 
Western “crusaders” and returning Afghanistan to an Islamic government, the 
struggle itself has been characterized as “narco-jihad.” 29
The so-called “golden route” that runs from Afghanistan through Pakistan and 
into Iran, from where the Golden Crescent’s narcotics reach Western markets, 
has become established as one of the world’s most lucrative illicit drug thorough-
fares.30 According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
2013 Report, global trafficking routes and seizure data in Pakistan indicate that 
the major trafficking routes run from Afghanistan through the western Pakistani 
provinces of KP and Balochistan into Iran in the west, and south to Pakistan’s 
coastal cities, including the ports of Karachi and Qasim in Sindh Province.31 The 
Iranian route passes through Balochistan into the northwestern region of Iran, 
which is inhabited by Kurds (al Qaeda financier Yasin al-Suri is Kurdish), and fi-
nally into laboratories in Turkey, where the opium is processed into heroin.32 Of 
the 11 Afghan provinces bordering Pakistan, only four (Khost, Paktika, Nuristan, 
and Paktiya) were either declared poppy-free or estimated to have cultivated less 
than 100 hectares of poppy in 2012. In November 2013, Rehman Malik, Paki-
stan’s former Interior Minister, also confirmed that Pakistan is a major transit 
route for Afghan opiates: according to him, nearly 160 metric tons of heroin, 
or 44 percent of total Afghan heroin production, transits through Pakistan’s 
territory. “It is estimated that in 2010, the total number of drug users in Pakistan 
reached about 8.1 million; they are abusing opium and heroin, including intrave-
nously, and hashish, among other things,” Malik said on 12 November 2013.33
Moreover, according to the UNODC, Pakistan itself has over 1,000 hectares of 
poppy cultivation, concentrated in the restive FATA on the border with Afghani-
stan. Most Pakistani poppy cultivation apparently takes place in FATA, including 
its Khyber Agency, Dir, and Bannu, and in non-traditional areas including 
Orakzai, Kurram, and the North and South Waziristan Agencies, along with 
KP and Balochistan. Cannabis is also produced in large quantities in the border 
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provinces, although most of the cannabis trafficked in the region originates from 
Afghanistan and is then processed for distribution in the inaccessible areas of 
Pakistan’s FATA region.34
It has been reported that the opium that goes through Pakistan is carried in from 
Afghanistan on trucks that are owned by the Pakistani Army’s Fauji Foundation, 
which means the trucks are never checked at the border by customs officers.35
The narcotics trade through Pakistan has principally been used for funding 
terrorism. General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who ruled Pakistan under a military 
junta from 1978 to 1988, encouraged the cultivation of poppy and cannabis 
during his regime to finance terrorist activities in India. General Zia’s support 
for the cultivation of narcotic crops gave a new dimension to both international 
drug trafficking and terrorism in India, but in the process he failed to anticipate 
its repercussions on Pakistan. Heroin addiction spread like an epidemic during 
his martial administration, while drug traffickers operated freely and within a 
short span of time, had organized themselves into syndicates along the same lines 
as the Latin American drug cartels. Pakistani political figures such as Lieutenant 
General Fazle Haque, Haji Iqbal Beg, Sohail But, Shaukat Ali Bhatti, and Malik 
Waris Khan Afridi, among others, gained notoriety and political importance 
thanks to funds generated by narcotics trafficking.36 Eventually, drug mafias 
established contacts within the government at both the political and administra-
tive levels.37
The Regional Ministerial Conference on Counter-Narcotics, held in Islamabad 
in November 2012, noted that the government needed to do more to explore 
and address the link between illicit drug production, trafficking and terrorist 
financing. The Conference participants also agreed on the need to strengthen 
international cooperation concerning possible links between illicit drug traf-
ficking, illicit production of narcotic drugs, and drug-related financing of 
terrorism.
In a way, Pakistan serves as the nerve center of the Afghan heroin networks, a 
key node in the trafficking of opiates from production to markets in Europe, 
Asia, and the Americas. For strategic reasons, Pakistan has long considered 
Afghanistan to be its “backyard,” a regressive mindset that has caused harm to 
Pakistan itself as it becomes both the primary transit route and a destination 
for Afghan narcotics. Crafting a workable response to Afghan heroin requires 
significant counter-narcotics and governance capacity-building within Pakistan, 
as well as in Afghanistan.38
Abduction for Ransom
Abduction for ransom is an important tactic used by various terrorist groups 
for the dual purposes of generating money and spreading terror. In the volatile 
atmosphere of contemporary Pakistan, abduction for ransom has achieved a 
significant level of notoriety and is affecting not only common people but also 
the country’s elites. The actual abductions are often outsourced to criminal gangs 
that supply arms and money to terrorist groups in both Pakistan and Afghani-
stan. Prominent terror groups like the Haqqani network, Quetta Shura Taliban, 
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Tawheedul Islam (a pro-government militia), 
and Baloch insurgents and other armed gangs are very much involved in abduc-
tion and ransom to fund their activities. 
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Between 2000 and 2010, official data showed a 153 percent increase in kidnaping/ 
abduction. Police in Balochistan reported that kidnaping for ransom (many 
incidents of which are never reported to the police) was a growing problem 
in the province. The cause is a complex mix of profit-seeking, rivalry between 
groups engaged in smuggling, and fundraising for terrorist activities. 
Reports indicate that all of Pakistan’s provinces are now under attack from 
armed abductors, with women and children being the easiest targets, along with 
foreigners and members of the Shi’a minority. Data collated from Criminal 
Statistics of Sindh Province suggest that, between 2003 and 2012, a total of 12,311 
cases of “kidnapping for abduction” and 933 cases of “kidnapping for ransom” 
were recorded in the province.39 The lack of official sincerity about dealing with 
the problem is evident in the fact that, apart from Sindh, no chronological data 
regarding abduction in other Pakistani provinces are available on the official 
websites of the respective provincial police.40
Pakistani police estimate that kidnaping is now the single largest source of 
revenue for the Taliban factions located in Pakistan. The Taliban’s main targets 
are wealthy businessmen, aid workers, and journalists.41 A report from the 
Canadian-based insurance brokerage Burns and Wilcox titled Kidnap and 
Ransom: Global Overview suggests that the risk is high for businessmen, 
corporate executives, wealthy people (and their families), foreigners, aid workers 
(especially in health services), and diplomats. Moreover, cases of extortion have 
spread, mainly in Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, and other major cities of Punjab 
and Sindh Provinces, but also in high-risk areas with militant activity such as 
Peshawar in KP, Quetta in Balochistan, and the FATA.42
Apart from the above-mentioned high-risk groups, certain religious minori-
ties—especially Shi’as and Ahmadis—also face the brunt of abduction. In 
one such incident, in November 2013, TTP’s local militants in Faisalabad had 
allegedly been assigned the task of kidnaping members of the Shi’a and Ahmadi 
communities to ransom for fundraising. The five alleged TTP terrorists—Usman 
Ghani alias Talha of Jameel Town, Ghulam Mohammadabad, Ali Azam alias 
Farooq of Razabad, Mubashar Nadeem alias Bao of Chak Jhumra, Usman of 
Lahore, and Shahzad Ali of Gurunanakpura—were captured by police and 
presented to the media at a press conference on 5 November 2013. Media sources 
said the plan to kidnap members of the two communities was approved after 
an “edict” in favor of such kidnapings for ransom was issued by an unidentified 
cleric. According to the sources, the militants told their investigators that they 
would raise funds for terrorist activities by looting the houses of Shi’a commu-
nity members and stealing phone company cables. They also confessed that they 
would send a part of their ill-gotten money to their group leader, Qari Imran, in 
Miranshah, North Waziristan.43
Kidnaping is a centuries-old scourge in parts of Pakistan, from the tribesmen 
who snatched British colonists in the nineteenth century to the slum gangs that 
have preyed on Karachi business families since the 1980s. Moreover, the Paki-
stani Taliban are unapologetic. “We are targeting foreigners in reaction to gov-
ernment demands that we expel the foreign mujahedeen,” said the deputy leader 
of the Pakistani Taliban, Waliur-Rehman, during an interview at his North 
Waziristan stronghold. Ransom demands typically range between $500,000 
and $2.2 million, although the final price is often one-tenth of the initial asking 
amount. The kidnapers’ methods are sophisticated: surveillance of targets that 
can last for months; sedative injections to subdue victims after abduction; video 
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demands via Skype; and the use of different gangs, who often operate with little 
knowledge of one another, for different tasks.44
In a country where the government itself has not been successful in dealing 
with terrorist organizations and their illegal activities, abduction seems to be 
the easiest way to generate “fast money.” In the atypical domestic atmosphere of 
Pakistan, militants enjoy legal impunity to a large extent. Moreover, abduction 
threats or actual abduction do not leave much scope for the victims but to pay 
the ransom amount, out of either fear or compulsion.
Zakat, Ushr, Fitrana, and Charitable Organizations
Islam as a religion emphasizes charity, community, and a humane element through 
various activities. The egalitarian outlook of the religion also encourages pros-
perous members of society to donate a portion of their riches for the benefit of 
the deprived. Unfortunately, like other tenets of Islam, however, the virtue of 
charity has been widely exploited, and the common people of Pakistan are often 
misled into donating to militant organizations like LeT and JuD that hide behind 
religious piety. Terrorist groups in Pakistan even use Eid (religious festivals) to 
connect with people and take advantage of their religious sentiment. Govern-
ment authorities make little or no effort to stop such transactions, despite the 
fact that donations to terrorists are officially banned.45
Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen, led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, and Jammat-ul-
Furqan, led by Maulana Abdullah Shah Mazhar, two banned militant outfits 
linked to the TTP and al Qaeda, have set themselves up as charities under the 
new names Ansar-ul-Umma and Tehreek-e-Ghalba Islam, as an easy way to get 
more funds.46 These organizations take advantage of the generosity of Pakistani 
Muslims, who annually contribute billions of rupees as part of zakat (an Islamic 
tithe) and fitrana/fitra, a gift of food or money paid on Eid-al-Fitr, the festival 
that marks the end of Ramadan.47 The funds are utilized for dawa (preaching), 
khidmat-e-khalq (provision of social services), and jihad, including recruitment 
and training, and the procurement of equipment and weapons. 
Like al Qaeda and the Taliban, JuD has used social media to collect funds.48 
In June 2012, for instance, JuD sent messages on Twitter and Facebook asking 
Muslims across the world to donate zakat and fitra during Ramadan. JuD also 
harvests significant revenues from gathering and selling the hides of animals 
slaughtered during the holy festival of Eid al-Adha. In November 2010, Yahya 
Mujahid, the spokesperson for JuD, conceded that, under the banner of the LeT-
affiliated NGO Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation (FIF), JuD had set up seven camps for 
collecting the hides of sacrificial animals in Islamabad and ten such camps in the 
adjacent city of Rawalpindi (both in Punjab Province). 
The problem with Pakistan’s counterterrorism practices lies in the fact that Paki-
stan’s government can appear duplicitous when it comes to controlling terrorists. 
The Pakistan Muslim League–led Punjab state government continues to provide 
financial support to JuD for “welfare” activities; the state budget for the fiscal 
year (FY) 2013–14 included a grant-in-aid of 61.35 million Pakistani rupees (PKR) 
(a little over $600,000) for the administration of the group’s training camp, 
Markaz-e-Taiba. The budget also included an allocation of PKR 350 million for 
a students’ knowledge park at Muridkey and various other development initia-
tives across Punjab.49 Earlier, in FY 2009–10, the Pakistani federal government 
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provided more than PKR 80.2 million for the administration of JuD facilities. In 
FY 2010–11, two separate grants of PKR 79.8 million were given to six organiza-
tions at Markaz-e-Taiba, and a special grant-in-aid of PKR 3 million was awarded 
to JuD’s Al-Dawa School system in seven districts of Punjab. In addition to these 
funding streams, JuD’s “Farmers and Labor” wing is responsible for the collection 
of ushr (an Islamic land tax).50
While the state collects zakat under the 1980 Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, and 
other benign charities are working in the field, there is strong evidence to sug-
gest that proscribed militant outfits set up religious charities and manipulate 
information about their true identity to collect zakat throughout Pakistan. 
The realization that there is a potential for terror financing via zakat is the 
main reason that, in 2012, the Interior Ministry of Pakistan began requiring 
social welfare organizations collecting zakat to formally apply for state permis-
sion before beginning any fund-raising activity.51
Moreover, militants do not seem loath to exploit natural calamities to generate 
funds for themselves. Militant-linked charities often enjoy a spike in donations 
after natural disasters. Following the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir and KP, the 
Taliban-linked Al-Rasheed Trust (ART) reportedly raised $10.1 million in five 
months, while Al-Rehmat Trust, a charity associated with Jaish-e-Mohammed 
(JeM), raised $6.4 million according to a 2009 report on funding of Pakistani 
militant organizations published by the Islamabad-based Pak Institute for Peace 
Studies.52
Fundraising in the garb of charitable trusts is another principal source of money 
for terror outfits. For instance, one notorious trust, Al Akhtar, an offshoot of 
the terrorist group JeM, has been designated by the US Treasury Department 
as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) since 2003 and by the UN since 
2005. Moreover, Al Akhtar Trust has been operating under a multiplicity of 
other identities, including the Pakistan Relief Foundation, Pakistani Relief 
Foundation, Azmat-e-Pakistan Trust, and Azmat Pakistan Trust. Saud Memon, 
a financier of Al Akhtar Trust, was found to be involved in the kidnaping and 
murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl.53 Al Rasheed Trust (ART) 
also deserves mention in this context; it was listed by the US Treasury Depart-
ment as an FTO on 23 September 2001 and by the UN on 6 October 2001. ART 
was known to be supporting jihadi activities in Chechnya, Kosovo, Afghanistan, 
and the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir under the leadership of Mufti Mo-
hammad Rashid. It also worked under the identities of Al Amin Welfare Trust, 
Al Amin Trust, Al Ameen Trust, and Al Madina Trust. ART was further linked 
to LeT, JeM, al Qaeda, and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, among others. Later, by the end of 
2001, it had merged with Al Akhtar Trust.54
The Saudi angle to such underhanded activities is manifest in the example of 
Al-Haramain Foundation (Pakistan), a branch of the Saudi Arabia–based Al-
Haramain Islamic Foundation founded by Aqeel Abdulaziz Aqeel al-Aqeel. This 
“charitable organization,” which is also associated with Maktab al-Khidamat, an 
organization financed by Osama bin Laden, was listed by the UN on 26 January 
2004 “as being associated with Al-Qaida or the Taliban for ‘participating in 
financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, 
in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of ’ Al-Qaida.”55
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The Taliban are also generating money from the timber trade and gem mining 
in the Swat area. Large-scale illegal cutting of the region’s pine forests began 
simultaneously with the 2007 Taliban offensive in the area. In addition, Taliban 
militants have been involved in the widespread logging of the thick pine forests 
and apple orchards of Malam Jabba, Fatehpur, Miandam, and Lalko, often in 
collusion with criminal syndicates. Emerald mining and the international sale 
of gemstones such as pink topaz, peridot, aquamarine, and tourmaline through 
various channels provide much-needed capital for the Taliban to capture other 
natural resources in the region. There are also reports that archaeological sites in 
the area are being looted, with the Taliban likely taking a cut of the proceeds.56
The Pakistani intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), runs an Indian 
currency counterfeiting network that is another source of finance for Pakistan’s 
terrorist networks, and unconfirmed reports suggest ISI operatives are involved 
in heroin smuggling from Afghanistan through Pakistani seaports.57 The ISI 
Directorate, which was formed at independence in 1947, received backing 
from the US Central Intelligence Agency during its anti-Soviet campaigns in 
Afghanistan following the 1979 invasion. As a result, the ISI came to control 
enormous—often unaccounted—financial resources, which it used to execute 
a range of sustained 
covert operations, 
including the creation 
and support of terrorist 
groups, across the 
South Asian neighbor-
hood. Media reports 
indicate that ISI consists 
of four “wings”: A-
Wing directs analysis 
and is the bureaucratic 
department; T-Wing 
is the technical section 
and provides assistance 
to the other wings; 
C-Wing conducts 
counterintelligence; 
and S-Wing reportedly oversees “external security” and is responsible for the 
state’s sponsorship of various terrorist formations, including al Qaeda, the 
Taliban, and a number of jihadi groups that specifically target India.58
Legal Measures to Control Terror Financing
Within a short span of three weeks prior to winding up their term in March 
2013, both the Senate (upper house) and National Assembly (lower house) of 
Pakistan’s parliament passed Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Bill 2013, which 
deals in particular with offenses related to the financing of terrorism. The 
bill, which the National Assembly passed unanimously on 20 February and a 
majority in the Senate passed on 5 March, empowers government authorities 
to take action against elements involved in financing terrorism in the country, 
and provides for, among other things, the confiscation of properties owned 
by those involved in such activities. This latest bill is an update of the earlier 
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Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Bill 2010 introduced in the Senate, which 
proposed amendments to the existing Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) 1997. The 2010 
bill, however, stayed in the Senate Standing Committee on the Interior, and was 
reportedly withdrawn in 2012 for reasons that remain unknown.
Clearly, there is an urgent need for a strong law to check terror-finance in Pakistan. 
ATA 1997 had been engineered against the backdrop of the political situation of 
the 1990s. After 9/11, however, the situation changed dramatically for the worse. 
Accordingly, there is a much more urgent need to provide augmented powers to 
the police and other investigating agencies for the monitoring and surveillance 
of persons, financial transactions, and money flows in connection with terrorism. 
The objective of the 2013 bill is to “strengthen the provision concerning the 
offences of terrorism financing and to provide more effective enforcement 
measures against such offences.”59 It also expands the scope of the definition of 
money in the context of terrorist finance to include “coins or notes in any cur-
rency, postal orders, money orders, bank credits, bank accounts, letter of credit, 
travellers cheques, bank cheques, bankers’ draft in any form, electronic, digital 
or otherwise and such other kinds of monetary instruments or documents as the 
Federal Government may by order specify.” The definition of property includes 
“corporal or incorporeal, moveable or immoveable, tangible or intangible and 
includes shares, securities, bonds and deeds or interest in property of any kind 
or money.” These are all worthwhile measures. In light of the strong anecdotal 
evidence concerning Pakistan’s many financial channels to support terrorism, 
an empirical investigation has potentially significant and widespread policy 
implications.60 But so far the bill stays on paper—due to strong opposition, it 
had not been signed as of this writing and thus isn’t being enforced.
The Pakistani state’s enduring legacy of harboring and supporting 
terrorism, however, casts doubt on the efficacy of Anti-Terrorism 
(Amendment) Bill 2013, even if or when it receives presidential 
approval. Pakistan’s covert policy of sponsoring terrorist formations as 
instruments of state policy can never be reconciled with any legisla-
tion that seeks to curb terrorism. The 2013 bill is, at best, a face-saving 
device to counter mounting pressure from the international com-
munity. Pakistan’s geostrategic ambitions will play a decisive role in 
undermining the efficacy of the provisions of the bill with respect to 
the control of terrorism financing.
External Pressure on Pakistan
The possibility of UN sanctions on Pakistan for failing to comply with 
the standards of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is likely to 
have fueled the development of Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Bill 
2013.61 The first concrete step on terrorist financing taken by the UN, 
in October 1999, was the adoption of UNSCR 1267.62 In this resolu-
tion, the UN Security Council called on Afghanistan’s Taliban regime 
to turn over Osama bin Laden without further delay because of his 
indictment in the United States for the bombings of the US embassies 
in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. It also called on all member states to 
freeze the funds and other financial resources of the Taliban and al 
Qaeda, and any associated entities and individuals.63
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It is apparent that the world’s awareness regarding terror finance was amplified 
as one result of 9/11. At that time, the US government undertook tactical actions 
to disrupt individual nodes in the terrorist financial network and strategic 
initiatives to change the environment within which terrorists raise and move 
their funds.64 Pakistan was first publicly identified by the FATF in February 2008 
for deficiencies in its anti–money laundering/counterterrorist financing (AML/
CTF) regime.65 In October 2011, the FATF pressed Islamabad to amend ATA 1997 
to include the freezing of assets and other stern action on charges of terrorist 
financing by 12 February 2012. When it missed the deadline, Pakistan was 
immediately blacklisted by the FATF. Later, in June 2012, the FATF reiterated that 
laws on terrorism financing and anti–money laundering in Pakistan either did 
not exist or were ineffective. Furthermore, in October 2012, the FATF included 
Pakistan in its official Public Statement, underlining continuing deficiencies in 
Pakistan’s AML/CTF regime.66
What Islamabad Has Accomplished
Media reports in October 2012 suggested that a few token steps were taken by 
the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) to check possible financing of terrorist activi-
ties, and that it had frozen 128 bank accounts and seized over PKR 750 million. 
Earlier, in 2010, the SBP had developed the Anti-Money Laundering Act,67 which 
also established a Financial Monitoring Unit to monitor suspicious financial 
transactions.68 In keeping with the trend of recent years, on 22 July 2012, au-
thorities imposed a nationwide ban on zakat and fitrana collections by banned 
organizations during Ramadan. “Any social and welfare organisation willing to 
collect zakat and fitrana has to apply and acquire permission from the govern-
ment; otherwise, no one will be allowed to indulge in these activities,” Rehman 
Malik, senior advisor to Prime Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf for internal affairs, 
said on the day the ban was announced.69
To provide an ownership structure in Pakistan for remittance facilitation, SBP, 
the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis launched a 
joint initiative called the Pakistan Remittance Initiative (PRI) in April 2009. The 
goal of this initiative was to both facilitate and support the efficient flow of re-
mittances and help to provide investment opportunities in Pakistan for overseas 
Pakistanis.70 So far, unfortunately, the initiative has not been very effective at 
undercutting informal financial networks. Earlier, according to the International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Vol. 2, SBP and Pakistan’s customs agency 
had set up jointly staffed counters at international airports to monitor the 
transportation of foreign currency.71 In furtherance of the “official commitment” 
of 2007, Pakistani authorities made a number of significant cash seizures at the 
international airports in Karachi (the provincial capital of Sindh), Lahore (the 
provincial capital of Punjab), and Peshawar (the provincial capital of KP), as well 
as at various land border crossings.
Conclusion
The latest UN Human Development Index puts Pakistan in the Low Human De-
velopment range, with a ranking of 146 out of 187 countries.72 This should come 
as no surprise given the situation in Pakistan, where the majority of resources 
and finances go to either the accounts of the country’s elites or the coffers of 
terror groups. As a result, the rest of the country languishes in a vicious cycle of 
never-ending poverty and deprivation, while the vast resources at the disposal of 
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insurgents and militants are used against the people themselves. In the end, the 
country is suffering from a man-made epidemic of violence and hatred, fueled by 
the various channels of illegal finance.
What is more, Pakistan’s inability to control terrorist activities within its borders 
damages its international reputation. The world’s leading financial standards 
body, the FATF, declared in June 2013 that Pakistan and 11 other countries have 
failed to make sufficient progress in preventing money laundering and terrorist 
financing.73 This complex web of illegal financial transactions needs to be taken 
seriously. Pakistan must restrict and disown regional terror activities—the 
country itself is internally crippled, and its people are among the worst victims 
of terrorist violence. It may be that, in terms of regulating terror, Pakistan has 
reached a point of no return where violent extremists can simply outshout the 
few remaining voices of reason. v
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Women in Terrorist Undergrounds
Dr. Christopher C. Harmon, Asia-
Pacific Center for Security Studies, 
and Dr. Paula Holmes-Eber
Even in the twenty-first century, many of us retain the sense 
that women are the gentler sex, the nurturers, and the protectors.1 But modern 
militancy is dangerously misunderstood unless the counterterrorism and intel-
ligence communities confront the fact that females have been and are fighting in 
the ranks, and are even taking a leadership role in some groups. Today’s insurgen-
cies and small terrorist groups include numerous women; they may command, 
execute, plan, handle logistics, write or translate publications, prepare false travel 
documents, manage safe houses, reconnoiter in advance of attacks, or do the 
shooting or bomb placement. Women are full participants in contemporary 
terrorism, yet this is not adequately recognized in the analytic community, in 
part because al Qaeda Central has been an all-male cohort. But this general 
misapprehension must not persist. What we don’t know can kill us. 
Does anyone remember Kim Hyun Hee? She is a former child model who ap-
peared in North Korean propaganda films and a terrorist who later declared that 
she was acting under orders from Kim Jong-Il, the son of North Korea’s long-
time dictator, when she helped place a bomb on a South Korean airliner in 1987. 
All 115 people aboard died in this act, which was aimed to discourage attendance 
at Seoul’s 1988 Summer Olympics. Kim’s role in this drama was to play “grand-
daughter” to a much older man, a professional North Korean spy. Their pairing 
removed suspicion. So, perhaps, did the beauty of this former actress, since 
many people believe that a beautiful woman is unlikely to be violent, let alone 
a terrorist. Unlike the older agent, Kim could not swallow her cyanide tablet as 
captors closed in. She lived, found herself showered with marriage proposals, 
wrote an autobiography, and still lives in celebrity in South Korea.2 “The only 
thing I can say is that I am sorry,” she confesses in frequent media appearances. 
North Korea had selected a female agent who could deploy beauty and acting 
ability to “disarm” security personnel. Modern insurgent and terrorist under-
grounds well understand the potential of female operatives and fighters to 
effectively carry out their cause. In some environments—such as Latin America 
insurgencies or the Nepalese Maoist uprising of the late 1990s—girls and women 
have become common in varied fighting roles. And they are effective. Several 
female members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) helped sink 
over half a dozen Sri Lankan naval vessels in LTTE’s long separatist campaign. 
“We find that they are more fierce than the men,” reflected a two-star general of 
Sri Lanka’s army as he looked back on personal experiences against women in the 
LTTE ground combat forces.3
In this article, we explore cases from across the globe that illustrate the many 
roles that women have played within terrorist groups, as well as their motivations 
for participation. Our goal is not to review, or debate with, the contemporary 
academic literature on female terrorism, but to expand general understanding 
of the phenomenon by examining cases of terrorists often forgotten by this 
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 Terrorist crime annals have 
logged the pregnant suicide 
bomber, the motherly safe 
house manager, and the 
secretive cyber-propagandist.
same contemporary literature. Our cases are drawn from a worldwide survey of 
newspaper reports, court documents, memoirs by terrorists, public interviews, 
and biographical accounts of female terrorists since 1900. Playing on social 
stereotypes of women as passive, nurturing, and nonviolent, the women in 
these organizations often use their traditional roles to avoid detection. Terrorist 
crime annals have logged the pregnant suicide bomber, the motherly safe house 
manager, the secretive cyber-propagandist whose postings emerge from the 
anonymity of the World Wide Web, the skillful but silent translator of explosive 
“jihadist” screeds, and the “helpless” widow who runs money as an international 
terrorist financier. 
The motives of such women are also in contrast to popular beliefs. Many volun-
tarily join terrorist groups. Very often, their motivations are similar to those of 
the men: politics, psychology, power, religion, glamour, adventure. Terrorism 
also appears to offer women opportunities to break out of the limitations of 
their gender roles in society. Familial and romantic ties may also play roles, as 
illustrated in certain cases examined in the following sections. 
Leaders
Lolita Lebrón was a flamboyant woman whose action helped set the tone for a 
violent Puerto Rican separatist campaign in the United States. In 1950, President 
Truman’s temporary residence in Washington, DC, was attacked by two male 
gunmen from Puerto Rico.4 On 1 March 1954, Lebrón assembled her team of 
four, took a train south from New York City to Washington, DC, and entered 
the Capitol and the visitor’s gallery overlooking the floor of the House of Repre-
sentatives. Suddenly, the activists unfurled a banner calling for independence of 
the Commonwealth from the United States, shouted “Puerto Rico libre!” and 
began sustained firing with pistols they had smuggled past guards. By the time 
the foursome were wrestled to the floor, five congressmen were wounded (one 
nearly died). 
Lebrón’s dramatic image probably redoubled whatever publicity the Puerto Rican 
separatist movement might have garnered from the attack. The Washington Post, 
still fascinated by her a half-century later, ran a magazine cover story on her life 
titled “When Terror Wore Lipstick.” 5 Prison did not dim Lebrón’s aspirations for 
the independence movement. She never apologized for attempted murder but 
instead “celebrated” each anniversary of the armed action until her death on 
1 August 2010. Some saw her as a hero of political nationalism. Her fan club must 
have included later generations of Puerto Rican terrorists, such as the Fuerzas 
Armadas de Liberación Nacional and Los Macheteros, organizations that 
deployed many women in varied roles, including as shooters and bomb carriers. 
Bernardine Dohrn set a similar tone on US campuses in 1969 and 1970. The 
organization Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was losing influence to 
extremists ready to use terror, especially the SDS faction called the Weathermen, 
to which Dohrn belonged. Robberies and the bombing of prominent buildings 
were hallmarks of this group of several hundred members, about half of whom 
were women. In 1970 the group, forced into hiding, renamed itself the Weather 
Underground. Dohrn’s flaming rhetoric and flaunted sensuality made her a 
spectacle on a stage with a microphone; her political intelligence and cool head 
made her an adept leader. She shared leadership duties with another prominent 
Weatherman, Billy Ayers, whom she would later marry. Many other women in 





the Weather Underground fought in the open or worked at 
length below the surface. Second-tier leader Diana Oughton 
died in a basement along with two others when her group made 
a misstep while building dynamite bombs.6 
Gudrun Ensslin was one of the troika leading the Red Army 
Faction (RAF) in Germany at about the same time that the 
Weather Underground was operating. She was also the intimate 
partner of co-leader Andreas Baader; to his recklessness and 
love of action, she added calculation and ideological serious-
ness. Both were aggressive and domineering types. They 
mistreated the third, more introverted leader, a woman named 
Ulrike Meinhof, who was a well-known journalist before 
turning terrorist. Meinhof was the last to join the threesome 
and the first to commit suicide in jail; Ensslin and Baader later 
followed her example. While alive, Meinhof added incompa-
rably to the leaders’ joint labors at public image-making, an 
activity that lies at the very heart of terrorism. Her impressive 
work gave the “Baader-Meinhof Gang” its informal label. Since 
he had so few ideas of value, Baader is today of little interest to 
scholars, while Meinhof is the subject of new studies.7 
Another female terrorist leader was Fusako Shigenobu, who 
emerged in the top spot of the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and 
served there from the 1970s until 2000. The JRA included a 
number of women who participated in its activities alongside the men.8 The 
group’s ideology was Marxist-Leninist, and its members’ passion for “communist 
internationalism” prompted the group to liaise with the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The JRA’s attacks included the May 1972 massacre 
of travelers at Lod Airport, Israel, where, ironically, the dead included many 
Puerto Rican Christians deplaning for tourism and worship in the Holy Land. 
Shigenobu worked from Beirut at times, and her cadre often enjoyed safe haven 
in North Korea. Shigenobu’s long run from the law ended with her arrest in 
Osaka, and she has spent the last decade and a half in Japanese custody.9 
No current international terrorist group is known to be directed by a woman, 
but at least two women have served as effective leaders in recent years. The 
Uganda-based Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is not fully the creation of the 
infamous Joseph Kony; it grew from an armed spiritual movement founded in 
the 1980s by Alice Lakwena, thought to be Kony’s aunt.10 She developed the 
perverse ideas of the organization by twisting together the biblical Ten Com-
mandments with certain indigenous spiritual concepts and personal embellish-
ments. The result was a cult that grew by way of guerrilla war, mass theft, terror 
attacks on villages, and the kidnaping and forcible enlistment of child soldiers. A 
number of women have held positions of authority in the LRA, although because 
these terrorists are being hunted by a multinational force of soldiers, the group’s 
current disposition is unclear. 
The fascinating second case of a woman in a leadership role is Maryam Rajavi, a 
metallurgical engineer–turned–terror boss. In the early 1970s, Rajavi joined the 
People’s Mujahedin-e Khalq, or MEK, a largely secular group of Iranian dis-
sidents led by her husband Massoud Rajavi. Maryam was Massoud’s second wife. 
They developed capacities at guerrilla war and terrorism originally in support 
Gudrun Ensslin in the film Das Abonnement
Ulrike Meinhof
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of, and then in opposition to, the regime of Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini; the 
Iraqi state later donated tanks and other conventional arms to the group. When 
Massoud disappeared after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Maryam carried on 
their enterprise. Presumably directed from the dual headquarters in the Seine 
valley of France and Camp Ashraf in Iraq, this disciplined and mysterious group 
continued its violent attacks, aimed especially at Iran’s civilian and military 
leaders and the Iranian public.11 In 2004, after the MEK faction in Iraq disarmed 
and was confined to Camp Ashraf, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
designated the group “protected persons,” a status they kept until Iraq regained 
sovereignty in 2009.12 Maryam grew into an adept politician, cultivating Euro-
pean parliamentarians, noted barristers, and the global media. When her travel 
was blocked by anti-terror sanctions, she made political broadcasts by satellite. In 
recent years, oversized ads seeking the removal of MEK from the US Department 
of State’s foreign terrorist group list appeared in various US media. Several public 
figures, including some who had held important counterterrorism roles, signed 
these ads in support. The publicity campaign succeeded: in late September 2012, 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton removed Maryam Rajavi and her “People’s 
Mujahedin” from the US terrorism list.
Lethal Actors 
There are a number of instances of women acting both alongside men and in 
specialized roles in insurgencies and terrorist organizations throughout the 
twentieth century. This section details a few of the noteworthy occurrences.
The Battle of Algiers (1956–1957)
A French intelligence officer who took a direct and reprehensible role in the 
Battle of Algiers published his memoir and some remarkable photos before he 
died in 2013.13 One picture in this collection shows four Algerian girls—Zohra 
Drif, Hassiba Ben Bouali, Djamila Bouhired, and Samia Lakhdari—who had 
been recruited by Fronte de Libération Nationale (FLN) terrorist Yacef Saadi to 
plant bombs in public places in Algiers, Algeria’s capital. Saadi and his female 
team blew apart fellow Algerians; colones (French nationals) who had settled 
in the country decades earlier; security forces from France; and others unlucky 
enough to go near popular expatriate nightclubs, dance halls, and cafes such as 
the Milk-Bar. Drif (who, after the revolution, would open a perfume shop), 
Bouali, Bouhired, and Lakhdari were selected by Saadi for calculated reasons: he 
knew their European appearance (light skin or hair, fashionable dress) and 
their prettiness would allow them easy passage through security cordons in the 
capital. The four enjoyed their roles in the FLN’s nationalist revolution—one 
memorable photo of them posturing with guns is full of grins. But playfulness 
was half the package, and part of the disguise: the women were supremely 
effective as bomb couriers.
During the war, Dr. Frantz Fanon, a gifted foreigner who served the FLN as a 
propagandist and medical doctor, wrote with admiration of the spirit, cleverness, 
and resilience of women in the underground. He declared that, as Algerians 
found themselves in a state of “total war” with France, leaders of the FLN could 
“no longer exclude certain forms of combat” and “had no choice but to adopt 
forms of terror which until then it had rejected.” 14 This meant the mass murder 
of civilians, Algerian as well as European. It also meant recruiting women as 
operatives. Female insurgents smuggled hand grenades or plastique bombs in 
Maryam Rajavi, 2006
 Left to right: Samia Lakhdari, Zohra Drif, 
Djamila Bouhired, Hassiba Ben Bouali
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their handbags; they carried messages and battle plans within their clothes; they 
stood outside safe houses, managing to be inconspicuous while watching for 
signs that the leaders huddled within could be under French surveillance. All of 
this female engagement gripped the psychoanalyst and student of human nature 
within Fanon, who wrote a number of books and essays detailing his ideas and 
observations. In one movement, he imagined the liberation of Algerian women 
from social confines, the personal growth of women matured by fighting for 
political freedom, and the satisfaction one might take in fooling an occupier or 
killing a tyrant. 
Ireland’s Troubles (1968–1998)
Western European terrorist organizations saw these qualities in women as well. 
In the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA), armed 
women were a minority, 
but a long-standing and 
active minority. In 1988, 
when a British Special 
Air Service team secretly 
deployed to Gibraltar and 
shot a three-person IRA 
team connected with a 
car bomb plot intended 
for a British target, one 
of those they killed was a 
woman, Mairead Farrell. 
The young Farrell had 
participated in a hotel 
bombing near Belfast in 
1976. She served 10 years 
in jail but emerged no 
less revolutionary and 
continued to operate 
until she and her two 
cadres died on the British 
“Rock” guarding the 
gateway to the Mediter-
ranean.15 She was neither 
the first Irish woman nor 
the last to wield a bomb. Two sisters were jailed for the IRA bombing of the Old 
Bailey courthouse in London in 1973: Dolours Price, who died in January 2013, 
said she and her sister were under orders from Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams 
(now a member of Parliament in the Republic of Ireland, or Eire). Two unrelated 
IRA women, Donna McGuire and Maria McGuire, spent years in confinement 
because of their participation in bomb plots at British bases on the European 
continent.16 
During interviews with Irish militants in Belfast in 1972, reporter Martin 
Dillon met a woman known by the alias Eileen, who was a long-time director of 
armed street fights against British soldiers. Dillon reported one street fight with 
awe: First he was impressed by watching an IRA man with a Thompson subma-
chine gun angling for fighting positions. Then he found out that this fellow was 
Belfast mural depicting Mairead Farrell and two of her IRA colleagues
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just one member of a group of men under the tactical command of Eileen, who 
also served her fighters tea and sandwiches from her home. Many a terrorist safe 
house has been managed by a clever woman, but here was a fighters’ command 
post, based in a family home and run by the woman of the house. Years later, 
while still reporting, Dillon met Eileen’s daughter, who had also joined the 
IRA women’s section.17 An early twentieth-century publication by a “women’s 
wing” of the IRA called Cumann na mBan (Irish Gaelic for “Republican flag”) 
reveals photos of uniformed and armed women, some of whom participated in 
shootouts. It appears that Cumann na mBan later lost its official character and 
was folded into the larger Provisional IRA organization. At present, one almost 
never hears the name.
The Palestinian Cause (1948–present)
Women have also played prominent roles in the classic, high-profile terrorist act 
of airline hijacking. The first known female hijacker was Leila Khaled, who was 
the perfect icon of Palestinian oppression after the creation of Israel in 1948: as a 
child, her family had lost its possessions in a Palestinian area appropriated by the 
nascent state of Israel. Khaled was so devoted to the Palestinian cause that when 
her face, noted for its beauty, became too famous after she participated in the hi-
jacking of Trans World Airlines Flight 840 in 1969, she had it altered in secret by 
a plastic surgeon so that she could qualify for a second hijacking mission. Khaled 
was a prized operative of the PFLP sub-commander Wadi Haddad. She thus met 
Venezuelan terrorist Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, known as Carlos the Jackal, and was 
friends with Fusako Shigenobu, the Lebanon-based leader of the JRA. Khaled’s 
iconic image, along with her autobiography, struck political gold for her cause.18 
Leila Khaled is one of a hundred reasons that a Palestinian statelet was eventu-
ally constructed in the West Bank and Gaza. 
Carlos the Jackal worked for the Palestinian cause with women on his operation 
teams. In December 1975, he employed Gabriele Kröcher-Tiedemann of the 
West German anarchist organization 2 June Movement. She had served jail time 
for terrorism, was freed in a deal that involved the release of kidnap victims, and 
joined Carlos.19 During an opera-
tion in Vienna, she shot down an 
Austrian policeman and an Iraqi 
guard. Another good example is 
Magdalena Kopp. An expert dark-
room technician and a member of 
the German terrorist group Revo-
lutionary Cells, Kopp made false 
documents for the Carlos group. 
She became increasingly involved, 
fell in love with Carlos, bore him a 
daughter, and ultimately married 
him in 1991. Kopp told an inter-
viewer that “I dreamt of having a 
normal family with Carlos,” but he 
was arrested in 1994 and currently 
lives in a Paris jail. Carlos also 
married his French attorney, yet 
he still sends cards to his daughter, 
via Magdalena, including one on 
As Carlos the Jackal believes, 
“women … are the other 




International Women’s Day, because, as Carlos believes, “women … are the other 
side of the revolution.” 20
The PFLP often used a woman on its teams. One woman—her identity is still 
unclear—was on the team that, in 1976, seized a passenger airliner flying out of 
Athens and directed it to Entebbe, Uganda; Israeli commandos soon arrived to 
shoot all the terrorists and save the hostages. That same year, Fighters for Free 
Croatia included a woman among the hijackers who grabbed an airliner in US 
skies. Notably, hostages in these hijackings offered testimonials about the special 
venom of the females on the hijacking teams vis-à-vis the male hijackers. The 
women’s behavior may have been calculated to further the hostages’ disorienta-
tion, but it certainly also worked to heighten the general terror. 
Leftists in the United States and Europe (1965–1985)
Women have proven themselves ready to kill in terrorist situations, not just to 
add to the political theater. Kathy Boudin, the daughter of a lawyer famed for 
his leftist activism, was an integral part of the Weather Underground. After that 
group declined, she and certain other members—mostly women—created the 
May 19th Communist Organization and briefly conducted joint operations with 
the Black Liberation Army in the northeastern United States.21 May 19th was 
involved in bank robberies and several gun battles with police, and Boudin was 
eventually convicted of a role in a multiple shooting. Fierce in her politics, like 
Chinese Communist revolutionary Mao Zedong, she acted in the conviction 
that power flows from the barrel of a gun. 
In Germany, too, the violent left included women who were well prepared for 
shoot-outs with authorities—enough so that one German official offered the 
famous advice to police forces that, if confronted in the moment by multiple 
armed terrorists, they should “shoot the women terrorists first.” 22 The RAF’s plan 
to free their leader Andreas Baader from prison was conceived and directed by 
female RAF members. RAF leader Ulrike Meinhof, still an active journalist at the 
time, posed as a social scientist and won a supervised interview with Baader in a 
light-security room. Several RAF women along with one man were the shooters 
that day. The operation succeeded and led to the RAF’s most active and violent 
period in its life span. 
Latin American Terrorists (1964–2012)
Many women form the ranks of combat infantry in the modern insurgencies 
that regularly use terrorism. Such all-purpose cadres are especially innumerable 
in Latin American insurgencies, such as Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), 
the Columbian National Liberation Army. As many as 10 women took part in 
the 19th of April Movement (M-19) guerrilla group’s assault at the Palace of Justice 
building in Bogotá, Colombia, in November 1985. Over three dozen M-19 mem-
bers participated in the attack, and some 120 people died in the ensuing shoot-
outs with security forces, including 11 supreme court justices. Girls and women 
of assorted ages make up between one-fifth and one-third of the insurgent group 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Recent books offering 
first-person accounts by former hostages held by the FARC make it seem that near-
equality exists in the infantry, where boys and girls, and men and women, carry 
weapons and manage leadership roles with little attention to their sex. 
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Teenage girls with automatic rifles were part of the team that the Peruvian Túpac 
Amaru (MRTA) terrorist group used in the five-month-long hostage-taking of 
Lima’s Japanese diplomatic residence between December 1996 and April 1997. 
The teenagers died along with the rest of the dozen-man team when commandos 
eventually retook the building.
Asia’s Insurgencies (1965–present)
Several violent movements based on the Maoist model, such as the Cambodian 
Khmer Rouge, included girls and women alongside males in their fighting 
organizations. In Nepal’s recent civil war (1996–2008), the Nepalese Maoist 
insurgents included women in their ranks. One muscular account of female rev-
olutionaries, Women Fighters of Liberation Tigers, was written by Adele Ann Bal-
asingham.23 She was the Australian wife of British citizen Anton Balasingham, 
LTTE’s best-known diplomat, who ran an office in London that collected funds 
and publicized the cause of Tamil separatism from Sri Lanka. The 40-page 
booklet provides historical background for the female formations, narrative 
about their introduction into combat in 1986, and accounts of infantry fighting, 
survival, and heroism. The opening page promises that Tigresses have “earned an 
international reputation as the most fierce, highly disciplined and courageous” of 
female combatants. Note is made of the special units for anti-tank and antiair-
craft operations, and war with heavy weapons, as well as the more obvious roles 
in which females have served guerrilla forces in so many countries: “In the field 
of medics, communication, intelligence work, etc.,” there had been “constant 
expansion and growth.” This development of women under arms would surely 
continue, declared Balasingham, because LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran 
“views the successful induction of women into the armed struggle as one of his 
major achievements,” and he promoted “the holistic development of the women 
fighters, as a part of his vision of women’s path to liberation.” 24 
Myriad Roles for Women in Terrorist Organizations
In recent years it has become less unusual for women to strap themselves with ex-
plosives and blow themselves up in public places. While there is a long tradition 
of lethal actors among women, however, women are more often used for, and 
have proven adept at, the many kinds of nonlethal duties that define the success 
or failure of long-term underground organizational life. These roles include car-
rying messages and packages, analytical intelligence work, spying, bookkeeping 
and financial organization, and managing logistics for large and small units.
Suicide for the Cause
Although the female hijackers of older decades broke new ground in the area of 
women’s participation in terrorism, what captures contemporary imaginations 
is the phenomenon of suicide terrorism. It appears that the first female suicide 
terrorists of the modern era were in Lebanon.25 From 1982 through 1985, Leba-
nese, French, and US interests were repeatedly ravaged by suicide bombings—the 
most deadly being vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, most often driven 
by men. Soon enough, Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK) militants in Turkey—male and female—were using the suicide bomb 
tactic, which also continued in the Middle East. Now it is well-established that 
female suicide bombers may “perform” for, horrify, and, to their way of thinking, 
instruct varied and global audiences. 
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Written in the late 1980s, the Charter of Hamas bore no suggestion that Muslim 
women should be killers at all, let alone suicide bombers. But Palestinian organiza-
tions debated about the use of women in terrorism, and some of these groups 
eventually abandoned their religious and normative reservations. Hamas and its 
rival organization Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade have each used women. Reem Riyashi 
of Gaza City, the first female suicide attacker for Hamas, will be long remembered 
for her propaganda poster: she stands with a rifle under one arm and a small child 
in the other arm, both wearing the classic green-and-white Hamas headband.26 
Chechen insurgent factions have often deployed female suicide bombers, known 
as “black widows,” in their attacks. At the infamous takeover of a Moscow 
theater in October 2002, 19 members of the 40-plus–person Chechen terrorist 
team, most of whom were strapped with explosives, were women. Almost 
miraculously, none of these human bombs self-detonated before they were all 
overcome by gas pumped into the building by the Russian authorities.27 There 
were so many terrorists with bombs, and they were so well-provided with explo-
sives, that sympathetic detonations might have killed all of the approximately 
one thousand people in the building.
Covert Operations, Intelligence, and Reconnaissance
Intelligence work often begins with being unsuspicious and coolly capable in 
public. Related to personal relations skills, it may include a capacity for getting 
to know people while simultaneously protecting one’s true identity and real mo-
tives. Women who have excelled at this are celebrated by nearly every country’s 
formal intelligence service, and so it is no surprise that many a non-state actress 
has been adept in this way. In the Algerian FLN’s fight with France, the most 
skilled of recruits included Fatima Benosmane, described as “very cultured and 
perfectly trilingual” in Kabyle, Arabic, and French. She was both a professional 
radio announcer and a communist, but she turned toward the FLN nationalists 
while keeping up her reporting—a perfect profession for a covert asset because 
it places one closest to fresh open-source information and the resources to assess 
its veracity. Benosmane was eventually arrested and tortured; when released, she 
returned to the militant underground. More recent examples of female intel-
ligence assets can be found in Sendero Luminoso, a Maoist guerrilla insurgent 
organization in Peru, which used women working as housecleaners to discover 
the inner secrets of important people who were potential targets. 
Individuals who serve as couriers are often chosen because they do not look like 
the more “typical” actors in a militant organization. This fact should affect our 
convictions about airport and other security (e.g., “30-ish Arab-looking men 
must be searched,” or “It is outrageous to bother a grandmother with a search.”). 
No one is looked upon more generously, by women and men alike, as the preg-
nant woman—which is why gravid women (and imitators with appropriately 
shaped disguises) have been used by terrorist gangs. This matter of appearances 
also helps explain the use of women as “drug mules.” A law enforcement officer 
told one of the co-authors about the interrogation of a prominent figure in a 
successful interstate drug-running gang composed of African-Americans. The 
trafficker disclosed to police that “types” like him did not move the drugs; the 
organization selected white, well-dressed “businesswomen” to be couriers.28 
Decades ago, Doris Katz, amateur diplomat and smuggler, “placed her ‘Aryan’ 
features and British passport at the disposal of the Irgun Zvai Leumi,” the Zionist 
Sendero Luminoso, a Maoist 
guerrilla insurgent organization 
in Peru, used women 
working as housecleaners to 
discover the inner secrets 
of important people.
Reem Riyashi stands with a 
rifle under one arm and a 
small child in the other arm; 
both wear the classic green-
and-white Hamas headband.
A “black widow” (left) pictured in a 
Russian TV capture during the Nord-Ost 
siege at Moscow’s Dubrovka theater
28
CTX | Vol. 4, No. 4
terror and resistance organization led by Menachem Begin. Her role was to help 
move large sums of its money between Geneva, Stockholm, Paris, London, and 
Palestine, and she told her life story in her 1953 memoir, The Lady Was a Ter-
rorist.29 Her testament lends credence to a recent French film, Outside the Law, a 
rare depiction of FLN overseas operations during the Algerian war from 1954 to 
1962. The Paris-based FLN support unit is depicted as collecting masses of money 
and using it to buy European arms for use back in Algeria. In the film’s story, the 
FLN operator is careful to choose a classy blonde society woman of sympathetic 
views to do the courier work of running his cash to Switzerland.
Support
Finding and running safe houses for a clandestine movement or group is one of 
the more technical, essential, and unrewarded of terrorist tasks, and it has often 
fallen to women. In some cultures, at least, mature women appear very natural 
in the role of running a large “family” home. They shop and prepare meals for 
varying numbers of operatives in hiding, or even for those in the field. These 
women naturally control the ingress and egress of visitors from the house, and 
can meet or confront authorities or unexpected visitors at the door. When a 
clandestine guest requires health care, a woman well known in the community 
can bring in a sympathetic, discreet doctor. An Algerian mother of five named 
Oukhiti became famous for the skills she showed in hiding senior FLN decision 
makers in her home. More recently, in the 1980s, New Yorker Lori Berenson, a 
passionate radical—perhaps a fanatic, if her courtroom performance is any indi-
cator—went to Peru on a journalist’s credentials and became enmeshed with the 
MRTA, a radical leftist terrorist organization with a strong presence in Lima. She 
opened her house to the MRTA unit planning a major operation in the capital 
building. Berenson was eventually arrested, served years in jail, and remains in 
Peru on probation. 
Financial support is a key logistical asset to a terrorist organization, and some 
women have excelled in such roles. In the RAF in Germany, Gudrun Ensslin 
often handled the group’s money, while Ulrike Meinhof would choose the safe 
houses. While many terrorist gangs may live hand-to-mouth, or depend on 
the latest bank robbery or foreign state donation, Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo cult 
deserves notice for the orderly and successful ways it pursued business. Aum 
companies created and sold computers and software, and also operated noodle 
shops. Recruits entering the cult had to hand over their personal assets. Shoko 
Asahara, the man who set himself up as a mystic and the group’s tyrannical 
spiritual leader, was a yoga teacher who made money from his many yoga studios 
and wrote his own line of books and magazines. Some investigators believe that 
Aum’s land and other assets were worth as much as one billion US dollars by the 
time of Aum Shinrikyo’s collapse in 1995 after the cult’s sarin gas attack on the 
Tokyo subway system. 
Many women, including Hisako Ishii, joined Aum Shinrikyo, a hierarchical 
organization in which some women had considerable authority. Ishii had been 
an office worker in the insurance field prior to joining the group and helped 
Asahara manage the group’s money and possessions. Those included everything 
from a one-time conference hall rental inside the Kremlin, to a ranch in Aus-
tralia, to a Russian military helicopter. When Asahara grew ambitious enough to 
imagine taking over the governing of Japan (after destroying its liberal republic), 
he told Ishii she would be the minister of finance, a dream that ended with the 
mass arrests that broke up Aum in 1995.30 
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Weapons development is another role that some women have embraced, despite 
the field’s domination by males. When an IRA cell called the Boston Three was 
arrested in the United States while developing a shoulder-fired missile, analysts 
paid little attention to the fact that one of the underground engineers was Chris-
tine Reid of California. Her contribution is briefly noted in a few IRA memoirs 
and obscure newspaper stories.31 
Al Qaeda leaders tried for years to buy a nuclear weapon, failing at all turns. 
The group had voluntary support from Aafia Saddiqui, a woman who held a 
scientific degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a PhD in 
neuroscience from Brandeis University. She served as a courier and financier for 
al Qaeda. When she was arrested, it became evident that she was engaged in pro-
fessional investigations into weapons of mass destruction. During her arrest in 
Afghanistan, she leapt to seize a soldier’s loaded weapon and fired on Americans 
in the room. She was wounded and subdued while screaming, “Allahu Akbar!” 
Bioweapons research is enticing to global terrorists who want to inflict mass 
casualties. While the handling and weaponizing of these living media are 
difficult—and dangerous—the Rajneesh cult demonstrated that it can be 
done. Under the spiritual guidance of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, this group was 
active in a rural part of the US state of Oregon from 1981 to 1985. A business-
woman called Ma Anand Sheela, who was Rajneesh’s chief administrator, and 
a nurse practitioner named Ma Anand Puja (whom some members reportedly 
referred to as “Dr. Mengele”) led a bioweapon development project based on 
the potentially deadly salmonella bacterium.32 Their goal was to prevent voters 
from coming to the polls in a local election, so that Rajneesh’s followers could 
take political control of the small town of Antelope. Cult members infected a 
number of salad bars and other locations in area restaurants with a fluid concen-
tration of salmonella and succeeded in sickening more than 170 people (none 
died). The plot failed, and Puja and Sheela were among the women and men 
arrested. This bio-attack has proven to be a one-of-a-kind terrorist incident that 
relied on basic science. But the two women at the top of the equation remind us 
of the misleading nature of the stereotype that all terrorists will be male. 
Motivations for Terrorism
In 2004, a militant Islamist cell called the Hofstad group murdered Dutch 
filmmaker Theo van Gogh, whom the group considered to be a political enemy. 
After Dutch police and intelligence services arrested the Hofstad group, inves-
tigations uncovered the presence and involvement of a large circle of women 
who were the siblings, wives, daughters, friends, or lovers of the male defendants. 
Journalists Janny Groen and Annieke Kranenberg, who interviewed the circle of 
women around Hofstad for months, found that although the women apparently 
did not do the actual killing, they were deeply involved in the group for reasons 
that were similar to those of the men. These Dutch women, who wore veils when 
attending the trials of their male counterparts, talked voluminously with the two 
journalists, saying they did so as a form of outreach, of religious “struggle.” 
Showing “extreme dedication” to religious study, the women were also followers 
and propagators of violent jihadist literature. They carried and reproduced 
pamphlets, and sometimes served as translators because they knew Arabic, 
English, and/or Dutch. They listened avidly to extremist audiotapes and read 
long, violent tracts that circulated as e-mail attachments. They expressed their 
passion, and desire for justice and revenge, freely in chat rooms and on websites 
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where their sex was no obstacle. The then-director of Holland’s General Intel-
ligence and Security Service called the internet the “turbo engine of the jihad 
movement,” and it became clear that these Dutch women—more than Dutch 
men—were its cyber-accelerators.33 
Generally, the evidence indicates that women join terrorist movements and 
insurgencies for many of the same reasons that men do. There is, above all, 
the sense of new prospects in a future one has helped to shape—a vision that 
combines idealism, hope, and the rebelliousness that many young people feel and 
vent in either political or nonpolitical ways.34 In 1959, Dr. Frantz Fanon wrote an 
essay called “Algeria Unveiled” about the women in the FLN, whom he portrayed 
as being moved, like the men, by revolutionary spirit. These women rebels 
displayed special fervor because the rebellion opened up access to social and po-
litical roles that Algeria’s traditional Muslim and Arab culture had denied them. 
A world away and a generation later, journalist Eileen MacDonald interviewed 
many female revolutionaries from conflict zones around the world and reached a 
similar conclusion.35 
The standard explanations for why people become terrorists start with the 
essentials of terrorism: politics, psychology, religion, power, the lust for glamour 
and adventure, and even sadism. First is the attraction to politics: from late 
nineteenth-century anarchist groups in Russia and Europe to the members of 
the European undergrounds of the 1960s and 1970s, both men and women 
members shared similar political outlooks. Individual psychology is a second 
underlying factor in terrorism: rebelliousness and lust for action doubtless move 
young women into terrorism. In groups such as the Weather Underground in the 
United States, many of the female members demonstrated a drive for action. 
Religion is yet another motivation for terrorist activities. Since the early 1990s, 
a majority of new international terrorist groups have been founded on religious 
grounds.36 Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese religious cult, and the Rajneesh spiritual 
community had large numbers of female cadre, some of whom were at senior 
management levels. And despite stereotypes of Muslim women as sequestered 
non-activists, Muslim women are increasingly joining the ranks of terrorist 
groups.37 British citizen Samantha Lewthwaite married a London-based Muslim 
terrorist named Habib Saleh Ghani and has written about her desire to raise all 
her children to be mujahedeen. In early 2013, she was living under a false name in 
Mombasa, Kenya, possibly as a sort of den mother to a terrorist cell: Interpol’s 
arrest warrant includes charges for possession of explosives and terror conspira-
cies dating to late 2011. Police recovered her personal papers, among which were 
the beginnings of a draft booklet in her handwriting showing her struggles with 
the right way for a woman to conduct jihad.38 
We cannot overlook the drive for power that motives some women: Bernardine 
Dohrn and many of the female leaders of the Peruvian group Sendero Luminoso 
shared this drive. Sendero leader Abimael Guzmán surrounded himself with 
female subordinate officers, whose orders could mean life and death to the 
less powerful. The promise of glamour and adventure also lures men and 
women alike to conduct internationally sensational acts of terrorism. When 
Gudrun Ensslin and Andreas Baader of the Baader-Meinhof group torched a de-
partment store or roared through city streets in a stolen car firing guns, it was the 
wild-eyed rebel in them, rather than Leninist theory, that drove their behavior. 
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Finally, it must be added that some of the uglier sides of terrorism have to do 
with another motive, evident in terrorists such as Abu Nidal: sadism and rank 
evil.39 Inside Aum Shinrikyo, where ferocious discipline and corporal punishment 
were common, women officials were reportedly as cruel as men, and actively 
helped produce the weaponized sarin. Ma Anand Puja, the nurse and bioweapons 
designer for the Rajneesh cult, is a further example. Just as the crime world has 
female sadists, so too does the politicized environment of modern terrorism. 
Some Unique Motives for Women
Are there also special motivations for female terrorists? As FLN proponent 
Dr. Frantz Fanon suggested, women may move toward violence when living 
within a closed or sexist society that denies them full civil rights and economic 
opportunities. Algerian women of the 1950s viewed themselves as breaking out 
of traditional Islamic roles: at the same time that they were freeing themselves 
from male expectations, they were freeing their fellow Algerians from French 
political subjugation. Sadly, after the victory of the FLN in 1962, although Algeria 
did receive independence from France, Algerian women did not achieve the 
same freedom or independence for their own sex. Their testaments have echoes 
now, in the dashed hopes of Muslim women after the 2011 and 2012 revolutions 
in Egypt. The aspirations for equality that women saw coming to fulfillment 
recently through the protests in Cairo’s Tahrir Square have been all but reversed 
by a reactionary crackdown. 
The desire to break out of traditional female roles may also come from a more 
secular politico-cultural context, as it did for Leila Khaled, the icon of the PFLP. 
According to her memoir My People Shall Live, although Khaled had signifi-
cantly higher grades and success in school than her brother, she was forced to 
withdraw from the American University of Beirut after only a year so that her 
parents could afford to pay for her brother’s university education. Immediately 
after her withdrawal from school, Khaled shifted her energies to training as a 
guerrilla with the PFLP.
The chance to rise swiftly in the political realm was also important to nascent 
terrorists in Latin America in the 1960s. Young women of the secular political 
left flooded into violent undergrounds and were in fact often treated equally, or 
better, vis-à-vis male cadres. Violent politics thus became a kind of social equal-
izer for women and men. 
Secondly, romantic ties can draw women into terrorism. Former CIA profiler 
Jerrold M. Post emphasizes this reason in his book The Mind of the Terrorist.40 
Our research indicates that such cases are a small but meaningful minority. Some 
women and girls enter a group when their boyfriend does; or if he is already a 
member, over time she too is drawn in. A number of terrorist groups include 
women who are, or become, leaders’ lovers: Gudrun Ensslin was the lover of 
Andreas Baader in the Red Army Faction; Magdalena Kopp married Carlos the 
Jackal. The cases of “terror for love” are markedly separable from a much larger 
group, in which girls are forcibly recruited into guerrilla undergrounds and then 
expected to cook and nurse and be sexual partners to the male officers. In our 
era, this has befallen thousands of girls in the rural areas of Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America—there is nothing unique about the practices of the LRA.
Women may move toward 
violence when living within a 
closed or sexist society that 
denies them full civil rights 
and economic opportunities.
32
CTX | Vol. 4, No. 4
Family ties can also draw women willingly or unwillingly into terrorist groups. 
Women who are wives, mothers, sisters, or daughters of terrorists may end up 
advocating for their male family members when the men are arrested or jailed. 
Irish Republican women who backed the IRA Provos (Provisional Irish Repub-
lican Army) would make an excellent subject for the study of this phenomenon. 
Partisan newspapers, such as those published in New York City, and of course 
the IRA paper An Phoblacht (“Republican News”), printed a steady supply of 
sympathetic stories that played up the families of the men. Publicity campaigners 
spoke and wrote of each convict as a man who had babies at home whom he had 
not seen, or an unemployed sister, or an elderly mother who desperately needed 
the jailed man’s aid. Doubtless many such stories were true. Doubtless they made 
for good press, with their attractive personal testimonies and sad photographs. 
Women such as Rita O’Hare of the Irish Northern Aid Committee made a career 
out of political work of this kind. She felt deeply for those in jail and had herself 
been jailed for IRA activity. She was a Sinn Féin representative and also worked 
for years at The Irish People, a political newspaper whose every issue offered fresh 
news and commentary in support of prisoners by name. 
Finally, the quest for redemption and honor following a disgrace or margin-
alization motivates some women to conduct terrorist acts—a pattern that has 
attracted great attention with the increase of female suicide terrorism.41 Studies 
of surviving female suicide bombers, as well as the biographies of those who 
died in the act, suggest that a significant percentage had been raped, divorced, or 
socially humiliated and marginalized through physical disfigurement, in some 
cases deliberately by men in the terrorist organization.42 If life brought disgrace, 
these women hoped that death would bring honor. For some it did. Posthumous 
iconic status and material benefits to the bomber’s family are central reasons for 
these women to willingly self-destroy. Revenge can be another strong motive, 
as it is for many of the Chechen “Black Widows” whose husbands, sons, and 
brothers died fighting for independence from Russia.43
Special Roles for Women in Terrorism 
Counterterrorism professionals must recognize what many violent covert orga-
nizations already know: female actors can turn traditional stereotypes about 
women’s roles to their tactical and operational advantage. Guerrilla war strategist 
Che Guevara wrote, “Women can be assigned a considerable number of specific 
occupations. …Perhaps the most important is communication between dif-
ferent combatant forces, above all, between those that are in enemy territory.” 44 
Although men and women can equally fill most of the roles in terrorist organiza-
tions, there are a few special roles that women can play to great advantage. If 
al Qaeda has only rarely deployed women to date, we should expect that it will 
deploy more of them in the future, for some of the following reasons. 
First, because women are traditionally seen as unthreatening, they are well suited 
to roles as couriers and messengers, as Guevara noted in the preceding quotation. 
The general profile of the terrorist is a young male, which makes it relatively 
easier for a girl or woman to avoid close examination. Gender expectations and 
custom make them less likely to be physically searched, especially by men. This 
was the premise of the FLN men who selected willing young ladies to be bomb 
couriers in Algiers in 1956 and 1957. PFLP hijacker Khaled, a smooth professional 
and a self-assured beauty at the same time, was able to smuggle a bomb onto an 
El Al airplane even though she ostensibly was searched before boarding. Among 
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Muslims, both women and men have used the customary long veils and robes of 
female attire to smuggle weapons of war and terror. Suicide bombers have not 
only moved plastique and other explosives with ease, but some women have also 
played explicitly on the shape of their body by molding the pliable explosive 
material around breast or hip areas to better disguise their payload. Nor can 
a woman’s “baby bump” always be trusted. In one case that took place in Co-
logne in 1977, a baby stroller concealing submachine guns was used by German 
militants to stop a kidnapping victim’s car.45 
Second, pairing a woman with a man so that they appear to be lovers or family 
can reduce suspicion toward the man as well as the woman. In the South Korean 
airliner bombing in 1987, airline security failed to suspect that the sweet “grand-
daughter” Kim Hyun Hee and her “grandfather” were actually deadly terrorists. 
IRA Provo member Maria McGuire played a similar role when she was assigned 
to accompany a more seasoned male IRA operative on a 1971 arms-buying 
expedition to the European continent. Hoteliers and other observers took them 
for a couple—and in fact, they fell in love and were thus convincing, for a while. 
Their ambitious and complex mission was to buy a large stockpile of weapons 
from a Communist Czech supplier; they succeeded in getting the arms as far as a 
warehouse in Holland before they were exposed. McGuire’s memoir records her 
relish of the enterprise.46 
A third role, familiar in crime and political subterfuge, is the use of sex appeal 
and beauty to glamorize terrorism. Any media expert recognizes what many 
terrorist organizers recognize: if there is anything more attention-grabbing than 
terrorism, it is a beautiful female terrorist. Such women offer the greatest shock 
value and public profile for their violent actions, both of which are essential to 
the calculated process of attracting public attention through violence. The youth 
and calculated charms of Kim added significantly to the media drama after the 
bombing of the South Korean airliner. Lolita Lebrón’s dramatic, glamorous, and 
photogenic image was used for years after the attack on the US House of Rep-
resentatives to garner sympathy for the Puerto Rican independence movement. 
Photos of Leila Khaled became so popular after her first hijacking escapade that 
she elected to have plastic surgery to avoid detection on her second attempt. 
Although not all female terrorists are beautiful or have a dramatic flair that 
appeals to the public, those who do have been very successful in gaining needed 
media attention for terrorist causes. 
Fourth is the similar and related role of tactical “lure.” In several cases, women 
have used their beauty not merely to evade detection or jail but to deliberately 
lure a lustful victim to his death. The Sandinistas, a revolutionary guerrilla 
movement in Nicaragua that came to power in 1979, were led by men. But the 
upper echelons of leadership, as well as the lower ones, included many women, 
including the respected, smart, multilingual, and attractive Nora Astorga. Early 
in the Sandinistas’ insurgent campaign to oust Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio 
Somoza, Astorga was assigned to seduce the general who was second in com-
mand of the state armed forces; instead of a tryst, however, he was knifed by as-
sassins hidden in the room. Astorga later took command of a Sandinista military 
squad, and eventually became a high-profile political figure and diplomat in the 
Sandinista government.47 
Another famed terrorist who served as a lure is Idoia Lopez-Riano of the Basque 
separatist organization ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna). A somewhat lurid 2011 
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a beautiful female terrorist.
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account in the British Daily Telegraph newspaper informed readers that this 
“green-eyed femme fatale” was nicknamed “La Tigresa” for her success in se-
ducing Spanish security officers.48 Twenty-three people died thanks to her. While 
some terrorist organizations might avoid such a scheme out of religious scruple, 
other groups have found the operational advantages of deploying a seductive 
woman irresistible. Even a zealously religious organization might accept foreign 
women or converts who volunteer for these specialized covert operations. 
Fifth and finally, it must be noted that not all female terrorists assume their roles 
by choice. Some are victims pulled, in effect, into underground organizations by 
gun-wielding kidnapers. Prominent newspaper heiress Patty Hearst was dragged 
from her Berkeley, California, residence and subjected to appalling treatment 
by her male and female “comrades” in the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) 
before becoming an apparently willing participant in armed robbery. Hundreds 
of village girls have been treated similarly in Africa by the male members of the 
LRA, Boko Haram, and other insurgencies. In a half-dozen Asian insurgencies, 
such forced mobilization of girls and women has occurred with some frequency. 
Even in Sri Lanka, where the Tamil Tiger insurgency included self-identified and 
proud all-female fighting units, some women began by being “drafted” by Tamil 
Tigers with guns. Yet even conscripted women can provide an operational ad-
vantage to terrorist groups that exploit natural concern for the “helpless female 
victim” to make security forces back down or negotiate. Thus the SLA sought, 
unsuccessfully, to use Hearst to gain money and concessions from the govern-
ment, including the release of two members of their terrorist organization. The 
use of conscripted women and girls in units of the Tamil Tigers’ combat forces 
posed serious ethical problems for the Sri Lankan security forces, who were loath 
to shoot those they took to be innocent victims.
Conclusions
While some still believe the female terrorist to be a rare bird, in fact what is rare 
is finding a proficient terrorist organization that does not include female cadre, 
support staff, or volunteers. It is true that most fighting units of al Qaeda have no 
women. Yet there was a highly active female circle around the males in the Sunni 
extremist Hofstad group in Holland a decade ago.49 Furthermore, it is notable 
that recent issues of Inspire—a jihadist magazine that al Qaeda created initially 
with men in mind—have departed from traditional norms. The magazine now 
has a “Sister’s Corner,” and at least three recent stories have been devoted to the 
desire of the “good” Muslim woman to join the fight.50 The World Wide Web 
has also seen the publication of “zines” aimed directly at radical Muslim women. 
Women who belong to neo-Nazi groups in Europe, Russia, and the United 
States are rarely tracked by authorities—for many of the misguided reasons 
mentioned earlier—but rightist parties and groups often do have female mem-
bers who “are anti-feminist, aware of tradition and devoted to their nation,” 
according to one such proud nationalist.51
According to a 2010 estimate by the German Office for the Pro-
tection of the Constitution, there are 25,000 far-right extremists 
inside the country, but only 11 percent were believed to be women. 
Although they account for a relatively small number, roughly half of 
the women who are involved in the scene were recorded as holding 
leadership positions within nationalist political organizations.52
The World Wide Web has 
also seen the publication of 
“zines” aimed directly at 
radical Muslim women.
Conscripted women and girls 
in units of the Tamil Tigers’ 
combat forces posed serious 
ethical problems for the 
Sri Lankan security forces, 
who were loath to shoot.
35
November 2014
US neofascist propaganda often plays to female readers in obvious ways. In 
killings carried out by the far right in Germany between 2000 and 2007, one 
of the three individuals leading the so-called National Socialist Underground 
was a woman named Beate Zschape. While a German security official’s famous 
warning to “shoot the women terrorists first” may be somewhat exaggerated, 
there are cases in postwar Germany to substantiate his point. The remark 
deserves at least passing mention as a corrective for our current prejudices. What 
is apparent is that women are deeply involved in contemporary terrorism of all 
kinds at many levels, including as top leaders and more frequently as second-tier 
leaders. Many women perform in such vital roles as logistics and even weapons 
development or procurement. Tens of thousands of women have been cadre 
in terrorist undergrounds and insurgencies in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, everywhere in the world. 
Due to the gap between the current assumptions and global realities about 
women as terrorists, the presence of women in violent sub-state groups presents 
a real danger, along with important kinds of challenges. The counterterrorism 
community needs first of all to reevaluate its intelligence processes and assump-
tions. Recent counterinsurgency operations have improved the intelligence 
assessment process and led to the development of female engagement teams of 
various kinds. But it is still easy to underestimate the many ways in which women 
routinely play vital roles in terrorist organizations, especially in nursing, finance, 
management of safe houses, reconnaissance, courier activities, and more recently, 
suicide bombings. The more pressure that armed forces place on men in asym-
metric warfare, the more important such women become, and the more likely 
they are to be armed. The proliferation of small arms and the relative lightness 
of new semiautomatic weapons such as the Kalashnikov mean that mature girls 
must also be considered as possible tactical threats in a conflict environment, as 
weapons couriers, bomb setters, or even infantry in rural guerrilla wars. As for 
smaller terrorist gangs, the ways we write about and understand them indicate 
that we still do not expect to see women in combat roles. 
It is apparent that terrorist profiling in airline and public transit security should 
be reevaluated. Even if most shooters are males, that need not be true of the 
people and organizations that supply and pay them, carry their intelligence 
packets and false documents, or do reconnaissance. Limited but specialized 
training of new security personnel is essential to the proper understanding of 
how terrorism works. At transit portals, female security teams are needed to 
search American women as well as passengers from other countries, as is already 
the norm in many airports and train stations around the world. In common 
crime, women are less active and less lethal. But in political terrorism, that is not 
at all true. Women can kill, and often have, for a number of reasons—in this they 
are not so different from their male cohorts. v
Due to the gap between the 
current assumptions and 
global realities about women 
as terrorists, the presence of 
women in violent sub-state 
groups presents a real danger.
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Of Culture and Cliché: Politics and the Uses (and Abuses) of 
Anthropology
Dr. Siamak Naficy,  
US Naval Postgraduate School
Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere, 
diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong remedies. 
 — Groucho Marx1
When we try to use anthropology to more effectively con-
duct war, we can find ourselves with a flawed understanding of both culture 
and warfare. In theory, the consideration of culture is a good thing, and cultural 
insight can be especially helpful in a time of military occupation at every point 
along the occupation spectrum, from peacekeeping to counterinsurgency. But 
when it comes to developing strategic depth and understanding, overly deter-
ministic cultural explanations will likely cause more harm than good. In this 
paper, I argue that while recognizing culture and social identity are important 
considerations in the construction of both foreign policy and warfare, an uncriti-
cal reliance on cultural factors to determine military strategy or predict political 
behavior can be perilous. We must not overlook the important role that mate-
rial experience plays in defining cultural parameters, or downplay the complex 
interplay between culture, policy, and war. A static view of culture leads us to 
the false perception that our opponents will always follow predictable foreign 
policies and strategies of war.
To be sure, the cultural approach to understanding human behavior has notable 
merits and so, like the proverbial baby, should not be thrown out with the bath-
water. This paper is not a call to ignore the fact that “culture exists,” but rather is 
a friendly reminder that we must do a better job of understanding what culture 
might mean in terms of real people; it’s not a question of whether culture mat-
ters, but how it matters. If we insist on clinging to an ahistorical and defective 
account of culture that depicts “others” as inscrutably exotic and incapable of 
contradiction or dynamic change, we will end up profoundly misunderstanding 
them and will constantly be surprised by them.
What Culture Doesn’t Do
The relationship between groups can be dialectic. For instance, the evidence 
shows that many insurgents are realists of a sort who do not necessarily conform 
to the traditions of their native culture. Instead, like us, they can demonstrate a 
surprising readiness to feed off global information and defy tradition in favor 
of practicality, if that will help them achieve success. They are able to rewrite 
their codes and rules as needed. They can be influenced by us (and our Twitter 
accounts), just as we can be influenced by them. At a larger level, the policies 
of regimes—like the human beings they are composed of—can be driven by 
different, competing, and at times contradictory impulses. Predicting a regime 
or an insurgent group’s behavior based on cultural characteristics can be tricky 
and requires discerning the consistencies and disconnects between what people 
say, what they think or imagine about themselves, and what they actually do. 
It’s not a question of 
whether culture matters, 
but how it matters.
An uncritical reliance on cultural 
factors to determine military 
strategy or predict political 
behavior can be perilous.
39
November 2014
A culturally deterministic 
approach rests on profoundly 
incorrect ideas of the 
ways in which cultures 
operate, particularly during 
war and other crises.
These things can be quite different, of course. By drawing sharp boundaries to 
corral and separate cultures into simplified categories, we tend to exaggerate the 
differences between categories and underestimate differences within categories. 
We also risk overlooking the ways in which ideas traverse such boundaries. This 
approach fundamentally misconceives what culture is. 
A culturally deterministic approach rests on profoundly incorrect ideas of the 
ways in which cultures operate, particularly during war and other crises, and 
tends to evoke stereotypical categories of “Western” and “Eastern” warfare.2 The 
Western stereotype—guileless descendants of Clausewitz who march in step 
with a military band, or knights clad in heavy armor who embody the ideas of 
blunt force and superior strength—contrasts with the Eastern stereotype, which 
imagines deceitful minions of Sun Tzu leading hordes of archers who timidly 
avoid a direct battlefield charge. The facts, of course, mock such overwrought 
assumptions. Early Iranian tribes like the Massagetae (and later the Sassanid 
Persians) are in fact thought to be the originators of the class of armored cavalry 
known as cataphract, while the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 to 1988 in some ways 
resembled the Western front in World War I: both featured the mass slaughter 
of young men who charged headlong to their deaths and the use of poison gas 
(by at least one side). Also contrary to stereotypes, in 1944 the Western Allies 
carried out what was arguably the most brilliantly deceitful act of twentieth-cen-
tury warfare (Operation Bodyguard) to mislead German intelligence regarding 
the D-Day invasion of Normandy.3 The military marching band, so emblematic 
of Western esprit de corps, was introduced into Western Europe through the 
Ottoman Turks, whose martial music also helped inspire such European classical 
composers as Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and Ludwig van Beethoven.
There are numerous other such examples of how wrong stereotypes can be,4 but 
the point is that history viewed through a culturally deterministic lens is not just 
bad history, it is fraught with potential strategic costs. Ironically then, though 
its purpose is to enhance sensitivity to the subtle and not so subtle distinctions 
among cultures, a culturally deterministic view helps promote an unsophisticated, 
essentialized, and crude view of culture, foreign policy, and strategies of war.
“War of the Worlds” 
This is a “war of the worlds” in the cultural sense, a head-on colli-
sion between civilizations from different galaxies. 
 — LTC (retired) Ralph Peters5
Let us imagine that there is some definable quality that differentiates people into 
categories we call cultures. It might even be useful to imagine “essential” differ-
ences between groups of people. The problem arises, however, when we conflate 
cultural attributes with a group of preordained, scripted, or genetic attributes. 
There may be stereotypic (even essential) differences between groups of people 
today that were shaped by those groups’ cultural history, but we must not forget 
that there was in fact cultural history. In other words, culture is a dynamic quality 
that evolves over time. Thus, any categorization scheme, however accurate, must 
also incorporate this potential for change. To see the Taliban, for example, as 
being from an entirely different planet or galaxy, as LTC Peters apparently does, 
according to his quote above, is to seriously underestimate the agility, freedom, 
and alacrity with which the Taliban can adapt, adopt, and transform strategies 
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to cope with changing circumstances. The assumption that the Taliban (or any 
other group) are so alien as to be unknowable can also prevent us from paying 
attention to the available evidence when we try to understand their motivations.
Of course, the notion of fighting against a culturally alien enemy holds a 
powerful attraction, at least in part because the “otherness” of the outsider, 
especially the enemy, serves as a marker we use to define ourselves and establish 
our own identities. So when we describe the enemy as primitive, barbaric, and 
irrational, it’s also a way of saying who we are: modern, civilized, and rational. 
But, of course, this impulse can also be off the mark. Westerners historically have 
debated our understanding of ourselves through the lens of the enemy, from the 
ancient Persians through the Soviet Union all the way to today’s Taliban. The 
impulse to categorize and simplify group identities in turn can affect the way we 
read and interpret history. We tend to extrapolate the same themes and assump-
tions that we embrace now to the past and then imagine them to be eternal.
An example of what we might call retrospective cultural determinism can be 
found in our popular understanding of Alexander the Great’s invasion of Persia. 
Reading certain history books or watching certain recent films might lead us to 
believe that the ancient Persians existed to be conquered by Alexander the Great. 
Slightly more nuanced minds might make the argument that Alexander’s war 
against Persia was retribution for two prior wars that the Persians had launched 
against the Greek city-states. Some may even be tempted to see Alexander’s 
march as the first of many attempts by “civilized Europe” to bring its light to the 
“barbaric East.” But in truth, Alexander deemed the Persian Empire to be worth 
conquering because of its wealth and not because it was in need of civilizing. In 
fact, much like the Huns who would later sack Rome or the Vikings who peri-
odically raided the British Isles, Alexander soon came to admire what he found 
in his new territory, adopting Persian titles, dress, and courtly manner. From a 
Persian perspective, of course, Alexander was not so great. Among the many un-
civilized things he did, his armies looted and burned the great city of Persepolis, 
and he is thought to have encouraged similar mayhem against other cultural and 
religious (e.g., Zoroastrian) sites throughout his new realm. What is most often 
overlooked in these various interpretations of history is that the Persians and the 
Greeks were in contact well before Alexander’s invasion and were in fact deeply 
influencing each other in such areas as the arts, architecture, philosophy, religion, 
worldview, and so on. Alexander’s conquest merely amplified such syncretism. 
Even knowing this, it is still tempting to imagine that different ethnic or national 
groups are of fundamentally different kinds,6 and that cultures are sharply dis-
tinct and bounded. We can readily imagine that the ancient Greek and Persian 
cultures existed in isolation from one another and interacted only through 
warfare, but cultures haven’t been homogenous or necessarily quarantined to 
territorial boundaries since emigration, trade, and exploration began. Cultural 
borders are porous, especially with the advent of modern globalization and 
social media, and we should not ignore the reality of continuous and dialectical 
interaction.
The recent push in US policy and military circles to emphasize the cultural 
dimension in strategic assessment may be driven by a variety of forces. On the 
one hand, it is likely inspired by the failures of recent American military opera-
tions to deliver the desired political outcomes. After the fall of the Soviet Union 
in 1991, which Americans like to presume was predicated on US efforts,7 the 
Alexander soon came to admire 
what he found in his new 
territories, adopting Persian 
titles, dress, and courtly manner.
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thinking was that its better intelligence and superior weapons, satellites, and 
drones would give the United States technological supremacy over the bat-
tlespace and make it invincible.8 Because this has not turned out to be the case, 
even against vastly technologically inferior foes, the fashion of invoking culture 
as a significant factor in war may be an antidote to the failed hubris of techno-
logical superiority. 
On the other hand, Americans’ shift towards cultural explanations for the 
decline in US power may also be a reaction to the world’s growing rejection of the 
United States’ cultural and commercial hegemony and the pressure to remake 
the planet in America’s image through globalization. Such a universalist vision, 
some would argue, has been the source of much of the recent troubles in various 
regions of the world, and is becoming largely unfashionable, for good reason. 
Nevertheless, one need not be Edward Said to point out the danger in embracing 
the opposite idea—the idea of orientalism—which postulates an ancient, fun-
damental, and unchanging difference between people.9 This kind of simplistic 
dualism is also sometimes used to account for why desired political changes—
such as embracing Western democratic liberalism—have not been embraced in 
chronically troubled spots like the Middle East. In a sense, there has been a swing 
from thinking they’re just like us to thinking they’re nothing like us.
Culture as a Weapon
When I hear [the word] culture … I release the safety from my 
Browning!
 — Thiemann, from the play Schlageter 10
In late September 2001, Maulana Inyadullah, who had begun fighting the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan at the age of 16, in 1982, was holed up in Peshawar. On 
the eve of the American-led invasion of Afghanistan, he offered this pithy sound 
bite to David Blair of Britain’s Daily Telegraph: “The Americans love Pepsi Cola, 
we love death.”11 Of course this statement is appalling and shocking, but then 
again, in all likelihood, it was meant to be. In other words, Inyadullah’s sneer is 
simply good propaganda, designed to evoke fear in the enemy by sounding as 
brutal, savage, and inhuman as possible. The real threat, however, is that we have 
leapt to embrace assumptions about groups like the Taliban (and most recently, 
ISIS—the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria)12 according to what they say to Western 
reporters and the image they project when they pose for us in photographs that 
appear in Western publications: angry, uncompromising, draconian theocrats 
and tribal warriors who are stuck in amber, slaves to their culture.   
 
Those menacing propaganda photos stand in stark contrast to the way the 
Taliban present themselves to the camera when posing for personal photographs. 
Not long after the Taliban lost control of Kandahar and fled from the city, 
photographer Thomas Dworzak visited Kandahar’s local photography studio, 
the Shah Zadah Studio, and discovered photographs apparently left behind by 
Afghan Taliban soldiers who had come in for a “flattering portrait, retouched 
by the photographer, secretly taken in the back room studio and decorated the 
best the photographer could manage.”13 Here, in intimate photographs that were 
clearly meant for private consumption, were Afghan men in surreal poses like 
so many silent-era movie stars, standing or sitting against cheerful backdrops of 
what look like Swiss mountain villages. These images are especially ironic and 
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even touching, not merely because they defy the Taliban’s mandate against im-
ages of living beings, but because the men aren’t quite the snarling soldiers we’re 
used to seeing. On the contrary, many hold flowers alongside their guns. In some 
photos, they affectionately throw their arms around one another. These intimate 
photographs are as disorienting to Western eyes as if Sylvester Stallone as Rambo 
and Arnold Schwarzenegger as the Terminator were to show up in a film toting 
their automatic weapons, only to smile, hug each other, and begin to exchange 
gardening tips.14
We need to remember that the popularized version of any phenomenon is likely 
not fully real. To continue with our example, the Taliban certainly do cultivate 
a particularly draconian form of orientalist nostalgia,15 but history shows us 
that they are also practical: they are innovative, and they break with tradition 
when it serves their purpose. The term Taliban (“student” or “seeker” in Arabic) 
has now become a trash can term of sorts for fractious Pashtun tribesmen who 
collectively hate the foreign invaders enough to turn even traditional enemies 
into friends. This shifting series of alliances comes with its own internal disagree-
ments over many issues, including religion. For example, in 2010, when the 
Quetta Shura sent a Muslim scholar to reprimand a band of young commanders 
in Paktia Province who were not following Taliban leader Mullah Omar’s direc-
tives, the young men just killed him.16 
Just as our conflicts are interactive, so too are our cultures. It could even be 
argued that one of the surest ways cultures interact and influence each other 
is through conflict and warfare. In times of crisis, particularly in times of war 
when a group’s future is at risk, however, an idealized collective identity can be 
reinforced by the group’s very opposition to the enemy force, and by extension 
the enemy’s culture.  
Because of this dynamic, once again it is important to discriminate between how 
people think about themselves, what they say they do, and what they actually 
do. When forced to choose between pragmatic compromise and hard-headed 
dogma, Taliban leaders will frequently opt for the former. Just consider how on 
a whole range of fronts, from suicide bombing to the education of girls, from 
narcotics cultivation and trafficking to the use of music and media operations, 
the Taliban have repeatedly adapted their rules to justify practical change.
Of course, they often justify such changes by reinterpreting passages from the 
Qur’an. Suicide bombing, for example, was once considered off-limits—not just 
because it was immoral, but perhaps worse, because it was considered unmanly. 
Nowadays, the Taliban assert that verse 2:207 of the Qur’an, as it turns out, actu-
ally supports suicide bombing.17 Similarly, when the Taliban banned girls from 
school in the 1990s, Mullah Muttawakil served as the Taliban foreign minister. 
Now, his daughter attends a school in Kabul—one he himself set up.18 Likewise, 
Taliban leaders once insisted that all narcotics were not just dangerous but also 
sinful, yet they were able to interpret the Qur’an in a way that permitted them to 
set aside religious laws—ostensibly in times of extreme hardship, such as starva-
tion—so that today they describe themselves as the protectors of poppy farmers 
and indeed, the narcotics economy.19 Similarly, they once banned all music but 
now spread their own motivational musical propaganda electronically from cell 
phone to cell phone via Bluetooth.20 The Taliban once shunned any depiction 
of the human form as idolatry and smashed everything from television sets 
to pedestrian crosswalk signs. They infamously blew up what were apparently 
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threatening religious/cultural artifacts such as the ancient Buddhist statues 
at Bamiyan, Afghanistan. Nowadays, however, not only do Taliban leaders 
regularly give TV and online interviews, they also have websites, sophisticated 
media operations teams, and even embedded journalists.21 More recently, the 
Taliban used the official Afghan Taliban website to advise other groups to “calm 
down.”22 Although they did not name ISIS directly, they called on “scholars in 
Sham (Syria),” a clear reference to ISIS, and warned somewhat paradoxically that 
“Muslims also should avoid extremism in religion.”23
Such examples emphasize the imperative that we interpret culture cautiously and 
anticipate such mutations and adaptations. Culture is an arsenal of metaphors 
and ideas that can be skillfully used, abused, interpreted, and even “weaponized” 
to justify a variety of choices. 
Country, Culture, Character, and Contradiction
Do what you will, this world’s a fiction and is made up of 
contradiction. 
 — William Blake24
There is a common saying in English: “He can’t see the forest for the trees.” This 
means that if one focuses too closely on the details of a subject (the trees), one is 
likely to miss the bigger picture that those details form when taken together (the 
forest). When it comes to predicting the behavior of members of a specific cul-
ture or state, a researcher who knows something of, say, international relations, 
but is not immersed in the subject’s specific cultural symbols and is unaware of 
the social structure, uneducated in the language, ignorant of geography, and un-
informed about the ruling power structure, will have little understanding of his or 
her subject (cannot see the trees). A researcher trained only in the cultural details 
of a society, however, may be equally limited and prone to consider the specifics of 
a case without grasping the general principles that may be having a greater effect on 
a cultural group or a state’s decision making (cannot see the forest).
Culture is an important and significant component in the architecture of choice, 
and cultural insight can therefore certainly shed light on the context in which 
choices are shaped. After all, ideas are tools with which to interpret the world, 
and ideas about appropriate norms, values, security, land, what is worth fighting 
for, or the appropriate use of violence are passed down within groups. Decisions 
and policy choices are made by decision makers who are steeped in particular 
cultural biases, values, and memories.25 A nation or tribe’s interests, what is 
“sacred,” what can be sacrificed, risked, or compromised, or even the conditions 
of success, are not necessarily self-evident or objectively obvious.26 
For example, the contradictory nature of risks in war or even “kinetic military 
actions” adds further variables to intelligence estimates. Assuming so-called 
rational behavior on the part of the enemy,27 an intelligence analyst is supposed 
to predict that the opponent will avoid a very risky operation that entails high 
costs but uncertain benefits. The fundamental flaw in such assumptions is that 
they are true only in theory. In practice, what is considered a high risk in one 
culture may be acceptable in another. In other words, there can be little doubt 
that culture informs and in some significant way, can shape the priorities of a 
state when defining its foreign policy objectives, but culture does not exist in a 
Not only do Taliban leaders 
regularly give TV and online 
interviews, they also have 
websites, sophisticated media 
operations teams, and even 
embedded journalists.
Decisions and policy choices are 
made by decision makers who 
are steeped in particular cultural 
biases, values, and memories.
44
CTX | Vol. 4, No. 4
vacuum and is itself shaped by material experience. An ideological worldview is 
defined (and in many ways propelled) by the harsh realities of experience.  
The late US Naval War College professor Michael I. Handel offered an excellent 
example of how a culture can develop around a state’s strategic context in his 
assessment of the plight of Israel.28 Since its founding in 1948, Israel has more 
than once achieved remarkable operational and tactical victories against in-
vading Arab armies. Paradoxically, however, as Handel points out, these victories 
may also have served to screen Israel’s considerable strategic inadequacies. His 
observation echoes that of political theorist Hannah Arendt, who warned in 
1948, on the occasion of war in Palestine, that Israel could become 
something quite other than the dream of world Jewry, Zionist and 
non-Zionist. The “victorious” Jews would live surrounded by an 
entirely hostile Arab population, secluded into ever-threatened 
borders, absorbed with physical self-defense to a degree that would 
submerge all other interests and activities. The growth of a Jewish 
culture would cease to be the concern of the whole people; social 
experiments would have to be discarded as impractical luxuries; 
political thought would center around military strategy.29
A cultural approach informed by history may help illuminate why Israel, with a 
small but well-educated population and a collective memory of both recent and 
ancient existential crises, is overcome with a siege-like mentality—a sense of itself 
as having “circled the wagons”—and is overly reliant on military solutions and 
preemptive war, technological superiority, and an absolute sense of security.30 
Culture, then, can be thought of as comprising the collective living memory of 
historical experience and the mythology and narratives that the group develops 
to share and pass on that experience. In this way, a diachronic account of Israelis’ 
personal histories, along with a synchronic understanding of Israel today as a 
fortress state, can in part explain the cultural context that shapes Israel’s strategic 
security policy.
Nevertheless, when it comes to writing history, an overly deterministic cultur-
alist approach underestimates the tangled relationship between war, politics, and 
culture. For instance, in a culturally multifaceted society, policy may be defined 
through the interaction of competing cultures and their own particular interpre-
tations of experience, which ultimately determines how competing interests are 
prioritized. In multicultural polities like Iran, the United States, and others, this 
can result in a contradictory experience at different levels of policy making—a 
reality that can make any coherent and constructive international response 
problematic. 
We may even come to see culture—and not, say, the economic and social 
unmooring of traditional territorial societies and identities that inevitably 
accompanies the uncertainties and insecurities of an increasingly globalized 
world—as the primary source of international conflict. But in the real world, 
of course, nations do not behave as culturally-chained-and-bound actors. From 
alliances of convenience between sixteenth-century England and Safavid Persia 
(for his part, Shah Abbas I “preferred the dust from the shoe soles of the lowest 
Christian to the highest Ottoman personage” 31), to Nazi Germany’s alliance 
with Imperial Japan, to the security cooperation between modern Shi’a Iran and 
Christian Orthodox Armenia (rather than Shi’a Azerbaijan), it becomes obvious 
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that pragmatic leaders can cheat and play musical chairs with identities. They are 
not necessarily trapped in their own articulated state identity, even when their 
foreign policy choices compete with or contradict the official rhetoric. 
The Case of Iran: Culturally Consistent, Politically 
Contradictory
The assumption, apparently harbored by many Americans, that the current 
differences between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran are due 
solely to the ideologies of Iran’s leaders is both one-dimensional and ahistorical. 
Current geopolitical frictions in the Middle East date to the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire at the end of WWI. The end of Turkish rule left a regional power vacuum 
that the war’s European victors and their newly urgent oil interests swiftly filled. 
This political, economic, and cultural semi-occupation by outside powers only 
deepened when the United States joined in during the Cold War, a move that 
perhaps inevitably put some of Iran’s strategic interests in direct conflict with 
those of the United States.
Although the domestic policies of successive Iranian regimes may have been 
vastly different, there has been remarkable continuity in their search for political 
and economic autonomy, as well as regional preeminence. A deep understanding 
of Iran’s geography and resources, its long history, and its rich Persian cultural 
roots, for example, may help critics appreciate why the Islamic Republic insists 
on an “absolute and inalienable right” to enrich uranium under the Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty (NPT). According to one expert, an indefatigable commitment 
to independence is a core component of Iranian political culture.32 If Iranian 
leaders regard nuclear energy as a means of assuring independence, then US and 
European analysts who imagine that Iran’s reformist leaders will be more willing 
to compromise on Iran’s nuclear energy than the so-called hardliners will have 
missed the mark. Even the reformist leaders of the Iranian Green Move-
ment, who were fiercely critical of the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad presidency, 
were equally fiercely nationalistic and supported Iran’s sovereign right to a 
complete nuclear fuel cycle.33 
“Neither an Islamic State nor a Republic” 
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a good example, not just of the continuities 
but also the contradictions that may be rooted in a nation’s multifaceted and 
complex sense of identity. The internal contradictions in Iran’s conduct of both 
domestic and foreign policy, and in even the way the state describes itself, were 
familiar to the late Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri. This Ayatollah, widely 
recognized as the most knowledgeable senior Islamic scholar in Iran during his 
lifetime, openly criticized the Islamic Republic’s domestic and foreign policy 
for more than 20 years.34 In 2009, he even admonished the top officials directly 
when he wrote, “At least have the courage to admit this is neither an Islamic state 
nor a republic.”35 To fully grasp what Ayatollah Montazeri was driving at, we 
need to understand the meaning behind the seemingly straightforward words 
Islamic Republic of Iran.
First, the word Islamic implies a transnational identity and a global interest 
because it refers to a world religion that cuts across territorial boundaries and 
ethnicities. In this way, it transcends the interests of the Iranian nation. Further-
more, Iran’s official state religion is Shi’a Islam, and some scholars have argued 
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that the moral authority and legitimacy of Shi’ism itself as “a religion of protest 
and revolt” are lost if it is ever successful politically.36 This is a provocative posi-
tion, given the status of Shi’ism in Iran today. Second, a state that calls itself a 
“republic” purports to represent the will of its own population. But this is hardly 
the case in Iran. Apart from rampant cronyism, nepotism, and rigged elections, 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has speculated that one day the elected 
office of the presidency may no longer be needed.37 Without representation of its 
people, what Khamenei is hinting at amounts to an Iran without Iranians. 
Finally, perhaps Ayatollah Montazeri should have gone further and insisted 
that the regime drop “Iran” from the state’s title as well. The name Iran signifies 
an accepted and recognizable geographical and territorial entity, replete with a 
people called Iranians, whose interests an “Iranian state” represents.38 In practice, 
national (Iranian), cultural (primarily Persian or Azeri), and/or ideological 
(Islamic) goals might be promoted by the regime when they are in step with the 
material interests of the rulers, but such interests are commonly sacrificed when 
they are in conflict with regime policies. Thus, the very name of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran is in conflict with itself and revealing of its own competing 
identities. This situation is only further complicated when one considers the 
multi-ethnic and multicultural polity that makes up Iran.
There can be some tension and ambiguity among citizens with regard to just 
what it means to be Iranian. While ethnic minorities in Iran may see Iranian 
identity as a meta-ethnic label, extending to all members born in and/or living 
in the Iranian state (a concept that has historical veracity), there are those among 
the dominant Persian ethnicity (especially perhaps among the Persian diaspora) 
who view being Iranian as synonymous with being Persian and of Persian 
culture. The state, regardless of these ideas, strategically evokes and embodies 
different identities for itself depending on the circumstances. This strategy was 
especially obvious after the fall of the Soviet Union, when Iran’s overtly Shi’a 
identity had little currency among the newly independent states. Iran’s rulers 
recognized that they could utilize Iran’s “Persian” identity as a source of strength 
in some areas (e.g., among the Farsi-speaking populations of Afghanistan, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) and leverage its sizable Azeri minority identity in 
others (e.g., Azerbaijan and other Turkic states), while Iranian history and its 
ancient traditions (like the New Year festival of Nowruz) could be invoked in 
general when trying to foster goodwill and cooperation across Central Asia. In 
attempts to broker its regional ambitions in Central Asia, Iran’s former deputy 
foreign minister, Abbas Maleki, famously even said that Iran did not wish to 
become involved in “rivalry and competition” but that, “naturally,” Iran had “far 
more deep-rooted ties with Central Asia than any other party competing for 
influence there.” 39
Iran is by no means unique in encompassing such internal contradictions, but 
if we are aware of both the cultural and pragmatic roots of regime decision 
making, we are less likely to be surprised by policies that seem highly contradic-
tory. For example, consider how Iran’s support for Hezbollah in Lebanon is 
typically justified by Tehran on the basis of Islamic brotherhood and shared 
Shi’ism. Meanwhile, the same Iranian regime maintains closer ties to Christian 
Orthodox Armenia than to its Shi’a neighbor Azerbaijan and was revealingly 
uninterested in the plight of the Farsi-speaking Tajiks during their civil war 
(1992–1997). To say that such choices were made because of state interests is 
exactly the point. The same argument could be made to explain why Iran once 
47
November 2014
considered it expedient to support Iraq’s Shi’a president, Nouri al-Maliki, while 
the now looming threat of ISIS has apparently caused that support to vanish.
Conclusion
Oceania was at war with Eurasia: therefore Oceania had always 
been at war with Eurasia.
 — George Orwell, 1984  40
Given that warfare is often a celebration of group identity in the form of patrio-
tism, it is paradoxical that there is perhaps no knowledge guild more insular and 
less aware of human cultural variations and interconnectedness than military 
and security studies. In theory, an understanding of culture is advantageous for 
militaries and policy makers at every level, from the strategic to the operational 
to the tactical. Appreciating the importance of a cultural perspective can help 
overcome any strong-headed ethnocentrism and foster an understanding of 
others’ perspectives. Further, by incorporating cultural studies into its training 
curricula, the military shows that it is capable of reforming and transforming 
itself, while the larger society acknowledges the utility and morality of improving 
its ability to communicate and empathize with others. This willingness to 
adapt is especially important when operating on foreign soil, where military 
personnel are asked to put on various hats, from peacekeeping to security to 
nation-building. Under such circumstances, recognizing and mapping the maze 
of networks, cross-cutting relationships, power dynamics, and ethnic perspec-
tives that influence local decision making may allow for a certain nimbleness in 
dealing with the possible problems at hand. 
At the same time, we should not uncritically invoke culture in international 
relations and policy making. Although culture is an important variable, it may 
not always be highly predictive. A naïve consideration of culture leads to the il-
lusion that other people are prisoners of their own culture, and that they are thus 
somehow always consistent—primordial and timeless. Taking a purely cultural 
perspective makes it easy to miss the practical, protean, and flexible nature of 
people everywhere. Culture is never simply a conservative reservoir for tradition 
and maintenance; it’s also a wellspring of powerful ideas and metaphors that its 
members can make use of to transform society. 
To avoid being caught in the amber of our own stereotypical thinking, we must 
account for, consider, and appreciate contradiction on the one hand and change 
and continuity on the other. Foreign policy is best understood as resulting from 
the interaction of competing cultures and their interpretations of experience, 
which provides the prism through which interests are rationalized and priori-
tized. In multicultural polities, this process can often result in a contradictory 
experience at different levels of policy making, a reality that can complicate any 
constructive international response. Because it is easy to mythologize stereotypes 
about others, our aim shouldn’t be to try to erase prior prejudices and stereo-
types, but rather to be in constant argument with them. This is the real value of 
what anthropology can bring to policy. v
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The Tie That Binds: Reflections on Veterans Day
MAJ Anthony F. Heisler, US Army 
Special Forces
The month of November is host to the US federal holiday 
called Veterans Day.1 The eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh 
month marked the official start of the armistice that brought the First World 
War to a close, but in 1954, Armistice Day in the United States was renamed 
and repurposed to recognize all veterans of US wars.2 Memorial Day is another 
US holiday that is synonymous with military service to the nation. Although the 
two days are different in meaning and purpose, they are often referred to inter-
changeably—most often by those who do not know what the holidays represent 
and usually to the consternation of those who do. Beyond the literal meaning 
and purpose of these two days, however, I believe there is a deeper purpose that 
is often entirely overlooked, but that should, in fact, be accounted for above 
most others. These two holidays provide a very real opportunity to examine the 
bond between military personnel who serve the Republic and the non-military 
citizenry, a bond that is a privilege in the truest sense of the word and that is 
in need of some maintenance. To begin, it is worth clarifying the difference 
between Memorial Day and Veterans Day. 
Looking Back
Veterans Day is intended to be a day of recognition, whereas Memorial Day is 
a somber day of remembrance. Memorial Day, observed annually in late May, is 
the holiday with the longer tradition and grew out of a custom of decorating the 
graves of those who died in the US Civil War in the years following the conflict 
that divided the nation.3 Veterans Day emerged from the day when the world 
marked the official end of World War I. Both holidays matured over time and 
grew to take on larger meanings: Memorial Day came to include the war dead 
from all US conflicts, while Veterans Day now recognizes not only veterans of 
all US wars, but all US military veterans, regardless of whether they served in 
peacetime or wartime. 
Many Americans enjoy a day off from work on these two federal holidays. The 
three-day-long Memorial Day weekend in particular is often associated with 
travel deals and sales on appliances. It also marks the unofficial start of summer 
for Americans. Most of the public outreach from veterans’ organizations with 
regard to both holidays is intended to educate citizens on the meaning of the 
two days: namely, that Veterans Day is a day of appreciation for the armed 
services, and Memorial Day is a day devoted to the memory of those in uniform 
who have sacrificed their lives for the nation. 
These are noteworthy distinctions, and the efforts to educate citizens on the 
differences are important, but there is something else that is being missed here. 
As a veteran of the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, I personally knew a 
number of people who were killed in each of those places. I have to admit that 
it was thus a little disconcerting to hear someone wish me “Happy Memorial 
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Day!” at the conclusion of a Memorial Day service this past May. This was my 
first Memorial Day back home in the United States in four years, and although 
I was not surprised at the juxtaposition of happy and memorial, having heard 
it countless times on television, I was still taken aback by the comment in that 
time and place. The distance I felt between my personal reality, which has been 
informed by 10 years of wartime service, and the reality of the well-intentioned, 
but uninformed, passerby became the initial inspiration for this essay. The 
uncertainty I felt when considering how to react reflected something larger than 
the fact that someone did not know the meaning of a holiday, but at that time, I 
did not understand what it was. An unexpected series of questions from a fellow 
officer from Europe helped me put my finger on it. 
In the week following Memorial Day, a NATO colleague of mine approached me 
between classes at the US Naval Postgraduate School. He had a number of ques-
tions about the affinity between the US military and the American people, how 
it came to be, and how it is maintained. Given the disconnect I had experienced 
on the street days before, I was intrigued by his inquiry and observations. The 
purpose behind his questions was to identify ways that his own military might 
be able to kindle a similar relationship with the civilian citizens of his nation. 
He noted the welcomed presence of US military units in parades on national 
holidays, the regular displays of military appreciation during professional 
sporting events, and anything and everything to do with NASCAR—again, his 
observation, not mine.4 My personal experience following the previous week’s 
Memorial Day service and the observations of my allied counterpart combined 
to shed light on the larger issue that I had previously been unable to identify.5
Although Veterans Day and Memorial Day are observed for specific reasons, 
they are purposed to a larger cause. They serve a critical function in maintaining 
the delicate—and absolutely essential—tether between the uniformed military 
personnel who serve to defend the nation and the civilian citizens who comprise 
the rest of the nation—the People. But the apparent disconnect between me 
and that passerby has given me cause to question the health and status of that 
relationship. On closer consideration, it further occurred to me that it is the 
responsibility of both parties, civilians and service members, to maintain it. 
Finally, my NATO colleague’s comments illuminated the fact that this essential 
relationship is a privilege in the truest sense of the word—not many nations 
enjoy these bonds to the degree that we do in the United States, if they enjoy 
them at all.
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American troops walking along a road during World War I.Infantry company of Sherman’s veterans.
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My father is quick to remind me that the closeness that the US military enjoys 
with the population today—as the NATO officer who spoke with me observed—
is not the way it’s always been. He is alluding to the military’s uncertain recep-
tion at home after returning from the Vietnam War. But the delicate relationship 
between the military and the civilian population goes back much further than 
that. Since the nation’s earliest days, the civil-military relationship in the United 
States has been tenuous at times. James Madison, the fourth president of the 
United States, was an outspoken critic of having a standing professional mili-
tary.6 Samuel Adams, a name synonymous with early American patriotism, was 
equally concerned with the potential danger that a standing military posed to 
the state and warned that such a body “should be watched with a jealous Eye.” 7 
There have, however, been previous high points in this relationship, as well. Take, 
for example, the unity of purpose shared by the military and civilians during and 
at the conclusion of World War II. 
To a degree, the current positive state of this relationship is the response to the 
post-Vietnam low—a positive backlash, if you will. This upswing during the 
last decade of war is in part supported by tens of thousands of veterans—from 
World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, and the periods in between—who 
remember very vividly the lows in civil-military relations post-Vietnam and who 
are now themselves civilians. With the exception of Desert Storm, the military 
drafted civilians into service to increase its ranks during those earlier conflicts, 
cutting across American social strata to build a force that was, in many ways, 
more socially diverse and integrated than the society that it sought to protect 
back home. Conscription also served to create a dense and diverse network of 
veterans from all walks of life connected through their service to the nation—a 
powerful force for civil-military integration. As these veterans pass on, however, 
so too will the painful lessons learned during that post-Vietnam low. And as the 
latent veteran support base that has played such a key role in maintaining the 
link between civilians and the military shrinks, so too will our access to the vivid 
memories that these veterans carry. Already we can see them fading slowly from 
our collective memory to the black-and-white pages of history books.
Looking forward, the current veterans of the all-volunteer force who reenter 
civilian life after their time in service are a mere fraction of those who did so 
during periods of conscription. Since 9/11, only 0.5 percent of the US population 
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Civil War veterans, Fourth of July or Decoration Day, 
Ortonville, Minnesota,1880.
Victorious Marines parade in France following the end of World War I. 
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has served in the military.8 The question this fact poses is immediately apparent: 
how does less than one percent of a population maintain a connection with the 
other 99.5 percent?9 As time goes on, this question will increase in importance, 
as will the urgent need for an answer. At its heart, this relationship is a two-way 
street of trust. From the military to the civilian population, it entails a promise 
and commitment to support and defend the Constitution and the nation against 
all enemies. From the country’s civilians to its military, it is an acknowledgement 
and understanding of the cost of misusing military power, and a commitment to 
support the armed forces through the power of the people’s voice and vote.
My concern is that most Americans are not even thinking about the relationship 
between the military and the people. That point was affirmed for me personally 
in a small way following the Memorial Day service I referred to earlier. After 10 
years of service, I venture to say that most members of the military can be equally 
insensitive to this bond. I know I was. Over the years, there have been a number 
of reasons why I brushed off thinking about the topic myself. The primary reason 
is that I have never had to think about it; during my time in uniform, it appeared 
to me that the civil-military relationship was, for the most part, great. I was 
the recipient of all the accolades and support that my NATO colleague noted 
(leaving aside NASCAR). Another reason is that I have been busy; more than 
a decade of conflict has left the US armed services stretched thin, and has kept 
servicemen and -women in a continuous cycle of combat or training for combat. 
There simply hasn’t been a lot of time to concern myself with civil-military 
relations. The third reason may be the result of responsibility diffusion; I simply 
assumed someone else was taking care of it. To a large degree, someone was: the 
media have been supportive of individuals in uniform during the conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan; citizens on the street often stop to thank the service members 
they meet; and the large body of veterans has been working tirelessly to support 
the troops and maintain the bond. But what happens next?
Disabled veteran, ca. 1943.
Veterans Day ceremonies at 
Arlington National Cemetery, 1978.
African American soldiers return 
home, 1917.
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What will become of civil-military relations when the war in Afghanistan comes 
to a close, and the public face of what was once called the Global War on Terror 
moves to the background of our collective social consciousness? What will 
change as the US military continues to draw down, a process that will further 
decrease the proportion of those in military service to the overall population? 
These shifts have the potential to further decrease public attention to and aware-
ness of both the military as an institution and the men and women in uniform. 
I think this point becomes of increasing concern as the number of veterans who 
provide the critical bridge between citizens in uniform and their civilian coun-
terparts decreases over time.
Is this much ado about nothing? Perhaps. It is highly unlikely that the notably 
strong relationship between US military personnel and the rest of the United 
States will be damaged irreparably, but it is not impossible either—such a situ-
ation occurred in the home country of my NATO counterpart. At this time, it 
also appears unlikely that the media will change its generally favorable coverage 
of the uniformed services. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, there 
was a notable distinction in media coverage between the soldiers, sailors, airmen, 
and marines who were fighting the wars, and the policies that sent them there.10 
When bad things did occur, such as the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq and 
the Robert Bales incident in Afghanistan, the media’s scrutiny focused on the 
individuals and chains of command involved, without vilifying everyone else 
serving in the war zone.11 By contrast, media coverage that came out of Vietnam 
too often overlooked the individual soldiers, or lumped them in with the larger 
problems of that difficult war, and thus gave the public the impression that 
soldiers were part, or even a cause, of the problems. 
The American military, news media, policy makers, and people learned a lot about 
the importance of the civil-military relationship from the Vietnam experience. The 
new and dynamic forms of conflict emerging today, as typified by current events 
in Iraq and Syria, may nevertheless require learning new lessons. Difficult policy 
choices made in highly volatile conflicts are being complicated even further by 
instant, unfiltered global communications. Access to unverified stories across the 
internet could put the public’s image of its soldiers in jeopardy once more. Finally, 
it is true that the nation’s veterans will not vanish overnight, but the fact is that the 
veteran base is not likely to be infused with the large numbers that came out of the 
Second World War and the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam.
The point is this: the odds of a serious disconnect between the military and the 
rest of the country may be low, but the stakes are high. Trust is what is at stake, 
and trust is one of the hardest things to earn but among the easiest to spend. 
The current supportive relationship between the US military and civilians has 
been hard-earned over generations. The concerns voiced by Madison and Adams 
illustrate the distrust of military power that existed when the United States was 
founded. It is easy to take the status quo for granted and assume that the current 
good relationship will remain positive indefinitely, but history has shown us that 
the civil-military relationship is like any other: to be successful, it requires the 
active participation of both partners and the ability of each to trust the other.  
Moving Forward
I am glad that the person who wished me a happy Memorial Day was enjoying 
the holiday and celebrating the freedom that I and my comrades-in-arms have 
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helped to protect through our service; but at the same time, it was apparent that 
they were not giving any thought to the sacrifices that the day commemorated. 
They were not holding up their end of the relationship—but the fact is, neither 
was I. All I managed to mutter in response as I kept walking was “Thanks, you too.” 
Like any relationship, maintaining this connection between the armed services 
and civil society demands effort from both sides. It also takes communication—
some form of dialogue. In retrospect, I should have stopped and politely re-
minded that well-wisher of the actual meaning of the holiday, and of the nature 
of the relationship between those who are protected and those who protect. 
That would have been holding up my end of the bargain. The thought, however, 
never even occurred to me, because I do not normally speak out like that. Like 
I said, prior to this experience, I had never really given any thought to civil-mil-
itary relations here at home, let alone my responsibility in helping to maintain 
that relationship. Until now, I thought that simply putting on my uniform and 
doing my job was sufficient. I don’t know if that is the case anymore. 
To be truthful, it is easier to just go about my business than it is to talk to people 
about what I do and why I do it. There have been times when I have avoided get-
ting into discussions with civilians about military service because, to use a cliché, 
“they just don’t get it.” The list of people who don’t get it has even included some 
members of my family. I don’t expect my civilian counterparts to empathize 
with the intimate details of firefights or what it’s like to be in the middle of a 
battlefield. But I am concerned about their inability to grasp the bigger picture: 
the dynamics of the type of warfare we are engaged in today; how sound bites 
on the news do not capture the whole picture of war; or simply the ins and outs 
of serving in the military today. At times, I have found myself frustrated by 
people—both strangers and people I’ve known my whole life—who have formed 
staunch opinions from those short news clips, or who simply cannot understand 
what life is like for those in uniform. After talking with my colleagues about 
these concerns, I suspect that I am not the only one in uniform who has expe-
rienced these frustrations. What I have since come to realize, and what I want 
to say to my fellow service members, is that bottling up that frustration and just 
walking away is doing nothing to solve the problem. It is certainly doing nothing 
to maintain the larger relationship. 
Communication, it is worth repeating, is critical to positive civil-military rela-
tions in a democracy. Dialogue between citizens who wear civilian clothes and 
those who put on a uniform will continue to be essential going forward. For 
military personnel, this dialogue may occur when you least expect it—perhaps 
on the street right after a Memorial Day service or a Veterans Day ceremony. The 
conversation may be as simple as setting the record straight on the meaning of a 
holiday deeply connected to your profession. It is equally important for active-
duty service members and reservists to reach out and extend that dialogue to 
veterans, because our predecessors in uniform are the most active bridge between 
civilians and the armed forces. What is more, they’ve walked a mile in our shoes, 
and we’ll spend the rest of our lives walking in theirs. 
Closing Thoughts
Although I’ve written specifically about the United States and its military, the 
message of this essay is universal to all democracies that maintain armed forces 
for national defense. The nature of the relationship between the military and the 
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civilian citizenry is a concern shared by most countries of the world. Holidays 
that commemorate the service and sacrifices of a nation’s military personnel offer 
all of that nation’s citizens—those in civilian clothes and those in uniform—a 
rare and welcome opportunity to come together in the same time and space and 
perhaps, in a very small yet very meaningful way, contribute to the vital mutual 
commitment each makes to honor and defend the other. 
For service members from other countries who find themselves in the United 
States on Veterans Day or Memorial Day, I invite you to attend a local service or 
ceremony. You will have a firsthand opportunity to peer a little deeper into an 
important aspect of American culture. You may also have the chance to examine 
the connective tissue that binds our military with our civilian population and 
gain a little insight into a corner of our national psyche that often goes unob-
served by outsiders and even, sometimes, by ourselves. 
Finally, there is something to be said about presence—about being there. I know 
that there is no standard duty day in the military, and when a long weekend 
comes, most of us hit the road without looking back. But if you should happen 
to find yourself sitting around the house on the last Monday in May or the 11th 
of November, it might be worth checking out a service or ceremony in your area. 
Not only is it good civics, but showing our face in the community—a smile, a 
handshake, a conversation—will go a long way toward maintaining the connec-
tion between the 0.5 percent and the 99.5 percent. v
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The “Golden Owl” Returns to Kazakhstan
MAJ Tlek Mirza and LT Ruslan 
Bek, Ministry of Defense, Republic 
of Kazakhstan
The fifth annual international sniper competition, known as 
Golden Owl–2014, took place in June at the Spassk Training Center near the 
city of Karagandy, Republic of Kazakhstan.1 This event was held under the 
auspices of the Central Asia Forum for Sniper Arts, as part of its contribution 
to the global fight against terrorism. The main purpose of the Forum, which was 
created in 2009, is to train members of Central Asia’s security forces to become 
masters of marksmanship.
The first Golden Owl competition saw only three countries take part along-
side Kazakhstan: Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Belarus. Every year since then, the 
number of participants has increased, and the meet now welcomes competitors 
from around the world. The 2014 event, which was organized by Kazakhstan’s 
Ministry of Defense (MoD RK), was larger than any of the MoD’s previous such 
competitions. Forty participants came to Karagandy from seven countries—the 
United Kingdom, Jordan, Kazakhstan, China, Pakistan, Russia, and the United 
States—to show off their skills and ability with sniper rifles over the course of 
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The main requirements were 
not only accuracy in shooting, 
but also proficiency, endurance, 
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orientate in unfamiliar areas.
five days. To prepare, representatives of the MoD RK had participated in marks-
manship courses all over the world and brought back with them a variety of 
exercises to incorporate into the Golden Owl competition.  
The participating national teams fielded competitors from various military and 
law enforcement agencies. Kazakhstan sent three pairs from the regional com-
mands: South, East, and West; one team comprised a sniper pair from Airborne 
Forces; and nine pairs came from the Special Forces of the MoD RK and other 
law enforcement agencies, for a total of 13 two-man teams. Russia sent two 
shooters from a Special Forces brigade of the Armed Forces, stationed at Novosi-
birsk. This year China sent two pairs from special units of the Lanzhou Military 
Region, while the United States sent a pair of competitors from the 2nd Special 
Forces Brigade of the US Central Command. The United Kingdom’s armed 
forces were represented by an intelligence unit of the 160th Infantry Brigade. 
The representatives of Jordan and Pakistan were counterterrorism personnel 
from the various law enforcement agencies of their respective countries. 
Winners were determined in two categories—general and international. The 
general category is for all teams; the international category is for one team from 
each country. Some tests were for individuals, but the final score for such tests 
combined the results for both shooters on a team. To ensure that the judging was 
fair and transparent, the main judge was Major Rukhi Bulgee from the Armed 
Forces of the Republic of Turkey, which had no participants. The judge also had 
to deal with any disputes or concerns that arose during the competition.
Major Bulgee noted, “The fact that I am here is giving us an opportunity to look 
at the real results of the competitors. Attendance at such events by representa-
tives from a neutral side is very important. There is no chance for cheating.”
The participants had to demonstrate their expertise and marksmanship in 16 ex-
ercises during five days, in which the main requirements were not only accuracy 
in shooting, but also proficiency, endurance, strength, concentration, and the 
ability to apply camouflage and orientate in unfamiliar 
areas without any modern navigation technology. The 
exercises included proficiency in shooting at a target at 
unknown distance, shooting at moving targets, shooting 
after running over a long distance on the field, shooting 
from a concealed position, and so on. The task in round 
one, for example, was to push a big 200 kg tank for 20 m; 
the second round required competitors to carry a small 
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20 kg tank for 30 m, then climb a 1.5 m fence, crawl a short distance through a 
tunnel, and finally shoot at a moving target.
The weather in Karagandy can change several times during the course of a single 
day, which complicated things even more for the participants. Some shot in 
calm weather, while others would have to adjust for a constantly shifting, gusty 
wind. The second day of competition was held under a steady rain and the 
sound of thunder. High humidity then gave way to burning heat and occasional 
windblown sand. “It is very cold here in the morning, but in the middle of day 
it is hot,” Captain Abid Zaman of Pakistan said of the ever-changing weather 
conditions. “Such weather is practically impossible to encounter in my country. 
So if my soldiers adapt and learn to fire in such circumstances, this means we 
have become stronger. This is an invaluable experience.”
To ensure that the participants would be comfortable with their weapons, the 
MoD RK allowed each country to bring its own weapons to the competition. 
Because of certain customs rules, policies, and other issues, however, not all of 
the participating countries were able to do so. The Chinese sniper pairs used 
rifles of their own making, which had technical characteristics that were much 
better than the weapons of some other participants. The Pakistani team brought 
a sniper rifle made in Great Britain, called the Accuracy International L96A1; 
ironically, however, the UK team arrived without their own weapons. The 
shooters who needed guns were issued Sig Sauer SSG 3000 rifles by Kazakhstan’s 
MoD. As Jordanian Colonel Wael Al Numan Esayd Davavneh remarked, “Using 
this type of rifle added to the experience. It was the first time we have used the 
Sig Sauer, so it was another challenge for us. Being in these different climatic 
conditions and using a new weapon are going to make us even stronger. We have 
improved because of the experience, and this is why we came here.”
The most difficult stage of the exercises, according to participants, was an 
obstacle course and 5 km run that included orientation in the field as well as a 
camouflage component. In this exercise, which took place at night, participants 
had not only to find the perfect place to set up a con-
cealed fire position, but also to endure harsh weather 
conditions: the night was cold, rainy, and windy. (Some 
participants even drank a little brandy to warm up.) The 
sniper duel exercise, which took place at the shooting 
range on the final day of competition, was the most 
decisive. Teams shot by pairs, and every pair had three 
targets: one small plate and two big poppers. The pair 
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whose popper fell first was the winner. Every sniper pair went up against each of 
the other pairs once, and each of the duels offered a spectacular show of marks-
manship. In some of the matches between international teams, determining the 
winners was very difficult because the time difference between shots was within 
a few tenths of a second. 
At the end of the first day of competition, it was already obvious that the main 
rivalry would be between Kazakhstan’s own teams. The overall prizes were won 
by the Special Forces teams of the MoD RK and other Kazakhstani law enforce-
ment agencies. First place went to a pair from the Special Forces of the MoD RK 
Main Intelligence Agency; the team from the National Security Committee 
“Arystan” service (for counterterrorism) was awarded the silver medals; and by 
a small margin, third place went to the RK State Security Service, which is in 
charge of security for state officials. In the international competition, first place 
went by a wide margin to a pair of snipers from the Main Intelligence Agency 
of the MoD RK, who worked the most harmoniously of any pair throughout the 
competition. Second place went to a pair of marksmen from China. Chinese 
shooters are among the best in the world, as all the competitors saw once again. 
The bronze medals went to representatives of the United Kingdom.
“We are quite satisfied with second place. All of the opponents were strong, and 
the weather was very unpredictable,” noted Lieutenant Zhou Jian of the Chinese 
Liberation Army team. “But this is not the limit. The next time we will prepare 
better, and we will fight for the medals of the highest standard.”
US Staff Sergeant Courtney Daniels in turn noted that he was impressed by the 
variety of individual exercises, which he had never encountered before. “Besides 
the weather and the weapons, we met totally new exercises. Now we know what 
we will need to practice for in the near future, and I would like to say thank you 
very much for these competitions.”
The Russian team didn’t find anything unexpected in this competition; never-
theless, the members were not satisfied by their results. 
“There is nothing new for us here, but we wish we could 
do better. We will tell our guys to pay attention and 
prepare much better for the next competition,” said 
Sergeant Vladimir Saliy of the Russian Army.
To sum up, it is worth noting that the Golden Owl 
competition is only in its infancy. In the future, the MoD 
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RK is planning to increase the number of participants. Observers of the 2014 
competition from Armenia and India have already expressed their desires to field 
national sniper teams for the next Golden Owl in 2016. (In 2015, the MoD RK 
will host a similar competition for Special Forces groups.) The planners hope 
that expansion of the event will enable it to become a platform for counterter-
rorism professionals to find a common language in the fight against global 
terrorism and that the Sniper Art Forum of Central Asia will transform into a 
World Forum for Sniper Arts. v
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This interview is taken from the collection of the Combating 
Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP).1 On 28 March 2014, Lieutenant Colonel 
Chok Dhakal of the Nepalese Army spoke with Amina Kator-Mubarez and Eliza-
beth Skinner about his experiences during Nepal’s recent civil war (1998–2008) 
and the country’s subsequent transition from a monarchy to a republic.2 At the 
time of the interview, LTC Dhakal was completing his master’s degree in Na-
tional Security studies at the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, 
California. 
AMINA KATOR-MUBAREZ: Thank you for sitting down to talk with us. Can you 
start by giving us some background on your experience as a commander during 
the Maoist insurgency?
CHOK BADAHUR DHAKAL: To begin, I have nearly 25 years of experience in 
the Nepalese Army, rising from the rank of 2nd lieutenant to my present rank 
of lieutenant colonel. So I have a range of experience working as a staff officer, 
instructor, and commander. I have participated in several United Nations peace-
keeping missions, and I have done various kinds of military training both within 
and outside Nepal. I am currently here at NPS studying in the master’s program. 
Regarding my command experience, from 2001 to 2002 I was deployed in the 
southern part of my country to fight against the Maoist insurgency. At that time, 
the insurgency was at its peak, and the Maoists were everywhere in the country. 
We were having a hard time just providing security to the population and 
assuring free access to public facilities. At the same time, we were also fighting 
against the Maoists nationwide. Filling the policing role on the one hand and 
doing military operations on the other hand was very challenging. 
From my experience as a commander, I would say you need to think about how 
to use your troops in a combat role, and simultaneously in a supporting role 
to help the local population. It was very difficult for us junior commanders to 
decide how to do it. The troops sometimes needed to go and fight against the 
insurgents, and then those same troops, using the same weapons, and with the 
same training and everything, now had to perform these different roles. Fighting 
the insurgent combatants, and also serving the people and doing the job of 
policing, are completely different things. 
KATOR-MUBAREZ: Did you have a lot of support from the civilian population, 
or was it difficult? Did you pursue propaganda campaigns to get their support?
DHAKAL: This is a very good question. Yes, we did a lot to support the civilian 
population, but it was only from the tactical level, I would say. At the national 
level we were having political troubles, and there was not a stable government 
running the country. But as we deployed on the ground, we had to do something 
to address the people’s needs as well. So we conducted military-civic action side 
Filling the policing role on the 
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by side. We ran the rural hospitals; we went to the schools to build some physical 
infrastructure, for example, toilets and some libraries; we also deployed to pro-
tect and escort public convoys—that was a different and unique part of my job. 
What we know is that if you support local people, that is a good way for you to 
get firsthand information and win support—doing your part and getting infor-
mation in return, and using this same information to help your combat elements 
fight against the Maoists. That was the good part, you know, to have the local 
support. They support you, not in terms of operational requirements, but in terms 
of information requirements. That was good for effective military operations. 
If you can’t gain popular support, then the insurgents will enjoy the popular 
support, and they will be much more effective against the security forces. So you 
need to think about the population first before going into combat in a counter-
insurgency campaign. From my experience, what happened in many places in 
my country was that the local population supported the insurgents. The people 
didn’t give information, didn’t give support, didn’t even speak with the national 
forces; they supported the insurgency. That made it hard for the state forces to 
fight against the insurgency, because the army did not have reliable informa-
tion about the population and wasn’t getting information from them. You 
need information, because they—terrorists or insurgents, however you define 
them—normally look like civilians. They don’t have any specific uniform, they 
don’t carry a weapon openly. They live with the population, they do everything 
within the population, so it is very hard for the security elements to recognize an 
individual as an insurgent or terrorist. 
KATOR-MUBAREZ: Was it difficult for your military officers or soldiers to 
shift mindsets from conducting combat operations to focusing on the civilians, 
working with the civilian population? You said that you were running these 
hospitals and other facilities to try to get support from the civilian population. 
Did your soldiers have a hard time transitioning from fighting insurgents to 
working with civilians? Or were there two separate military groups doing the 
two missions: one dealing primarily with the insurgency and one dealing with 
the civilian population?
DHAKAL: As far as resources are concerned, the military normally is given the 
resources required for military operations, not for the other, population-focused 
efforts. You need different types of resources and different types of skills—dif-
ferent technical skills. So it was very hard to make it happen, but what we nor-
mally did was to use the resources we had for both roles. We had to have security 
units providing security to our own troops, the ones who were conducting the 
population-centric efforts. So this was our first problem. 
Number two was about the insurgents’ linkage with the population. If you 
openly go and do something in a community, there is a danger of being targeted 
by the insurgents because they are already there. It is very difficult to know who 
is there before you. The insurgents are watching you all the time: who is doing 
what, which commander is there with his staff. It was a very, very difficult part of 
military or police work. Even during a military operation, if the insurgents were 
few in number, they could come and pretend to support you along with the real 
villagers. They could learn more about you: what weapon you are carrying, what 
your rank is, and how many troops you have. They can get very close and start 
talking with you, and they like to try to win you over psychologically by helping 
you, providing you with some resources, but you don’t know who they are. 
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Later the insurgents will target you. They now know you very well, they know 
your address and information regarding your family. They can go to the family 
and threaten them. This happened in my country. They would get all the informa-
tion about the troops and then make threatening calls to the families. Like, if you 
don’t stop sending your son to the military, we will come and kidnap you. We will 
even kill you. So this made it very difficult for us to work with the population and 
remain with the population for a very long time. It was very difficult for us to get 
information regarding the Maoists—we didn’t know if a person was an innocent 
civilian or a terrorist insurgent, but they knew very well where we were coming 
from, what weapons we were bringing, what our intention was, what we looked 
like, and how we dealt with the population. If we were doing some population-
centric work and giving out information as part of that work, it could become 
very problematic to then launch an effective combat operation in that same area. 
ELIZABETH SKINNER: As you were preparing to go into the hot part of the war, 
do you feel like you and your troops had the training you needed to conduct 
guerilla warfare among the civilian population? Or did you have to go in with 
what you had and think on your feet?
DHAKAL: It is a very practical question. I would like to tell you what in fact 
happened. Initially, the government mobilized the police force, and they fought 
against the insurgency for five years. The situation went out of control, the 
police couldn’t control the Maoist insurgency, and the government decided to 
mobilize the military, the Nepalese Army. We had enough time to train and get 
resources, but you know, getting resources is not easy. Nepal was having political 
problems at the same time, with the political transition from monarchical rule to 
democracy. So political stability was the question. We were also having problems 
with the economic conditions because the Maoists were conducting physical 
attacks on industry, against the people who were running the businesses. The 
country was not in a position to provide the appropriate level of security to the 
industrial sector. From my perspective I would say we had enough time, but 
the real problem was resources. We lacked the resources, so we were not able to 
address the people’s desperation. They wanted many things to be done by the 
security forces. They wanted to have a good environment to run their schools, 
they wanted to have a good environment to continue their businesses, but the 
problem was that the security forces did not have enough resources or enough 
numbers at the time to tackle the situation. 
SKINNER: In the period right before the assassinations, the fighting was very 
heavy.3 Your forces were under a lot of pressure in the mountainous areas. There 
were reports that civilians were taking a beating as the two forces were coming 
at each other in the villages. Do you think there was training that would have 
helped you and your troops handle that kind of situation better when you were 
in hot combat around the villages? Were there things you think could have been 
done better on the army’s side? 
DHAKAL: Yes. There is always space for improvement, everywhere, for all 
troops. In the beginning, when we deployed against the Maoist insurgency, 
there was a problem of information sharing, not having the correct informa-
tion because we lacked reliable sources to get information. We had to depend 
on captured insurgents or some local villagers to provide us with information. 
Maybe these people have a problem with each other, so somebody tells us, “He 
is a Maoist,” and other people say, “These people are insurgents, these people are 
not supporting you.” So when you have a very short time to deploy, when you 
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go against the insurgents in populated areas like the villages or similar areas, you 
cannot just rely on someone to have correct and valuable information. For that 
reason, yes, I would admit that there was mishandling of the civilian population 
from both sides: not only from the insurgent side, but from the army’s side as 
well. But later, the army started providing training in human rights, on how to 
win the hearts and minds of the people, how to deal with the population, and 
what information to expect from the population. After getting this training, and 
in a little time—say, after 2002—I think the achievement of the army was great.  
Without having information it is like you are walking in complete darkness. You 
can go and use your force, but without any information you can’t do anything 
effectively. The insurgents were in a better position because they knew where the 
opposition political parties were, where the leaders were, and how those people 
supported the government and the security forces. But from the military or 
police perspective it was very difficult to say, this place will be the target, or this 
place will be left for a security operation. It was very difficult to decide where we 
should go, what we should do, what was the main track, or what was the target 
there. As a commander it was very demanding to make decisions for the troops 
on the ground. 
KATOR-MUBAREZ: What do you feel is the current situation now? Do you think 
that the rebel groups are under control, or do they still pose a significant threat? 
DHAKAL: I think it is a very good story. The insurgency ended in 2006, and 
it was ended through a negotiated political settlement. It was a group decision 
that ended the war peacefully. Now the rebel force is a participant in politics. 
They became part of the government and had a prime minister from 2008 to 
2009. They are the largest political party in Nepalese politics. So this is a very 
good part they play. They also did a lot to change Nepalese politics. Nepal, you 
know, was a Hindu kingdom, constitutionally ruled by the king. Now Nepal is 
very much a secular country. We have a republican government that is run by the 
president. I would say that in the political area, that was a very good change. 
Nepal has many different ethnic groups, different minorities. Going back a long 
time, these groups were marginalized by the state. Now these people have started 
demanding their rights, expressing their grievances. That is a good part the Mao-
ists are playing in the country, but the problem is that now we are in the process 
of drafting a constitution. We need to have a new constitution, but the political 
parties are divided. One is very much democratic, and the other is very much au-
thoritarian, I would say. The rebel force is now the major political party—I can’t 
say rebels any more, right? The Maoist party has its own interests, and the other 
democratic parties have their own interests, which lead to much contradiction. 
This has made it difficult to create a new constitution. The political parties are 
still having problems creating a stable government that has a long-term strategy 
for national concerns like the economy, relations with other countries, and 
security policies. There are many things to be decided, so not having the constitu-
tion written on time doesn’t help ensure lasting peace. But, after 10 years of armed 
conflict, it is better to take more time to create a stable, long-lasting constitution 
that will give the country security, peace, and stability in the long run.  
SKINNER: What has the Nepalese Army had to do to integrate former insur-
gents? Has there been a process of bringing in fighters and integrating them into 
the service? Are there many Communists coming into the army and if so, how 
has that process gone?
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DHAKAL: That is a very good question to answer now because the integration 
is already completed. The Nepalese Army now includes former Maoist combat-
ants. They have finished their training and joined the army’s ranks. There was a 
political decision and strong commitment to make that happen, and the former 
combatants now rank from soldier to colonel as part of the Nepalese Army. I 
don’t think we had any problem integrating them into the force. The former 
insurgent fighters did well in training, and we have good relations with them. 
The only problem is political, because the Communists were fighting for the 
rights of the people, and we were fighting to safeguard the rights of the people. 
So the problem was that the political objective was different. The insurgency 
wasn’t simply a fight between the guerrilla fighters and the state security forces, 
it was a fight between political elites, political ideologies. On the one hand, the 
government was fighting to safeguard the population and defeat the insurgency 
in accordance with the existing constitution, under which Nepal was a multi-
party, democratic monarchy. On the other hand, the Maoists were fighting, with 
much popular support, to destroy the established social, political, and economic 
structures and establish Nepal as a socialist people’s republic. Integration of 
the armed forces was one of the provisions of the negotiated political settle-
ment, which has made the army a more inclusive national force. It has members 
from all the different ethnic groups: the people from the south, the north, the 
center—all over. So this is a good part of the story. 
SKINNER: So you feel like that process has gone successfully?
DHAKAL: It has, I would say. I don’t think there is any problem left within 
the military. The military and political leadership is happy to have solved the 
problem peacefully. If the political problems are solved, I don’t think there will 
be any problem within the military. I know the military made a considerable 
contribution to settling this issue. The political leaders prepared the organiza-
tion, prepared the way to integrate, planned how to make things go smoothly. So 
I think the contribution of the military in this regard was great. 
KATOR-MUBAREZ: What would you say has been your most memorable experi-
ence as a military commander? Something that stands out for you.
DHAKAL: I deployed with the UN mission to Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 2000 and 
2001 as an information officer in UNIFIL HQ. At that time there was a problem 
between Israel and Hezbollah. You know, I saw the same thing in my country 
that Hezbollah was doing: using conventional weapons such as missiles against 
the regular armed forces. The difference is that Hezbollah was operating from 
one country against another country and did not enjoy popular support among 
the population from where it was operating. Local people consider Hezbollah to 
be a loyal supporter of the Palestinian cause, not a terrorist group, but outsiders 
call its members terrorists. It can be very difficult sometimes to define who is or 
is not a terrorist, so you need to have a clear-cut definition of what is a terrorist. 
In my country, the state considered the Maoists to be terrorists and mobilized its 
power to defeat them, but the majority of the people supported the Maoists as 
a group that was fighting for the people’s rights and future. Let me give another 
example. Some people still say the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri 
Lanka were freedom fighters, fighting for independence, but from the govern-
ment side, they were terrorists. In the beginning, we also called the Maoists 
terrorists, and there was an anti-terrorist act implemented by the government. 
The United States and India also labeled the Maoists as a terrorist organization. 
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Later, however, the Maoists became a major player in the national politics of 
Nepal. As a junior leader, how do you differentiate between a terrorist and an 
insurgent when they are doing similar things for different causes? Thus it is not 
easy sometimes to define what are terrorist acts and what is guerilla warfare, and 
decide how to deal with each. This is my experience both from within my country 
and from outside.
KATOR-MUBAREZ: You mentioned challenges that the Nepalese military had. 
What do you think are some areas of improvement that the Nepalese Army 
could try to initiate or work on?
DHAKAL: That is always there, you know. 
KATOR-MUBAREZ: Is it a logistical issue, or an issue of training? 
DHAKAL: I would say it is an issue of strategy, of the defense policy and military 
doctrine. Before the civil war, the army was very conventionally trained because 
we thought we didn’t have to do anything different on the domestic front. When 
we deployed our force against the rebels within the country, it was the first 
experience we had with this kind of warfare. So we were not well trained, not 
resourced, and not very well focused to get information regarding the domestic 
situation. To have a better result in the future, I think we need to have more 
focus on the unconventional part. Or else we need to have some separate unit 
to deal specifically with the internal problems. We still have the conventional 
type of force: battalion and brigades with conventional weapons. If some day 
we need to fight against the insurgents again, I think it would be better to have 
different, insurgency-ready military units, and experts to deal with the require-
ments and aspirations of the local populations. If you train your military in 
a conventional way and then fight in an unconventional battle, there will be 
problems. I think we need to have some different units trained for a counterin-
surgency environment, and they need to have different resources to tackle the 
requirements of the local areas. It is very difficult to adjust from seeing things 
in the conventional way to seeing them in the unconventional way. So training 
has to be superior, and the main part is the issue of human rights. The people’s 
rights are always an important issue, so we need to think about them more from 
the beginning. We didn’t have that much detailed training about human rights, 
or training about the population’s concerns during the insurgency. Now we have 
started, I think, to make it better, and we must continue so we will have better 
results in the future.
SKINNER: It sounds like you’re talking about developing something like Special 
Operations forces. Are you getting any help to do that from the United States? Is 
that a process that is being undertaken, or is it still being talked about?
DHAKAL: Yes, Nepal is, you could say, politically in transition, but economically 
not much. We cannot sustain a big army. We need to have external assistance 
to develop a specialized unit to deal with internal security problems. During 
insurgency, we received wide-ranging support from friendly countries such as 
the United States, the UK, India, and China. As for the special security units, the 
United States helped us to establish, train, and equip our Special Forces units, 
such as a Ranger battalion that was stood up during the insurgency. It was a 
great help, and US assistance has continued even post-conflict. We want this to 
continue because we want to have an army that is better trained, more skilled, 
and more professional. To have this, we need to have exposure. I am here at NPS 
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getting my master’s degree because of US military assistance. This kind of as-
sistance plays a great role, not only at the individual level, but also at the organi-
zational level. I now can contribute something to my country in a different way. 
India and China are also helping a lot because, you know, we are sandwiched in 
between India and China. We have good relations and have been getting good 
support from them, both during the conflict and in the post-conflict environ-
ment as well.
KATOR-MUBAREZ: Shifting gears a little bit, how has your experience at NPS 
been? What do you think you will take back with you, since this is your last 
quarter?
DHAKAL: I had the great opportunity to earn master’s degrees in two different 
subjects in my country. You know, the academic process here is very different and 
it’s tough, but it gives you a world class education. It has also kept me busy. It is 
very good: good exposure, good experience, and good knowledge. We have the 
opportunity here to learn more about the world, whatever subject or elective we 
choose. It has been challenging—very busy and difficult to get free time with my 
family, but it has been good. I really enjoyed this experience.
KATOR-MUBAREZ: Are there any last remarks you would like to say or anything 
else you would like to add?
DHAKAL: Thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to come here 
and say something about my experience. What I want to say is that, being a mili-
tary man, you have to be ready not only for fighting, but also for dealing with 
other issues as well. In a period of conflict, don’t only think about using your 
weapon. Think about the people where you are living, and think about their 
problems before using your weapon. Try to find some solution to address their 
problems, address their grievances. We cannot operate in isolation. We are part 
of the civilian society. Again, I would like to thank you so much for providing 
me this forum to speak.  v
ABOUT THE INTERVIEWERS
Amina Kator-Mubarez is a CTAP coordinator, research assistant, and indispens-
able member of the Global ECCO project.
Elizabeth Skinner is the managing editor of the Combating Terrorism Ex-
change and has harbored a keen interest in Nepal’s development for many years.
This is a work of the US federal government and not subject to copyright protection in the United 
States. Foreign copyrights may apply.
Being a military man, you 
have to be ready not only for 
fighting, but also for dealing 
with other issues as well. In a 
period of conflict, don’t only 
think about using your weapon.
Nepal is, you could say, politically 
in transition, but economically 
not much.  We cannot sustain 
a big army.  We need to 
have external assistance.
NOTES
1  The Combating Terrorism Archive Project aims to collect and 
archive knowledge on strategy, operations, and tactics used by 
military and other security personnel from around the world 
in the twenty-first-century fight against global terrorism. 
Collectively, the individual interviews that CTAP conducts will 
create an oral history archive of knowledge and experience in 
counterterrorism for the benefit of the CT community now and in 
the future.
2 This interview was edited for length and clarity. Every 
effort was made to ensure that the meaning and intention 
of the participants were not altered in any way. The ideas 
and opinions of all participants are theirs alone and 
do not represent the official positions of the US Naval 
Postgraduate School, the US Department of Defense, 
the US government, or any other official entity.
3  On 1 June 2001, Nepal’s Crown Prince Dipendra massacred his 
father and mother, the king and queen, along with his brother and 
sister and four other family members, in a sudden rampage that 
remains only partially explained. Dipendra shot himself afterward 
and died three days later. His uncle, the dead king’s younger 
brother Gyanendra, was crowned king but was deposed by popular 





A Line in the Sand
George Lober,  
US Naval Postgraduate School
Lately I have been thinking about evil—not just any evil, but 
the truly horrible acts that some people are capable of, the evil that manifests in 
individuals who delight in taking life, who draw sadistic pleasure from destroy-
ing lives, or who are profoundly amoral and feel no regard for the suffering, pain, 
and emotional devastation they cause others. Most of us, fortunately, will never 
meet the kinds of sadists and psychopaths who make the cheating salesman, the 
unethical commander, or the rapacious venture capitalist seem mild by compari-
son. I’ve been thinking, moreover, about the moral dilemma that arises when we 
try to deal with evil people through less than commensurately evil means.
Foremost in my thoughts is Canadian Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire (now 
retired), who served in 1994 as Force Commander for the United Nations Assis-
tance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).1 In 1994, while UNAMIR was monitoring 
a border dispute between Rwanda and Uganda, Rwanda’s Hutu majority popula-
tion suddenly turned against their Tutsi neighbors with a savagery of bloodlet-
ting unparalleled outside of warfare. At one point in his memoir about Rwanda, 
Shake Hands with the Devil, Dallaire describes an encounter with the individuals 
who were directing the genocide.2 Dallaire had requested the meeting himself, 
under the pretense of wanting to discuss “security,” while secretly hoping to 
also arrange for the safe transfer of refugees from areas under Hutu control. He 
feared that if he could not negotiate such transfers, he would lose any further op-
portunity to prevent the deaths of Tutsis and other innocents still trapped inside 
the Hutus’ territories. At the same time, he was struggling with the mounting 
realities of the genocide: the roadside piles of dismembered corpses; evidence of 
sadistic, mutilating rapes and murders; and the ongoing, relentless slaughter of 
Tutsis and opposing Hutus of every age—all being committed under the direc-
tion of the very men with whom he had asked to meet. 
These men, Dallaire offers, had not been regarded as security threats by UNAMIR 
before the killings began. They’d been seen as little more than “gang leaders, 
punks, [and] criminals.” 3 Now they were responsible for overseeing the butch-
ering of thousands. Knowing that fact, and fearing his possible urge to kill them 
on the spot, Dallaire removed the bullets from his pistol before entering the 
building where the meeting was to occur. As he began shaking hands with each 
man, he noticed that the arm and chest of one of the leaders were spattered with 
dried blood, presumably the blood of one or more Tutsis the leader himself 
had recently hacked to death with a machete. At that moment, it came home 
to Dallaire that he was shaking hands with the very individuals who not only 
acknowledged directing the massacre but were also participating in it. Yet even 
so, he sat down with them and began to negotiate for the possibility of transfer-
ring refugees safely to his control. 
I’ve been thinking about the 
moral dilemma that arises 
when we try to deal with 
evil people through less than 
commensurately evil means.
Fearing his possible urge 
to kill them on the spot, 
Dallaire removed the bullets 
from his pistol before 
entering the building.
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Years later, still haunted by the butchery he had witnessed, Dallaire questioned 
whether, when confronted face to face with that personification of Evil, he 
should have kept his pistol loaded and killed those men.  
It’s an interesting question, isn’t it? Setting aside the likely tactical and strategic 
factors that may have played into Dallaire’s decision—after all, his remaining 
international force was inexperienced, outnumbered, and outgunned (many 
members of his force arrived in Rwanda weaponless), and his overarching goal 
at that time was to find a way to rescue as many of the refugees as possible—one 
might still wonder whether he should have pulled the trigger. The men he shook 
hands with were, by his own description, génocidaires and personifications of 
pure Evil. The notorious Interahamwe militia and other militias they controlled 
would go on to slaughter thousands more innocent men, women, and children. 
It’s possible some of those lives could have been saved if Dallaire had broken with 
his own professional and moral ethics and killed the leaders when he had the 
chance, instead of negotiating with them. Even as he was leaving the meeting, 
Dallaire acknowledges, it was a question that ripped his stomach apart.
Without question, there are many reasons why Dallaire was justified in not 
shooting those men, but his decision demands that we ask how we would judge 
him morally if he had. Most estimates place the number of those killed in the 
attempted genocide at around 800,000, and there’s no doubt 
the men seated before him were happily directing the savagery 
as it took place. But then there is also the annoying fact that 
Dallaire had no legal authority under the UNAMIR mission 
to unilaterally engage the Interahamwe leaders with force. If 
he chose to kill them, would our moral assessment of that 
decision depend on the consequences? If the genocide had 
faltered as a result of being leaderless, even briefly, and if lives 
were saved, would we hold his decision in an approving moral 
light? Or would we still regard it as murder? 
Let me quickly offer a second example of what I’m pon-
dering. Over the last 13 years, some of the officers I teach 
have struggled with a similar moral dilemma. They have, on 
occasion, risked their lives and the lives of their subordinates 
to capture truly evil, sadistic individuals and turn those 
individuals over to host-nation judicial systems, only to learn 
later that those evildoers had been released back into society. 
Sometimes the killers were released because of corruption 
within the judicial system, sometimes because of flawed 
judicial policies and processes, but too often the result was 
that my students and their subordinates had to risk their lives 
to capture the same evil individuals again … and again. As a 
consequence of this frustrating pattern, these officers adopted 
a moral cynicism that led them to question openly whether it 
wouldn’t actually be more moral to summarily execute such 
individuals than to permit them to continue to take innocent 
lives and wreak terror on a society because of a flawed judicial 
Years later, Dallaire questioned 
whether, when confronted 
face to face with that 
personification of Evil, he 
should have kept his pistol 




system. Essentially, they questioned whether the moral code, as prescribed by a 
society or a military organization, shouldn’t bend on rare occasion, to meet the 
extreme circumstances of dealing with the truly diabolical.
Whenever I’m asked that question, and I’m asked it often, I recall the writings 
of war correspondent Christopher Hedges, who believes that war is an addictive 
poison for mankind. Yet in War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning, he writes that 
“the poison that is war does not free us from ethical responsibility. There are 
times when we must take this poison, just as a person with cancer accepts che-
motherapy to live.” 4 Hedges is asserting that despite war’s horrible effects, there 
are occasions when an ethical responsibility demands that a moral nation engage 
in war so as to counter an even greater threat or evil, just as a cancer patient 
consents to engage in debilitating chemotherapy to counter the life-threatening 
effects of the disease. But Hedges then goes further by offering, “There are times 
when the force wielded by one immoral faction must be countered by a faction 
that, while never moral, is perhaps less immoral.” 5 In the world of Chris Hedges, 
no faction that engages in war is ever moral, but some factions are less immoral 
than others, and there unquestionably are times when the truly immoral must be 
countered.
I think of Hedges’s comments in the contexts of both my students’ questions and 
Roméo Dallaire’s dilemma. If, despite Hedges’s personal detestation of war and 
the brutality it unleashes, he is, in fact, speaking a truth regarding the macro level 
of war and the moral responsibility to engage in it when circumstances demand, 
then is it not possible that the same moral responsibility exists at the micro level? 
Can there, in fact, be occasions when the suffering inflicted by the immoral ac-
tions of one individual must be countered by an action that, while never moral, 
is perhaps less immoral?
Even as I write those words, I admit that they make me uncomfortable. I realize 
their implications for my personal moral framework, the introspection and 
reexamination they now demand. I realize the threat such questions pose to my 
obdurate position regarding the role of the rule of law in society and my personal 
reverence for human life. I also am aware, however, of my willingness to accept 
what I’d like to think are well-thought-through, ethical exceptions to both those 
cornerstones of my moral being. Am I willing to consider another: the very 
personal and immediate dilemma faced by my students?
I think I have a lot of work to do to honestly answer my students. I think I need 
to recognize that if I truly revere human life, and if a social or judicial or insti-
tutional system and its policies fail to stop the destruction of that life, I have an 
ethical dilemma. If the terrorists and killers my students capture are repeatedly 
released to kill and terrorize again, I may be at that uncomfortable ethical cross-
roads where consequences intersect with principle. And for me, the way to go 
isn’t clear.
I realize, of course, that my words may elicit a wave of protestations and con-
cerns over what may be perceived as advocacy of vigilantism and the dangers of 
setting an uncontrollable precedent. Surely some will counter with the historic 
objection, “Where do you draw the line?” To each of those concerns I respond 
that I’m not advocating vigilantism in the least; I understand the importance of 
Can there be occasions when 
the suffering inflicted by 
the immoral actions of one 
individual must be countered 
by an action that, while never 
moral, is perhaps less immoral?
If I truly revere human life, and if 
a social or judicial or institutional 
system and its policies fail to 
stop the destruction of that 
life, I have an ethical dilemma.
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precedence but reject the fallacy that exceptions can’t exist. Most importantly, I 
sincerely don’t know where we should draw the line between the truly Evil with 
a capital E, such as those blood-spattered men in Rwanda, and the lesser, but 
still rapacious and lethal, predators of humanity. I don’t know. But I am willing 
to give the question serious consideration. I invite you, if you’re willing, to do 
so as well. v
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NOTES
1 UNAMIR forces under Dallaire’s command were initially 
sent to Rwanda in 1993 to monitor the resolution of a border 
dispute between Uganda and Rwanda. In April 1994, after the 
presidents of Uganda and Burundi died in a plane crash under 
suspicious circumstances, ethnic Hutus began slaughtering 
Rwanda’s ethnic Tutsis in a genocide of horrific proportions. 
The weapon of choice was the machete. Dallaire made desperate 
calls for UN members to support the mission, but UNAMIR 
could not field the mandated number of troops or marshal the 
needed resources to intervene. Despite the efforts of people 
like Dallaire, the UNAMIR mission was a complete failure, 
due primarily to international indifference. See “Rwanda–
UNAMIR Background,” United Nations, n.d.: http://www.
un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirS.htm
2  Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil (Toronto: Random 
House Canada, 2003), 345–47.
3  Ibid., 346.
4 Chris Hedges, War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning (New York: 




Militant Groups in South Asia
Reviewed by Malladi Rama Rao, 
Editor, South Asian Tribune
A tragedy is a tragedy. Words are no compensation for the 
pain inflicted by terrorist bullets. Time can gradually offer some healing 
touch, however, and the reopened Nariman House in India’s financial 
capital, Mumbai, provides a reality check on the events that took place 
there nearly six years ago. 
Nariman House was the headquarters of the Jewish organization Chabad of 
Mumbai. The November 2008 assault on the six-storey building in a narrow 
South Mumbai lane left six people dead, including the center’s directors, 
Rabbi Gavriel Holtzberg and his pregnant wife Rivika. The couple had come 
to Mumbai in 2003 to serve the local Jewish community and through their 
dedication made the center one of the city’s landmarks. When the Nariman 
House opened its doors once again on 26 August 2014, Rabbi Moshe Kotlarsky, 
vice chairman of Merkos L’lnyonei Chinuch, the Jewish group’s education arm 
that helped rebuild the house, said, “We will not fight terror with AK 47s, nor 
with grenades. We will fight by spreading love. I had pledged rebuilding. It’s 
a moment of tears as well as a moment of joy. We will continue their (the late 
couple’s) legacy.” 1
The bullet holes left in the walls where the Holtzbergs died serve as reminders 
of the tragedy that shook Nariman House and six other Mumbai landmarks, 
including the iconic Taj Hotel, the Chhatrapati Shivaji Railway Terminus, 
and the popular Leopold café, for nearly 59 hours from 26 to 29 November 
2008. The perpetrators were 10 youth apparently connected to the Pakistani 
organization, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Enterprising TV journalists brought the 
horrendous mayhem they created “live” to every sitting room across the world. 
The assault left 166 people dead, 28 of whom were citizens of the United States, 
Britain, and nine other countries. Only one gunman, Ajmal Kasab, was caught 
alive. But the real masterminds remain free in Pakistan because the police case 
registered against them under pressure from India and the United States has 
made no headway thus far. On the grounds that Ajmal Kasab was a non-state 
actor, Pakistan barely acknowledged the official notice of his death and refused 
to accept his body.2
A new book throws fresh light on the Pakistani organization, LeT, to which 
Kasab belonged and which allegedly prepared him and his cohort for the assault 
on Mumbai. Militant Groups in South Asia devotes 12 pages to LeT, which also 
styles itself as “Soldiers of the Pure.” The authors are Surinder Kumar Sharma, 
who is an authority on the phenomenon of Islamic militancy in Pakistan and 
Kashmir with all its ramifications, and Anshuman Behera, a specialist in India’s 
internal security who pays particular attention to religious fundamentalism 
and terrorism. Both are associated with the Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analyses (IDSA), a New Delhi–based think tank.
Surinder K. Sharma and 
Anshuman Behera 
New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 
Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analyses (IDSA) 
Hardcover: Indian Rupees 995/- 
302 pages
November 2014
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In their introduction to the section on LeT, the authors 
note, 
The Mumbai carnage of 26 November 2008 
and subsequent designation of Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT—soldiers of the pure) as a terrorist 
organisation by the United Nations (UN) 
and the Pakistani government’s promises to 
control the organisation have not affected 
the activities of the terrorist body at all. On 
the contrary, the activities of the organisation 
have been intensified and extensified, while 
the UN and the Pakistan government remain 
silent. Pakistan’s former President, General 
Parvez Musharraf, banned LeT in January 
2002, along with four other militant groups. 
Within a few months of its ban, it reportedly 
renamed itself Jamaat-ud-Dawa ( JuD—party 
of the calling) (167).
For those who are keeping tabs on the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) phenomenon, the genesis, organizational 
structure, and footprint of LeT will be of interest, in 
addition to the way it changed its colors to survive the 
American ban. This is because, as Sharma and Behera 
make clear, LeT/JuD seeks to establish an Islamic state in 
South Asia by uniting all Muslim-majority regions in the 
countries that surround Pakistan: India, Afghanistan, 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Iran. LeT/JuD further 
pledges “the liberation of Kashmir and the destruction of 
India” (169).
Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, former professor of Islamiat 
(Islamic religious studies) at the University of Engineering 
and Technology in Lahore, established the extremist 
group Markaz-ud Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI) on a sprawling 
campus near Lahore in 1986. MDI initially focused on 
assisting the US-inspired anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. 
After operating under the aegis of the Pakistan-based 
terrorist organization Al Barq for five years, Hafiz and his 
colleagues decided to form LeT “at the behest and with 
the support of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)” (169). 
The authors contend that most of the Islamist and jihadi 
groups working in South Asia are the foot soldiers of ISI, 
which is the security wing of the Pakistan Army. From this 
hypothesis flows their thesis: 
The pre-Al Qaeda and pre-Taliban groups, like 
LeT, were created by state agencies in Pakistan 
for specific objectives, that is, to launch a pro-
tracted proxy war in Kashmir and also to help 
the Americans in their efforts to drive out the 
Soviet forces from Afghanistan through guer-
rilla tactics. These groups largely depended 
on state patronage and funds generously pro-
vided by the US and other Western nations, 
and also West Asian countries like Saudi 
Arabia, through a network of newly created 
banking organisations like the Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International.3 ... The jihadi 
groups in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-
Pak) region largely drew their cadres from 
madrassas and extremist religious groups in 
Pakistan which were amply supported by the 
Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate 
and the Pakistan Army. They relied primarily 
on the sentiments of religious “brother-
hood,” both within Pakistan and outside, 
and their association with the ISI to create a 
chain of madrassas and training grounds for 
recruiting, indoctrinating and training the 
so-called “freedom fighters” (Mujahideen) 
(Introduction, 3–4).
How many jihadi groups are operating in South Asia? 
It is difficult to arrive at a precise number because these 
groups, like amoebas, keep splitting, merging, dividing, 
and reshaping themselves, often because of internal 
personality clashes. Another reason is the operational 
requirements of the ISI, which in turn executes the stra-
tegic goals identified by the Army’s General Headquarters 
(GHQ) Shura of Corps Commanders. According to data 
culled from the South Asia Terrorism Portal, there are 
more than 200 militant groups in South Asia today, but 
not all of them are currently active.4 Sharma and Behera 
have, therefore, chosen some 30 important groups for 
rigorous study, along with a few inactive groups identified 
on the basis of their potential to regroup and get back into 
action. A few smaller groups like Hizb-ul-Tahrir (HuT—
Party of Liberation) are also mentioned because of their 
radical activities.
The book is divided into four parts.
Part A deals with two groups in Bangladesh: Jamaat-
ul-Mujahideen ( JuM) and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami-
Bangladesh (HuJI-B). 
Part B focuses on 18 groups that are operating in India. 
Nine of them, including Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, are located 
in Kashmir; five groups operate in the predominantly 
tribal northeast of India; three Islamist groups, such as Al 
Ummah, have a pan-India footprint; and one left-wing 
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extremist outfit, the Communist Party of India (Maoist) 
(CPI-M), is active in eastern, central, and southern India.
Part C is exclusively about extremist groups in Pakistan. It 
brings into sharp focus the activities of more than a dozen 
groups, including the Pakistan Taliban, the Haqqani Net-
work, LeT, and al Qaeda (AQ), which have been operating 
in Afghanistan and elsewhere beyond the porous Paki-
stani borders. Radical Sunni groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba 
of Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) receive 
notice because they have drawn into their fold a large 
number of the mujahedeen who became unemployed 
after the Soviet flag was pulled down in Kabul in 1989.  
Part D is devoted exclusively to Hizb-ul-Tahrir, which is 
steadily emerging as a new threat with its call to Muslim 
Ummah to unite and reestablish some version of the me-
dieval Caliphate that once ruled across the Mediterranean 
and Middle East. Founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by Sheikh 
Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, a Palestinian radical, HuT, unlike 
ISIS, is not an armed group. There is evidence that HuT 
cadres have infiltrated the Pakistan armed forces. It has 
also entrenched itself in Central Asia, particularly in the 
valuable and contested Fergana Valley, which is shared by 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Today, HuT has a 
presence in 50 countries, including the United Kingdom 
(UK), Germany, the countries of the Middle East, and 
some Southeast Asian countries. In South Asia, it is active 
in Pakistan and Bangladesh.  
In 2003, the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis 
(IDSA), the publisher of the present book (in associa-
tion with Pantagon Press), undertook a study on ter-
rorist groups in Kashmir titled Jihadis in Jammu and 
Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery.5 The present volume goes 
well beyond Kashmir; with data culled from open sources, 
it examines how terrorism has changed in the Indian 
subcontinent since 9/11. Sharma and Behera detail the 
cadre strength, recruitment and training methods, areas 
of operation and influence, alliances/networks, source of 
finances and weapons, and weapons in possession for each 
group, as well as its current status. Thus, their book serves 
as a kind of handbook on terrorist groups for the benefit 
of the initiated and uninitiated reader alike. In this short 
review, I can highlight only some of the more important 
groups and findings from this detailed work.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan Factor
Any study of terrorism in South Asia must undertake a 
critical examination of the socio-political environment 
in Pakistan. Sharma and Behera do so within the context 
of the groups in their study that are based primarily in 
Pakistan. The authors describe how many of these groups 
receive active or passive help from the agencies embedded 
within the Pakistani military and security establishment 
to carry out destabilizing activities in the region. This is 
“a suicidal strategy” according to the authors, but they 
believe it is perpetuated by Pakistan’s perceived grievances 
vis-à-vis India. “Unfortunately, despite the recognition 
at very top levels that the blow-back effect of nurturing 
non-state terror outfits has been disastrous for Pakistan, 
there has not been any significant revision of this policy of 
nurturing terror groups for use against India” (2).
The authors’ take on the group Tehreek-e-Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP, or Pakistan Taliban), and the Haqqani 
Network is also interesting. 
The TTP has grown to be a serious threat to 
Pakistan as it has spread its network beyond 
FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Area]. 
Its presence in Punjab and in Karachi has 
been a cause of serious concern to the security 
forces. ... On 28 December 2012, the TTP of-
fered to hold talks with the government but 
put a condition that it would not lay down 
its arms until the implementation of their 
version of Sharia in the country. ... [Pakistani 
Prime Minister] Nawaz Sharif, while talking 
to newly elected members of his party, said 
that “we should take the Taliban offer of talks 
seriously” (213). 
On the Haqqani Network, which Washington sees as a 
major problem once US troops finish withdrawing from 
Afghanistan, the authors make the following observation:
In spite of the US declaring the group as a ter-
rorist organisation and the group’s addition 
to the UN blacklist, there is no concrete proof 
that the Pakistan government has taken any 
action against the group. ... 
It is unlikely that the sanctions will have 
a major effect on the militant activities 
of the outfit. This is because most of the 
funds collected are transferred through 
hawala (non-banking channels) or carried 
by human couriers. Further, the command 
of the network is now in the hands of Sira-
juddin [Haqqani, son of the founder], who 
is believed to be one of the most strongly 
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committed Islamists, unlike his father, whom 
the US has not added to the list of terrorists. ...
Among the various sections of Taliban, the 
HN is known to be the most conservative 
and opposed to any idea of reconciliation. ...  
In case of any reconciliation, the Haqqanis 
are likely to stay out and push for a military 
takeover of Kabul depending on the ground 
situation and if it suits, Pakistan intelligence 
agencies may help them in their military 
adventure (165).6
After the 9/11 attacks, the Haqqani Network became 
more important than any other militant group to the 
development and sustainment of AQ and the global jihad. 
There is a long write-up on the Indian Mujahideen (IM) in 
the chapter on Islamist groups in India with a pan-India 
footprint.7 The IM has been held responsible for many ter-
rorist strikes across India in cities like Jaipur, Ahmadabad, 
Pune, and Hyderabad since 2008. The United States has 
added the IM to the list of foreign terrorist organizations, 
as well as to the list of specially designated global terrorist 
entities.
Under the heading “Alliances and Network,” the authors 
write, “The arrest of Abu Jundal and Fasih Mohammad 
from Saudi Arabia has revealed the IM connection with 
the Pakistan-based terrorist group, LeT” (130). Notwith-
standing an element of fatigue in the post-9/11 war against 
terror, the authors note that India is benefitting from 
increasing international cooperation in counterterrorism 
operations. 
The book has a mandatory chapter on AQ, given that the 
group’s presence is strongly felt in South Asia. It has a 
foothold in some 100 other countries as well, either on 
its own or in league with a local group. AQ is the most 
organized, linked, and networked terrorist group in 
the world. Another important group that has close ties 
with AQ is LeT. “The LeT commander Zaki-ur-Rehman 
Lakhvi’s association with the AQ is very special as he is the 
brother-in-law of Abu Abdur Rahman, one of the depu-
ties of bin Laden. In the immediate post-9/11 period, after 
NATO forces attacked Afghanistan, it was gathered by the 
intelligence agencies that new recruits of AQ were trained 
in the LeT training camps” (153–54).  
Sharma and Behera share the general perception that 
the killing of Osama bin Laden by US security forces 
in 2011 “weakened the strength of the AQ central to a 
considerable extent” (156). Yet they hold the view that 
the allied AQ cells in various parts of the world have been 
getting stronger thanks to internet-based propaganda 
that has boosted operations, fundraising, and cadre intake 
from Western countries. The authors put the number of 
AQ-related websites at a whopping 5,600. 
In the Indian sub-continent, the AQ is looking apparently 
weak. But it is not out of the scene. Militant outfits like 
the Haqqani Network, TTP, LeT and a few others are 
of major help to the AQ in sustaining its strength and posi-
tion. As the US prepares to withdraw its security forces 
from Afghanistan in 2014, one should not be surprised to 
see the AQ becoming more active and strong in the years 
to come (156).
Because I began this review with the LeT attack on 
Mumbai, it is fair to revisit the chapter on Lashkar-e-
Taiba. The LeT runs a number of training centers in 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan, and 
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Its objective is to have 
an office and a center in every district of Pakistan. Three 
other LeT-related nuggets from Sharma and Behera’s book 
should be cause for alarm. First is LeT’s linkages with 
Chechen militants. Shamil Basayev, the Chechen rebel 
leader, was trained at LeT’s Khost (Afghanistan) camp in 
1994; he later stayed at LeT’s Muridke campus. Second, 
LeT is actively involved in supporting the Muslim resis-
tance in Bosnia, while raising funds and building sleeper 
cells in countries such as Spain and Germany. Third, LeT 
has recruited several persons from the United States and 
trained them at its camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan 
since 1989 (175–77). 
“Unlike the Al Qaeda, which is solely dedicated to jihad, 
the LeT complements ‘armed struggle’ with education—
da’wah and jihad—a combination which makes the LeT a 
‘long distance runner’ in the field of jihad,” write Sharma 
and Behera (169). “The outfit has more than 3,000 offices 
across Pakistan and over two dozen launching camps for 
militants along the Line of Control (in Kashmir)” (171).
The authors offer insights into the genesis, history, ide-
ology, agenda, and leadership of each group covered in 
this book, to “make the reader aware of the socio-political 
conditions as well as the ideological motivation that gave 
rise to the group” (9). Clinical precision in the details and 
an absence of patriotic blinkers are a big plus to the nar-
rative. My main criticism is that some tight editing could 
have enhanced its readability. Furthermore, with their 
tight focus on Pakistan-based and India-centric groups, 
the authors pushed the extremist group Hizb-ul-Tahrir 
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literally to the last seven pages of the book. This radical party deserves closer 
examination because it is deadlier than ISIS and has declared Pakistan to be 
wilayah—a place suitable for the assumption of power. The authors may want to 
fill the gaps in their discussion of HuT in a subsequent edition of the book.
These minor criticisms aside, this book is an important contribution to the 
scholarship on regional terrorist groups, some of which have organic linkages 
with extremists in the Middle East, including ISIS. It should be very useful to 
counterterrorism experts and anyone who wishes to better understand the highly 
complex and increasingly volatile terrorist situation in South Asia. v
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THE MOVING IMAGE
The Potential of Transnational Cinema to Counter Islamic Extremism
LTC Samuel W. Bettwy, US Army 
Reserve
It is well recognized among US strategists and policy makers 
that the so-called War on Terror is a “war of ideas” in which the Western world 
needs to “tell its story better.” 1 Much has been written about the use of new 
social media such as Twitter to drive and shape political narratives,2 but history 
shows the potential “soft” power of propaganda films as well. Today, it seems 
to be a foregone conclusion that in Western democracies, cinema is the sole 
province of commercial filmmakers who are driven not by politics but by profits 
and therefore the appetites of their audiences.3 This article revisits literature on 
the propaganda value of cinema and suggests that the emergence of transna-
tional filmmaking presents an opportunity for greater collaboration between US 
and Middle Eastern filmmakers to produce films designed to unify moderate 
Muslims against Islamic extremist messages4 and perhaps even to dissuade some 
of those extremists from their incorrect interpretations of Islam. 
Filmmakers, acting independently, tend to incorporate their own national biases 
into their work, as can be seen in many Western anti-terrorism films. Such films 
appeal to like-minded audiences, but very few are designed specifically to influ-
ence Muslim audiences. Western films instead tend to alienate these audiences 
by depicting the Islamic extremist as an irrational “other” to be dominated by 
Western heroes, conflating Muslims with Arabs and terrorists, and representing 
Israel as the victim of Palestinian terror.5 But American filmmakers have an 
authentic story to tell that could resonate with the Muslim world—namely, 
the unique ability of US culture and society to assimilate immigrant Muslim 
populations.6 Americans are also especially religious compared to other Western 
countries, but American filmmakers have been reluctant to address religion, and 
“the relationship between violence” and fundamentalist Islam.7 
Egyptian and Algerian films are potentially more persuasive at reaching Muslim 
audiences because they offer more subtle depictions of Islamic extremists and 
terrorists as complex individuals who are misguided, and they tend to justify 
Palestinian violence against Israel (as do Palestinian films, naturally).8 Euro-
pean filmmakers have begun collaborating with Middle Eastern filmmakers to 
produce films in response to Islamic fundamentalism, and the US government 
should consider encouraging US filmmakers to do the same.
This article describes the historical use of films as propaganda and their effec-
tiveness and recommends that the United States consider promoting and even 
funding collaboration between US and Middle Eastern filmmakers to produce 
anti-terrorism films for consumption by foreign audiences. Documentaries are 
worth considering, but the most effective types of films appear to be narratives 
(feature films and television miniseries) in which ideas are more subtly, even-
handedly, and therefore persuasively delivered. 
A Brief History of Cinematic Propaganda
Literature on the history of propaganda films shows that the United States 
cannot rely on commercial US filmmakers acting independently to produce 
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narratives that will counter Islamic extremism. In a time of war, US filmmakers 
tend to produce patriotic films that unify Americans and their allies but alienate 
others. And in peacetime, they tend to depict US society as depraved, which 
plays into the hands of enemies. Collaboration among international filmmakers, 
especially European and Middle Eastern filmmakers, has resulted in a “transna-
tional” narrative that is more balanced and genuine and therefore more palatable 
and even persuasive to a wide range of audiences worldwide. 
Feature films were first made as early as 1895, and their effectiveness as propa-
ganda improved with the advent of sound in 1927.9 Mustafa Özen describes 
the Ottoman Empire’s early use of films as propaganda during World War I.10 
Post–World War I commercial war films were, in effect, propaganda films that 
justified isolationism and, later, appeasement because they conveyed a message to 
the public that, apart from the heroism of the fighting man, the Great War was 
a “political catastrophe.” 11 Vladimir Lenin, Josef Stalin, and Leon Trotsky took 
control of the early Soviet cinema as propaganda “to implement a proletarian 
and atheist culture,” 12 and the 1925 Soviet silent film Battleship Potemkin13 is 
cited as an effective propaganda film against the former Tsarist regime (and 
any lingering royalist sentiment among the population).14 In 1933, the British 
Film Institute was founded to promote the use of film for propaganda purposes 
throughout the Empire,15 including the Bantu Educational Kinema Experiment 
(1935–1937), in which British films were produced to acculturate Africans in East 
and Central Africa to capitalism and Western society.16 
In 1935, Hitler commissioned the brilliant female director Leni Riefenstahl to 
glorify him and the Nazi regime in Triumph of the Will,17 and five years later, his 
propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels commissioned the 1940 German anti-
Semitic propaganda film Jud Süss.18 
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In response, England produced propaganda films that “successfully appealed to 
the interests of American audiences” 19 to draw the United States into the war 
against Germany “with depictions of the brutality of the Gestapo.” 20 A good 
example is the 1941 British film Forty-Ninth Parallel,21 in which Laurence Olivier 
renders a cartoonish performance as a Quebecois who is murdered by invading 
Germans. The British also used propaganda films to gain the confidence and 
support of their West African colonialists. These films, transported by jeep and 
riverboat into remote areas, emphasized “the power and valour in combat of 
imperial military units, including the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy.” 22 
In 1942, the US Office of War Information (OWI) was established,23 and the 
mission of its movie-review unit, the Bureau of Motion Pictures, was to influ-
ence the production of commercial films to promote the war effort to American 
audiences.24 The Bureau also selected, acquired, and produced films for foreign 
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and valour in combat of 
imperial military units.”
distribution to 85 countries.25 It collaborated with foreign governments and 
private organizations to tailor films for specific countries, “suggesting ways in 
which a film could deliver stronger win-the-war messages.” 26 Some notable 
commercial products are the 1942 films Blondie for Victory and Star Spangled 
Rhythm,27 which promoted volunteerism to support domestic war efforts; 
Casablanca (1942),28 which portrayed the evils of the Germans in occupied 
French territories; and Mission to Moscow (1943),29 which glorified US ally Stalin. 
In 1943, Congress discontinued funding OWI, and the movie-review unit was 
shut down.30 
After World War II, the United States Information and Educational Exchange 
Act of 1948 established a bureaucracy (the USIE) for the management of 
exchange programs in arts, education, and culture.31 Despite the proven success 
of feature films, the USIE produced and commissioned only documentary films, 
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and by 1951, it claimed over 400 million viewers per year. The films highlighted 
Americans’ high standard of living and the United States’ leadership in science, 
technology, and industry. The purpose was “to convince foreigners of their 
‘own potentialities as individuals and nations.’ ” 32 Mobile projection units were 
dispatched to remote locations, especially in South America and Africa,33 where 
the documentaries were very well received, primarily because of the novelty of 
cinema in rural areas.
Due to the perceived propaganda value of documentaries, the United States 
continued their production during the entirety of the Cold War.34 In 1952, Presi-
dent Harry Truman consolidated all of the government’s overseas film activities 
within the International Information Administration (IIA),35 and in 1953, under 
President Dwight Eisenhower, the responsibilities of the IIA were transferred to 
the secretary of state under the newly created US Information Agency (USIA).36 
The USIA oversaw radio stations like Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty. 
In 1956, the USIA introduced documentaries designed to fight the Cold War by 
telling “the world about peace and the dignity of the individual.” 37 Domestic 
distribution of the films was initially prohibited because this “US Government 
agency should not be able to brainwash Americans or put things out there that 
would not be considered objective information.” 38 (Apparently there was no 
such quibble regarding foreign audiences.)
During the John Kennedy presidency, the USIA’s film program flourished under 
Hollywood producer George Stevens, Jr., who commissioned documentary films 
designed to reinforce the “ideological agenda and foreign policy purpose of the 
United States.” 39 The USIA favored short-form documentaries and produced 
thousands of them because they “present a point of view quickly and dramati-
cally.” 40 But “short subjects” were falling out of fashion, no longer shown before 
the main feature in movie theaters, and the USIA lost influence over the produc-
tion of commercial films.41 
Because of the United States’ preoccupation with the Cold War, counterter-
rorism did not become a high priority until the 1990s.42 In 1993, “USIA Director 
[ Joseph] Duffey called for the country to engage the world on issues of ‘the 
economy, the environment, drugs and terrorism.’” 43 But the perceived nature 
and threat of terrorism was not enough to cause a resurgence of public diplo-
macy, and the USIA was dismantled in 1999.44 Public diplomacy did not end with 
the demise of the USIA, but efforts were less centralized, and the governmental 
production of documentary films ended. 
The 9/11 attacks inspired a fresh round of commercial anti-terrorism, pro-
Western films. As Motion Picture Association of America president Jack Valenti 
stated, “We are not limited to domestic measures. The American entertainment 
industry has a unique capacity to reach audiences worldwide with important 
messages.” 45 At the outset of the US military involvement in Iraq and Afghani-
stan, “the film divisions of the major media conglomerates expressed their 
eagerness to become part of the war effort.” 46 
With a propaganda strategy “aimed at terrorists rather than Islam in general,” 47 
President George W. Bush established the Office of Global Communications,48 
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which focused on radio and television programming.49 The Office promoted 
television programs that focused on Muslim life in the United States, but many 
TV stations in Islamic countries refused to air the programs.50 VOA was expanded 
to broadcast radio programs in Afghanistan, while countermeasures were 
taken against the Taliban that included the bombing of its radio station Radio 
Shariah.51 
Currently, the secretary of state and the Broadcasting Board of Governors 
remain authorized to use appropriated funds “for public diplomacy informa-
tion programs … intended for foreign audiences … through press, publications, 
radio, motion pictures, the Internet, and other information media, including 
social media.” 52 The State Department exercises this authority regarding mo-
tion pictures through its American Film Showcase, which coordinates with 
US embassies to sponsor workshops with emerging filmmakers, youth groups, 
and leaders of nongovernmental organizations to address local issues through 
cultural exchanges.53
Effectiveness of Cinema as Propaganda
There are no useful data on the effectiveness of cinema as propaganda. The USIA’s 
primary performance measure was the size of its audiences, which is a measure 
of success used by commercial film producers.54 But Hollywood is trying only to 
strike an emotional chord with audiences; it is not often trying to change their 
hearts and minds. The USIA may have dazzled millions of unsophisticated foreign 
viewers with the new technology of filmmaking, but there is no evidence docu-
menting what effect, if any, the substance of the films had on their points of view.
Subjective, qualitative assessments are available, but they may be biased with 
over-optimism or wishful thinking. For example, British information officers 
judged their World War II propaganda films to be effective in “mobilizing 
people to the war effort;” 55 Congress expressed its approval of USIA documen-
taries by continuing to fund them;56 Jackie Kennedy wrote to pioneer television 
journalist Edward R. Murrow, “You made the world look at us in a new way;” 57 
and the April 1966 issue of Newsweek hailed the “soft policy” films of the USIA.58 
But there are no studies, performance data, or other concrete criteria to back up 
these opinions. 
James Combs and Sara Combs contend that, despite the high quality of USIA’s 
documentaries, “Hollywood was the chief source of images of America for 
foreigners. This turned out to be the best propaganda the government could 
wish for—messages that flaunted American affluence, freedom, and vitality.” 59 
They cite as examples of effective propaganda feature films That Hamilton 
Woman60 and Mrs. Miniver. Mrs. Miniver “promoted positive representations 
of British people and the national struggle against Fascism.” 61 Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill reportedly said the film helped the war effort “more than a 
whole flotilla of destroyers could.” 62 President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered 
“propaganda leaflets with the vicar’s stirring sermon dropped over cities in Oc-
cupied Europe.” 63 Wilson P. Dizard, a retired Foreign Service officer, wrote that 
“arguably movies were the most potent mass media instrument developed in the 
twentieth century—and the United States led the world in exploiting it through 
Hollywood films.” 64 
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In his extensive survey of propaganda films of the Soviet Union (1917–1928), 
Germany (1933–1945), and England (1938–1945), film historian Nicholas Reeves 
argues that documentaries are not effective at shaping public opinion65 but 
acknowledges the possible propaganda value of feature films. He states, “There 
can be little doubt that, in contrast to all the other examples of [documentary] 
film propaganda that we have discussed, [feature] films produced in Britain 
during the Second World War did achieve much success.” 66 Feature films can 
have propaganda value, but the conditions have to be just right. Done incor-
rectly, they can be ineffective or, worse, counterproductive. 
Because they are effective at solidifying or shaping public opinion, feature films 
can stir up hatred. D.W. Griffith’s 1915 feature film Birth of a Nation67 is cited 
as an embarrassing example of a film that was effective in carrying “a virulent 
message of racism, leading to a revival of the KKK [Ku Klux Klan—a militant 
white supremacist group that arose following the US Civil War] in the 1920s.” 68 
Totalitarian regimes have also recognized the propaganda value of feature films 
to stir up both ultra-patriotism and hatred of others, which is a plot point in 
the 2009 Quentin Tarantino anti-Nazi film Inglourious Basterds.69 Jud Süss70 has 
been cited as “one of the most notorious and successful pieces of antisemitic film 
propaganda produced in Nazi Germany.” 71 
Many modern commercial US films are likely counterproductive as propaganda 
in foreign countries because they focus on the negative aspects of American 
society. Self-criticism can be an effective tool of persuasion for foreign audiences, 
but the airing of “dirty laundry” is easily misunderstood and can be used by for-
eign governments as an informational weapon against the United States. During 
the 1960s, some in Congress questioned the wisdom of airing our civil rights 
problems on film.72 At the 1970 Sorrento Film Festival in Italy, President Richard 
Nixon’s USIA director Frank Shakespeare lamented the vision of America 
in Hollywood films, where “most of the [Hollywood] films deal with social 
aberration in American society and tend to create the illusion … that we are a 
purposeless society dedicated to violence and vice.” 73 As Bernard Rubin wrote in 
1971, “Motion pictures, shown around the world in theaters or on television, are 
often condemned for introducing noxious social ideas and, by repetition of these 
themes, forming bases for hatred between men and nations.”74 In 1993, President 
Bill Clinton’s USIA director Joseph Duffey bemoaned the fact that commercial 
media represented the United States as a “culture of instant gratification.” 75 
The State Department therefore mistrusts directors like Quentin Tarantino 
and favors directors like Steven Spielberg.76 According to media scholar Yosefa 
Loshitzky, Spielberg’s Munich77 was “Hollywood’s ultimate Zionist apology, 
perpetuat[ing] the myth of Israel’s unchallenged moral superiority.” 78 
All of these assessments about the propaganda value of films concern the solidi-
fying or shaping of latent public opinion. But films may also have the potential 
to persuade or dissuade. Josef Stalin is quoted as telling a visitor from the United 
States, “If I could control the medium of American motion pictures, I would 
need nothing else to convert the entire world to Communism.” 79 As discussed in 
the following section, Egyptian and Algerian filmmakers have been producing 
films since the early 1990s to criticize Islamic fundamentalists and educate 
Middle Eastern audiences on the true, nonviolent precepts of Islam. Many such 
films are also critical of globalization and the West, but they denounce violence 
as a viable solution. Egyptian and Algerian filmmakers have also collaborated 
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with European filmmakers to produce even more persuasive, cross-cultural films, 
which are known in film studies as “transnational” films. 
Transnational Anti-terrorism Cinema
As Combs and Combs point out, propaganda is less effective when it is easily 
recognized as propaganda. “When propaganda is obvious, it can be ignored as 
audiences suffer through it awaiting the next battle scene.” 80 The most effective 
propaganda is “oblique and covert, interwoven in the fabric of a movie in a 
somewhat obscure fashion but apparent enough to have an impact without en-
countering … resistance” from the audience.81 As Peter Peterson of the Council 
on Foreign Relations writes, “The credibility of an American message will be 
enhanced significantly when it does not appear unilateral.” 82 For this reason, 
documentaries are probably the least effective form of propaganda, just as Reeves 
concluded. Documentaries are generally viewed and accepted by those who are 
already sympathetic and resisted by viewers, if any, who hold opposing views.83 
There is also the problem of communicating to a foreign audience.84 As an article 
in the October 2010 issue of Entertainment Diplomacy stated, “Film can be a 
tricky medium for an outsider to manipulate,” 85 and there is a natural mistrust 
of a governmental role in communications.86 A transnational film, however, 
can be so internationally collaborative that it becomes difficult to determine 
its national origin.87 The degree to which a film is transnational can be assessed 
according to the following attributes: realism, stories based on real-life events, 
intercultural dialogue, multiple native-spoken languages, international settings 
and filming locations, diasporic and exilic themes, narratives about globalization, 
international stars, and most importantly, international collaboration between 
or among filmmakers.88
Carlo Testa, a professor of comparative literature, examined several Italian films 
on left-wing terrorism from 1971 through 2002 and determined that the most 
persuasive condemnations of terrorism were found in films with universal, as 
opposed to parochial, themes.89 Cinematic exchange results in a hybridization of 
ideas and approaches, so transnational films tend to carry universal themes that 
will be more likely to reach and resonate with foreign audiences. 
Since the mid-1990s, Egyptian and Algerian cinema has challenged Islamic 
fundamentalism, which is viewed by Cairo as a threat to Egyptians’ way of life.90 
In 1994, Egyptian filmmaker Nader Galal made The Terrorist, which is said to 
be the first Egyptian film to denounce Islamic terrorism.91 The story is about an 
Islamic extremist who evades law enforcement by living with a modern Muslim 
family. After seeing how they live, he has doubts about his extreme views of 
Islam. The Egyptian Minister of Information praised the film for revealing “the 
internal contradictions within the terrorist movement” and for showing that 
“whenever anyone is allowed to see society clearly, they give up extremism.” 92 
Many Middle Eastern anti-terrorism films also criticize globalization (closely 
associated with the West), which is perceived to be an underlying cause of 
terrorism. In his contribution to the collaborative film September 11, Egyptian 
director Youssef Chahine criticizes both Islamic fundamentalists and the United 
States, arguing that the United States is responsible for the 9/11 attacks because 
it created the monster that attacked it.93 “Americans decide who the terrorist is,” 
says Chahine (played by Nour El-Sharif ) in his film.94 In the French-Egyptian 
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collaboration The Other (1999),95 Chahine depicts poor and middle-class Egyp-
tians as victims of both globalization and Islamic terrorism through star-crossed 
lovers Adam and Hanane, who are a modern-day Egyptian Romeo and Juliet. 
The US government may be reluctant to promote the production of films that 
criticize the United States, but as security studies expert Michael Mazarr suggests, 
to be effective, anti-terrorism films should “serve up strong critiques of US culture 
and policies, so long as the proposed remedies are nonviolent.” 96 And strategist 
Amy Zalman writes that “the United States will be well served … by learning to 
see itself as others see it in action … in shaping its end of a global dialogue.” 97
There are also several examples of collaboration between European and Middle 
Eastern filmmakers to produce transnational films that express a distrust of 
Islamic fundamentalism, the West, and globalization. In Bab El-Oued City 
(1994),98 which is a French-German-Swiss-Algerian collaboration, Algerian 
filmmaker Merzak Allouache follows the conflict between a young Algerian 
man and local Islamic fundamentalists, hinting that the fundamentalists are 
supported by corrupt government officials.99 Before he is driven out, the local 
imam tells the fundamentalists, “Violence begets violence. Islam is a religion 
of tolerance, against violence.” At the same time that this film criticizes Islamic 
fundamentalism, it associates Western influences with decadence and downfall. 
Closed Doors (1999),100 the result of French-Egyptian collaboration, is “oriented 
to audiences and contexts of production outside the Middle East.” 101 Egyptian 
filmmaker Atef Hetata depicts how Mohammad, a young, sexually repressed 
male growing up in a poor section of Cairo, is singled out and recruited to study 
at a local madrassa that espouses the creation of an Islamic nation. In the French-
Algerian collaboration Rachida (2002),102 a female schoolteacher in Algiers 
defies terrorists who attempt to murder her for refusing to plant a bomb at the 
school where she teaches. 
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The Academy Award–nominated Dutch-Palestinian-Israeli-German-French 
collaboration Paradise Now (2005) is a strongly transnational film. Dutch-
Palestinian director Hany Abu-Assad presents a balanced narrative about two 
Palestinian friends who are recruited to conduct a suicide bombing mission in 
Tel Aviv. The Arabic language film is shot on location in Nablus and Tel Aviv. 
After much soul-searching, one of the would-be suicide bombers backs out, and 
the other decides to go forward with it. Palestinians in the West Bank criticized 
the film for portraying the suicide bombers as “less than heroic and godless, 
hesitant in their missions,” 103 while Israelis criticized the film because it would 
“encourage more terrorist attacks all over the world.” 104 
A rare example of a US film that addresses Islamic extremism is the 2005 
diasporic narrative The War Within,105 in which screenwriter Ayad Akhtar, an 
American of Pakistani descent, employs extensive intercultural dialogue about 
Islamic faith in a story about Pakistani Hassan and his unwavering, successful 
plan to detonate a suicide bomb in New York City’s Grand Central Station. 
Hassan was radicalized by his prison cell mate after American agents kidnap him 
from the streets of London and hand him over to Pakistani agents, who torture 
him for two years. After his release, Hassan goes to the United States to carry 
out a suicide bomb attack. The film is daring for a US film because it addresses 
the clash between moderate and radical Muslims and educates the viewer about 
the difference between greater jihad (the struggle within) and lesser jihad (the 
use of violence). 
Conclusion and Recommendation
There is reason to believe that films, when properly made, can be a powerful 
propaganda tool to solidify the unity of moderate Muslims in the Middle East 
and perhaps even to help disabuse Islamic extremists of their misperceptions 
that Islam justifies the use of violence. The most effective vehicles for conveying 
this message in films to target audiences are probably feature films and television 
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miniseries.106 Whereas “most European states have been very reluctant to … 
directly challenge the extremist ideology,” 107 the United States has the moral 
authority to do so. During the Cold War, the USIA challenged communism by 
producing films that vaunted American values and achievements. The US govern-
ment should consider the promotion of films that challenge Islamic extremism 
by emphasizing America’s strong religious heritage, its open pluralistic society, 
and its successful assimilation of Muslims. The government should also consider 
the promotion of collaborative film projects between US and Middle Eastern 
filmmakers. Such collaboration is likely to result in a persuasive cross-cultural 
product that will help to unify moderate Muslims and counter the violent 
propaganda of Islamic extremists. 
Performance data and measures should also be developed to determine the ef-
fectiveness of films in changing the knowledge, opinions, and attitudes of foreign 
audiences. Shortly before its demise in 1999, the USIA set forth some “examples 
of data sources” in its USIA 1997–2002 Strategic Plan “to determine whether prog-
ress is being made in achieving [its] performance objectives.” 108 One data source 
that related directly to films was the “results of foreign audience research.” Today, 
17 years later, obtaining these data is much easier given the dramatic expansion 
of the internet, with broader access to films and the ability of audience members 
and critics to write online reviews, such as those found on Rottentomatoes.com 
and numerous blogs. Such instant feedback can help US strategists analyze and 
assess the effect that anti-terrorism films are having on audiences. v
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